ANALYSIS
OF THE TALENTS & CHARACTER OF BONAPARTE

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B.R.'R A.S.

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NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

AN ANALYSIS

OF

THE TALENTS AND CHARACTER

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE;

A GENERAL OFFICER.

26963

From zeal, or malice, now no more we dread,
For English vengeance wars not with the dead.
A generous foe, regards with moist'ning eye
The man whom fate has laid, where all must lie.—JOHNSON.

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PREFACE.

SOME books are written to please every body and instruct nobody; others to instruct every body and please nobody; but to which class of productions the "Analysis of the Character and Talents of Napoleon Bonaparte" may belong, it is not for the Author to say.

The intention certainly is to instruct, by an endeavour to come at a knowledge of the component parts of the character of one of the most extraordinary men that ever existed.

So many circumstances have combined to throw a false glory over those transactions in which he was the principal actor, that every thing should be done that can be done to come at the truth.

If it should be said that it is too early—the answer is ready. It never can be too early. From whom do the best historians obtain their most valuable materials? From

cotemporary writers most certainly. Time produces indeed many important documents that cannot be obtained by cotemporaries, but those insulated fragments of history, however valuable, could neither be properly connected nor appreciated without the groundwork had been laid by those who lived at the period of the transactions to which they have a relation.

If that is true with respect to history, how much more so must it be with respect to a work professedly undertaken by a cotemporary, to correct the errors of history, and the materials from which history is composed.

Though it is become a common practice to speak lightly of cotemporary writers, yet how much credit is given to Pliny, Josephus, and other writers, principally because they lived near the times at which they wrote.

To come to more recent examples, "Burnet's history of his own Times" is chiefly valued on account of his treating of what was recent.

It is no doubt true that future historians will have materials, and valuable materials that we cannot obtain by any possible means;

but will they be able to judge so well of the situation of the world, and of its feelings, and ways of thinking, with respect to whatever concerns the French Revolution and Bonaparte?

We cannot form even at this short distance of time a true idea of the character of Oliver Cromwell, and the opinions entertained of him when he was alive. It is not because we want materials, but that we cannot appreciate them like those who lived at the time.

The great outlines of character and the important transactions in which he was concerned we can perfectly understand, but the minute features are not within our comprehension.

Those who have seen the energy and the enthusiasm of the French, and the manner in which they have spoken of Napoleon, can conceive that they considered the glory of their country as identified with his glory, and their disgrace with his fall. The imagination comes in aid of the understanding, and from seeing that, we form a decided opinion. We do more, we feel, that enthusiasm and not reason has guided the judgment of most

of those who admired that extraordinary personage.

The same feeling makes us comprehend how he was feared much more than there was any occasion for, and even already the illusion of his greatness is diminished. A British peer is probably now ashamed of his having applied to Napoleon the words which Shakspeare puts in the mouth of Cassius, when speaking of Cæsar,

> What man! He does bestride this lower world
> Like a Colossus, and we little men
> Walk under his huge legs, looking about,
> To find ourselves dishonourable graves.

It would be rather cruel to name that little British peer who confessed himself crouching about under the legs of the colossal Napoleon; it is, however, brought to recollection to prove the extraordinary effect produced by his conquests and conduct.

That the peer, however, may not now seek a grave from shame, as by his own account he was formerly doing from fear, let it be remembered that parliament debated gravely and seriously on the fortifying of London! That a sort of mechanical contrivance was actually executed, by which the

river Lee was dammed up, to prevent the French from attacking the capital from the Essex side!

So much were some persons fascinated by the gasconade and false pretences of Napoleon, that fear assumed the place of judgment. They thought that the river Lee, (a mere running brook in comparison,) would stop the armies that had crossed the Rhine, the Danube, and the Po, in the face of their enemies; and, that a hasty fortification extending from Lee-bridge to Battersea-bridge would resist the men who had taken Mantua!!

Even the feeble Harold, when the Norman William invaded England, met him boldly in the field. He did not think of waiting for him in his capital.

The invasion of England was never seriously intended by Napoleon, but the pretence served to alarm this country to put it to expense, to amuse the French, and deceive other nations. It was under the pretence of the descent on England that Bonaparte kept an army ready to attack Austria, which he actually did in the most effectual manner, transforming the imaginary

triumph in London to the real triumph at Austerlitz*.

The conduct of England on the threatened invasion will be a standing record of the terror inspired by the name of Bonaparte, and what has happened since will prove with how little reason.

It is useless to deny the fact, that all the powers on the continent were for a number of years paralyzed and fascinated by the

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* Before the camp at Boulogne broke up to march hastily to attack Austria, Bonaparte endeavoured to throw that power off its guard, by the following article in the official gazette of the Hague, of the 30th July 1805:

"Napoleon will no longer delay the execution of his grand plan; he will send out the expedition against England, and compel that kingdom to make a separate peace before the powers of the continent can join the same. Napoleon has foreseen the possibility of a great and sudden change in the dispositions of the powers on the Continent, and he has determined at the same time, to be beforehand with them, by a sudden and unexpected blow." The army at Boulogne, from the disappointment of their expectations on England, were on the brink of mutiny at that very time; they were beginning to treat this rash attempt with ridicule. Bonaparte could neither advance nor retreat with honour or safety: when all at once he marched off to Germany, where he commenced hostilities on the 7th of September; on the 13th was quartered in the imperial palace at Schoenbrun, and on the 27th of the same month, after taking possession of Vienna, fought the great battle of Austerlitz

brilliant victories of that extraordinary man, and that for a moment the delusion extended to this country.

One might be almost tempted to think that the lines by Johnson, descriptive of the intended march of Charles XII. to Moscow, were written to describe the fatal expedition of Bonaparte to the same place; so like are heroes to each other! and so like the fear, the delusion, and admiration of mankind!

On what foundation stands the warrior's pride,
How just his hopes let Swedish Charles decide;
A frame of adamant, a soul of fire,
No dangers fright him, and no labours tire;
O'er love, o'er fear, extends his wide domain,
Unconquer'd lord of pleasure and of pain;
No joys to him pacific sceptres yield,
War sounds the trump, he rushes to the field;
Behold surrounding kings their powers combine,
And one capitulate, and one resign;
Peace courts his hand, but spreads her charms in vain;
'Think nothing gain'd,' he cries, 'till nought remain;
On Moscow's walls till Gothic standards fly,
And all be mine beneath the polar sky.'
The march begins in military state,
And nations on his eye suspended wait;
Stern famine guards the solitary coast,
And winter barricades the realms of frost;
He comes, not want and cold his course delay;—
Hide, blushing glory, hide Pultowa's day:

The vanquish'd hero leaves his broken bands,
And shews his miseries in distant lands.
But did not Chance at length her error mend?
Did no subverted empire mark his end?
Did rival monarchs give the fatal wound?
Or hostile millions press him to the ground?
His fall was destin'd to a barren strand,
A petty fortress, and a dubious hand;
He left the name, at which the world grew pale
To point a moral, or adorn a tale!

England has, however, amply redeemed her momentary divergence from her usual character; but having been under the effects of such a delusion, it is highly important to ascertain by what means a brave and reflecting nation was led into such an error, for that it was an error, and not a very excusable one, it will be but candid to admit.

It will be satisfactory to know the nature of the complicated and well-combined plans, for misleading mankind, that were put in practice by Bonaparte and his expert confederates and able accomplices.

It only remains to be observed, that though the admirers of Bonaparte may think, and probably will think, that justice has not been done to their hero in the following analysis of his talents and character; yet they will be

obliged to allow, that where he has been improperly blamed or unjustly attacked, he has been vindicated; and the author can assert, that in both cases it has been done with the same view and with equal sincerity.

The detractors of Bonaparte, and the enemies of his whole system, will probably be displeased that in any case his conduct is vindicated; but as the intention is to form a true estimate of the qualities of that extraordinary man, it is just as necessary to praise or palliate in some cases, as in others it is to join in crimination.

It is more than possible that this analysis will be considered by one party as being unjustly severe, and by another as being much too favourable; if so, that will be a proof of impartiality, and a desire to form a true judgment.

Men of all descriptions, but particularly those who govern others, may learn the most useful lessons from the character and conduct of that extraordinary man. They will find much to shun, and much to imitate; and unfortunately there appears to be a disposition to follow his example where it does not deserve to be followed, and to neglect following

it where that would be attended with the greatest advantage.

His restless activity, and affectation of simplicity in his manners and dress, have found some great imitators. His mad, mistaken policy of dividing kingdoms and removing landmarks, has got imitators, and so have his false policy about commerce, and jealousy of the industry and manufactures of Britain*. So much has the delusion, arising from the twenty years' practice of making false appearances, and instilling false principles, produced a permanent effect.

Those who imitate his manner and adopt some of his principles, have not even the merit of making a good choice in either the one or the other. The parts of his conduct that are most admirable, are left without an imitator.

The procuring assistance from the best talents in the countries under his dominion; em-

* The continental nations all follow Bonaparte's plan of excluding *British Manufactures*, but they follow it foolishly, ignorantly, and imperfectly. Bonaparte excluded colonial produce also, but they have not the power to do that, and when the exclusion is confined to British manufactures, the balance is against the continental states, for Britain buys more from them than she sells to them by about one-third, or rather more, as may be seen by the custom-house books.

ploying rewards to call forth merit, and excite exertion; the rewarding service, particularly if it was voluntary service*; and when he rewarded it, doing so readily, and in a way to give it its full value; his hearing complaints himself, and being accessible to the meanest subject; and indefatigable in doing what he thought it right and necessary to do. All these things merit the highest praise, and deserve to be imitated.

A great distinction is to be made between the end he aimed at attaining, and the means employed for its attainment. The end was often bad, and so sometimes were the means, but then in other cases they were admirable.

To see a man of an obscure origin rise up, and in splendour and magnificence, in talents and generosity, outstrip all the monarchs on the Continent, and make them bend before

* Voltaire ridicules the French government for never rewarding voluntary service, and under some other governments the case is the same. It is indeed one of the grand features of regular governments, now called legitimate to treat with contempt men of talents and independent principles, and protect and reward fawning drivellers; they, by that means, have feeble supporters and formidable enemies. Bonaparte had all the energy and talents on his side, and he might well despise his weak and imbecile opponents.

him, does not complete the wonder, for after his power is gone, his opponents having ceased to tremble, begin to imitate, and some of them have not even the wisdom to do it well*.

Let moralists explain upon what principle it is that bravery and genius, which have no sort of connexion with moral turpitude, diminish our abhorrence of crime, and in some cases almost reconcile us to actions, which, if they were attended with cowardice and cunning, would even look blacker than they really are.

As the honour and moral principles of mankind have undergone a considerable alteration for the worse, since the want of both

* Bonaparte never lost any opportunity of making himself look great and generous. One day, when bad weather confined him to the house, though he seldom played at cards, he won about a thousand zechins of Venice from the plenipotentiaries. He never took up the money, but sent for the officer of the guard, and, with great apparent indifference, told him, "To take the gold and distribute it amongst his grenadiers."

The company, who before had complimented him on his good luck, could now scarcely find words to express their admiration of his generosity. The Marquis de Gallo repeated, with the enthusiasm of a madman, again and again, "What a noble! what an astonishing man!" By such tricks he surprised and astonished. *On n'avait jamais vu un Charlatan de cette force.*

have been seen accompanied with actions that for their brilliancy surpass any on record, it may be of use to the cause of true honour and morality, to prove that cunning and connivance had as great a share in the achievement of those exploits as bravery and genius; that they were all combined, and that honour, integrity, and humanity, were the only military virtues that were completely excluded.

It is useful also to trace the failure of these grand military projects, and the ultimate ruin and disgrace of the hero of the day, to that want of honour of good intention, and to that fraud and breach of promise, which are incompatible with permanent prosperity, as well as they are disgraceful to those by whom they are practised.

> Mark by what wretched steps their glory grows,
> From dirt and sea-weed, as proud Venice rose;
> In each how guilt and greatness equal ran,
> And all that rais'd the hero sunk the man.
> Now Europe's laurels on their brows behold;
> But stained with blood, or ill exchanged for gold;
> Then see them broke with toils, or sunk with ease,
> Or infamous for plunder'd provinces.
> The whole amount of that enormous fame—
> A tale, that blends their glory with their shame."—Pope.

ANALYSIS

OF

THE TALENTS AND CHARACTER

OF

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

SECTION I.

From the first Rise of Bonaparte till his Return from the Conquest of Italy.

THE history of the public life of Bonaparte and of Europe are, for twenty years, so intimately connected and interwoven, that the main events of his wonderful career, are before the public in a great variety of forms. Many circumstances have combined to procure for him flatterers. The whole of the continental press was at his command during the greatest part of his public life; and in this country, where we are free to write, government, which cannot control the press, has apparently been at great pains to let literary men see that it undervalued and despised their approbation or assistance.

This contemptuous treatment of men, who,

however much they may be mistaken, have generally a pretty good opinion of themselves, has led to an unfriendly feeling that makes them delight in drawing a contrast between that worker of wonders (Napoleon,) and the every-day politicians to whom he was opposed.

The original obscurity of his situation—the rapidity of his rise—and the irresistible and commanding attitude he assumed, struck his foes with terror, and filled his friends with admiration. Those feelings of fear and admiration were not a little increased by his mysterious and unfathomable mode of speaking and acting. He was a mixture of the great general, statesman, hypocrite, and impostor; and it is only by analyzing his character and talents that they can be appreciated or understood. There is such a combination of the great and the little, of the splendid and the mean, of knowledge and ignorance, of self-command and of wilfulness, that no idea can be formed from a general view.

Bonaparte does not appear to have been the greatest of the French generals nor statesmen, but he united in himself more talents of different descriptions, than perhaps any man that ever existed, which all applied with a perseverance and steadiness of which there is scarcely an example, led to the wonderful success of that extraordinary man.

The two characters to which that of Bonaparte

bears the greatest resemblance, are *Nadir Shaw** and *Oliver Cromwell.* Every attempt to draw a comparison between him and Alexander, Julius Cæsar, and Hannibal, only shews an ignorance of them all. Betwixt all ambitious men who have been leaders of armies and conquerors, there must necessarily be many traits of resemblance; but that is not enough. In the infinite varieties of the human countenance there are always some traits and features that may be compared, and to a savage from a desert island, the first four human beings he should be shewn, would appear to be alike. He would think them resemblances of each other, though in reality they might be very dissimilar. We have seen so few men whose lot has been to conquer and astonish, that we imagine a similitude between them where very little exists. This, however, is natural, and to a certain degree, unavoidable.

Amongst the circumstances that have tended to make mankind form a wrong estimate of the talents of Bonaparte, as compared with other conquerors and heroes, is, that the transactions of his life have concerned them so nearly, that their importance, great as it really was, has been magnified and strangely overrated.

* Nadir Shaw reigned in Persia about the middle of the last century, of whom a very interesting and entertaining account is given by Jonas Hanway, of musical memory, who was in Persia for a considerable time during his reign.

There is a *mental perspective* as well as an optical one, and the mind exaggerates what is near and recent, while it diminishes the value or importance of what is distant; in the same manner, that to the eye, a man that is near occupies a greater space in appearance than a mountain at a distance. Experience has taught every one to make an allowance for the diminished size of a distant object as it appears to the eye, but the same allowance is not made when the impression is on the mind. Charles XII. of Sweden, at the head of a third-rate nation, was an object of wonder, of terror, and admiration in his day; but now the wars in which he was engaged appear of little importance, and even his eccentricities are scarcely the cause of wonder.

Another circumstance to be attended to in forming a judgment of the abilities and merit of Bonaparte is, that party spirit has discoloured and magnified or diminished, almost every transaction of his life, and every personal quality belonging to him whether good or bad. Excepting pure mathematics, party spirit has in our times an influence on every branch and species of human knowledge. Even arithmetical statements, when they are connected with politics, are distorted and made to serve party purposes; and, when that is the case, how powerful must the effect of party feeling be in judging a man whom nearly all Europe obeyed, whom one

portion hated and another adored, but with respect to whom not one individual felt indifferent?

With respect to military talents, Bonaparte was probably not the first amongst the French generals; but in audacity and policy he exceeded them all, and to the singular union of those qualities, he seems to have owed his exaltation. The military character is seldom found united with that cunning and meanness to which Bonaparte owed his first advancement. There is an openness and honour generally to be found in brave men, that prevents them from seeking advancement by circuitous or unworthy means; and, therefore, the man who to military talents adds the other qualities with which it is so seldom combined, has over his competitors a great advantage.

No victories ever achieved by Bonaparte were greater, or more surprising than some of those achieved by the French in the early part of the Revolution, when the troops were raw and irregular. Bonaparte, by audacity, servility, and intrigue, became a general at the very moment that the French armies were in their highest state. The enthusiasm of liberty yet remained. They were become bold through success, and they had acquired experience. During the first years of the Revolution the armies wanted experience and confidence; and, in the latter period

enthusiasm was extinguished, so that perhaps never did a bold man arrive at the command of an army at a better moment, or under circumstances more auspicious than Bonaparte when he took the command in Italy.

As the meanness * of his character gave Bonaparte a superiority over all his fellow-officers, so his total want of humanity and his prodigality of human life gave him an advantage over the able generals to whom he was opposed. All moral and physical difficulties vanished before the man who could sacrifice a regiment, burn a city, or lay waste a province without hesitation or reserve, when a purpose was to be served.

How treacherously the Republic of Venice was betrayed, and that ancient and noble city humbled, while by false promises and pretences, Alessandria the key to Savoy was occupied, must always be remembered; and, it will be allowed that the generals who were opposed to him, to whom honour and humanity were not matters of mockery or an empty name, combated his ferocious hordes under great disadvantages.

The fair promises with which the founders of the Revolution had deluded neighbouring nations, had gained them many partisans in every country they attacked, and in none more than in Italy. To the delusion in favour of liberty were added

* Meanness by stooping to take dishonourable methods that others would not adopt.

at that time an admiration of the bravery of the French, a fear of their vengeance, and discontent with their own governments, so that there was nothing at all astonishing in the rapid conquest of Italy which has been so highly extolled by the admirers of Napoleon; yet, after all, this is the portion of his military career the most creditable to his talents and skill, particularly as he contrived to act without control as completely as even when emperor, at the time that he was under the despotic and capricious Directory.

Before the daring resolution of Bonaparte all authority but his own vanished like a shadow; and before his superior talents for intrigue, the envious attempts of his rivals were of no avail.

The wonders attached to his conquests in Italy must be greatly diminished, by contemplating the ferocious and dishonourable means by which they were achieved, and the divided state both morally and physically of that unhappy country. The French armies were in a deranged and distressed state when he took the command, but according to his plan of plunder and marauding, the very wants of the soldiers contributed to his victories. The enthusiastic and half-starved soldiers when let loose on the inhabitants of that fine and fertile country fought like demons, and the regular armies opposed to them who respected private property, were soon repulsed.

It must also be kept in mind, that the modes of fighting adopted by the French, consisting

chiefly of rapid movements and large masses, were not the invention of Bonaparte, and were highly favourable in the country of an enemy. The French had every thing to attack, and nothing but themselves to defend; and wherever they obtained possession, the inhabitants were either the victims of their severity, or reduced to the most abject state of obedience. The few instances of revolt or resistance that, at the beginning took place, were punished with the conflagration of the houses, and the murder of their miserable inhabitants.

Such were the terrible means by which Bonaparte obtained his first reputation and success. Never was war in any civilized country carried on with a more unfeeling determination to succeed. Other conquerors had wished to spare the conquered; but, to Napoléon, it was indifferent whether he reigned over a garden or a desert, he was resolved to obtain possession, and with such a resolution, and such means of accomplishing his design, a failure was next to impossible.

That he displayed great talents himself, and was seconded by men who had great military talents also, is not to be disputed; but all that was deemed next to miraculous, was occasioned either by ignorance, want of observation, or the flattery of his followers, when crowned with success. A mysterious and astutious conduct, and profound hypocrisy, contributed not a little to the conster-

nation of his enemies, and the admiration of his country.

We shall follow him through his military career, and try to analyze it in a similar way, that a just conclusion may be formed of the conduct of this extraordinary man.

SECTION II.

The Expedition to Egypt and Syria, and Return to Paris.

Passing over, for the present, the intrigues which prevailed at Paris on the return of Bonaparte to that capital, after his victories in Italy, we shall follow him to Egypt, to which country he went from a double cause.

When he arrived in Paris his affectation of waiting on the Directory in a military great coat, maintaining a reserved conduct, and a commanding tone of independence, was ably seconded by mean underhand intrigue. It was soon discovered that, possessing the confidence and the admiration of the people, who were greatly discontented, his stay in Paris would be very inconvenient to the Directory.

On the other hand, he found that the time was not come for him to throw off its authority.

His honours were too new, and his elevation from obscurity too recent; besides a romantic ambition, of which he possessed more than perhaps any man that ever existed, led him to view with pleasure, the realization of an old and favourite project of the French, by subduing Egypt, and assailing the English in India.

Here we have, for the first time, a proof of the ignorance of Bonaparte in respect to the nature of other races of men, than any that he had seen, and of the difficulties that distance and geographical position opposed to that mad enterprise.

The expedition of Alexander to India served as a whet to his ambition, and every thing was prepared in a way to have procured success, had success in such an enterprise been possible.

The attack on Malta, and the success of that attack, are well known; but perhaps the secret intrigues, by which an almost impregnable place was given up, are not; it is however certain, that treachery, and not military skill, procured success to that bold enterprise.

Though we refuse to give Bonaparte credit for either bravery or skill on this occasion, it is impossible to deny that it was accomplished by a very deep-laid and well-executed plan, and he was not guilty of deceit, as in the case of Venice and of Alessandria in Savoy. His stratagem was one of those allowed in war. He bought over the connivance of a portion of the Knights; but

he did not deceive them, nor make any promise that he did not keep.

This acquisition was of no great importance to France, which was in no want of safe harbours in the Mediterranean sea; but it gave great eclat to the expedition, and tended to discourage the Turks, whom he was preparing to attack in their most distant provinces.

The first military error of Bonaparte, who had hitherto been uninterruptedly successful, was his ordering the admiral to remain with the fleet at anchor in the bay of Aboukir, in a position where he was liable to be attacked by an English fleet, and where he soon after was attacked by Admiral Nelson, when one of the most splendid, and by far the most interesting, naval engagements took place that is recorded in history.

Without pretending to know that of which we are not certain, and determined not to give as certain, that which is held in doubt, we must consider the cause of this misfortune, as being probably an error arising from his want of knowledge of naval affairs, or his too great confidence in the French force; for though it has been said and perhaps with truth, that the general intended to render the retreat of his army impracticable, and by that means inspire into it the courage given by despair,—the design is too desperate, and too atrocious, to be attributed even to him. That Bonaparte did every thing in the power of

man to convert so signal a misfortune into an advantage, is true, and in that he is most deserving of praise. It is unfair to infer from thence that he projected the misfortune, and that "what he chanced, was what he meant to do."

It is indeed difficult to conceive why he did not let Admiral Bruix return to France, if he wished to convert his expedition into a *forlorn-hope*, particularly as the remaining on the coast of Egypt, to be blockaded by the English, could serve no good purpose; and if he was to do so, why he did not permit that brave and skilful admiral to choose the situation that he thought the safest and the best? Any other general but Bonaparte would have done so. But while he himself shewed the greatest contempt for the orders of his superiors, namely, of the Directory, who gave him the command, he exacted the most strict obedience to his own will, from all over whom he had any authority. As this is not the analysis of his moral, but of his military character, it is not now very important to inquire into his motives for putting his judgment in competition with that of an able naval officer in so important a case, the true nature of which he could not be supposed to understand; it is particularly strange that he should be so self-sufficient as to contradict and over-rule the admiral's opinion. As a military officer, that was a great error, and will ever be a blot on his reputation; and it is not unlikely that

it was an act of mere despotism, proceeding from a determination to direct every thing, and be obeyed in every thing.

The conqueror of Italy found the sandy plains of Egypt, and a thinly-inhabited and nearly desert country, a very different theatre of action. Rapid movements and requisitions were there impracticable, or at least useless; and if the expedition is reduced to its true value, and described in its true colours, it will be found to have been little else than the exploring of a country once great and famous, by a number of scientific men, protected by a great military force.

A few conflicts with the undisciplined, inexperienced, and unprepared troops that were in that country, though they always terminated in victory, could not be considered as adding to the military reputation of the French general, or of the army which he commanded. There appears not to have been any plan laid for putting in execution the mad design of establishing a communication with India by the Red Sea, the project which was considered as the object of the expedition *.

The romantic genius of Bonaparte was pleased with visiting the pyramids and the ancient monuments of the genius and industry of mankind in the early ages. There, surrounded by men of science, he affected a mystical sort of superiority,

* See Appendix A.

obtained their adulation, and prepared the way for his exaltation, when he should abandon them and return to France. He visited Egypt, partly for the reasons already given, with an intention of imitating Alexander, if he should succeed; and, if he should fail, of resembling Julius Cæsar in his invasion of Britain, which was an enterprise in itself of no utility, and disastrous to the army, but one that tended not a little to increase his credit with the degraded populace of Rome, when he attacked the liberties of his country, and resolved to become its master *.

The only real military exploit of this great general, during that expedition, was his attack on the fortress of Acre, on the coast of Syria, defended by 1,100 English sailors, under the command of Sir Sidney Smith. What the object of that strange expedition was, has in reality never been discovered. To divide an army, already found to be unequal to the conquest of Egypt, appears to have been the height of madness, and altogether inexplicable.

The detachment under Bonaparte was neither sufficiently numerous, nor sufficiently equipped, either to have made any real impression on Syria, to have established a chain of connexion between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, or to have proceeded to Constantinople, had the fortress of Acre not been in the way.

* See Appendix B.

That small place, fortified in the manner of the 12th century, that is, merely surrounded with a thick wall and a ditch, was found however sufficient to interrupt the career of the conqueror of Italy.

There are various opinions respecting this enterprise; and the admirers of Bonaparte, those men in particular, who lose no opportunity of depreciating the bravery of the English, say that Bonaparte failed in the enterprise for want of artillery. This is one of those insidious ways of blending what is false with what is true, in order to come to an unfair conclusion. It is true that the French artillery had been partly captured at sea, but Bonaparte had sufficient cannon to batter down and make a very practicable breach in those old mouldering walls, and it was not necessary to do more with artillery. It was after the wall was destroyed, and the ditch filled up, that the French were repulsed by a few English sailors and the Turkish soldiers who were found in the place. The attempt was not abandoned, till the French, in despair, refused, after the eleventh time, to try to mount the breach by assault! Until there were five times as many of them slain as the number of English who resisted, and they actually formed a sort of parapet of the bodies of their dead*!

Such was the termination of the only engage-

* See Appendix C.

ment during the Egyptian expedition, in which the military talents of Bonaparte were put to the test.

It is not to the purpose in this place to inquire respecting the cruelties that were said to have been exercised on Turkish prisoners; true or false, those have nothing to do with military talents and skill, into which it is the present business to inquire.

Having failed in this strange expedition, and finding no means of obtaining better success in Egypt to which he returned; and learning, by intelligence received from France, that the existing government was ready to fall, he left his army by stealth, and arrived unexpectedly in Paris, where, except the ruin of the fleet, the disasters of the expedition were altogether unknown*.

The expedition to Egypt was a very contemptible imitation of Alexander's astonishing expedition to India, but Alexander went prompted by ambition and a desire to conquer. The French army was sent to Egypt for a different purpose. That nation wished to astonish the world with a great and novel enterprise, and Bonaparte had his reasons for encouraging the attempt, but he was not in his proper element amongst sandy deserts, and as his quickness in forming a judgment and his promptitude in execution were uncommonly great, the moment that he saw what was best for him to do, that moment it was done; his friends were surprised and his enemies confounded.

* See Appendix D.

SECTION III.

The second Conquest of Italy by Bonaparte.

WHEN Bonaparte returned to Paris without leave, after having sacrificed a fleet and abandoned an army, which, when they quitted the shores of France, were the pride of the nation and astonishment of the world, it might have been thought that he would have begun by explaining his reasons and excusing his conduct—an ordinary man would have done this, but not so Bonaparte—he took the Directory to task, and abused it severely for the state to which it had reduced France. In short, he acted as if he had already been the ruler and master of the country, and those who really were the rulers were struck dumb before him.

Such unexpected audacity and magnificent boldness, which, under other governments, would be termed rebellious insubordination and insolence, were highly to be admired towards the miserable and miscreant intriguers who at that time governed France. It was in such bold daring strokes that Bonaparte surpassed all men that ever existed, and there is no wonder that ordinary men fell down before him.

To repair the disasters that had befallen France in his absence, was his first military enterprise,

and on this occasion it was that he raised himself truly to a high rank as a general. In two things Bonaparte excelled almost all men. His vigilance and activity were unremitting, and whenever he had any undertaking to perform, he began by saying to himself, "What do I want to enable me to do this?" He then estimated the number of men, money, and munition of every sort, rating all at the highest, for he was prodigal of every thing that he thought necessary to success in his preparations, and in his use of what was thus prepared, he was equally prodigal.

In stating these circumstances, no inference is to be drawn, that it is meant as a blameable line of conduct, that must depend on the judgment with which the matter is conducted; and in this case it would be great arrogance to pretend to blame so great a general.

It is perfectly clear, however, that the general who carries on war in this manner has a much easier task to perform, than one who is limited or sparing in his means.

At this crisis in the fate of France, it is impossible to view the military talents of Bonaparte altogether separately from the other parts of his wonderful composition. From the time that he quitted France on the expedition to Egypt, every thing had been going wrong with the republic, yet the talents of the officers and bravery of the armies, were well known. The great man re-appears not!

with an army to second his efforts, but nearly alone, and every disaster is almost instantly repaired as if by a sort of miracle or enchantment. It is on this occasion in a most particular manner, that Bonaparte shewed the superiority of his genius. The fate of France seemed to depend on him alone; those armies and generals that had achieved splendid victories before his name was known to the public, now seemed as if dependant upon him for life and motion. In his absence their laurels wither and their conquests cease. He re-appears and their energy, enthusiasm and success return with him.

On no occasion did Bonaparte appear so great. He was not either by rank or service so high as several other generals, but he then really seized the reins of authority, and placed himself in fact, as he was soon after in name, at the head of the affairs of France.

His conduct and character are not to be judged of by small occurrences or trivial circumstances; the single, great, and leading fact, that he had the courage, abilities, and address, to assume the lead in affairs under circumstances where almost any other man would have trembled for himself, displays at once a superiority of character that destroys even the idea of comparison or competition.

When Julius Cæsar returned to Italy to crush the republic, he returned at the head of a great

and victorious army: he had physical force to support his pretensions. His family was powerful—his connexions and those tied to his fortunes and interested in his success, were numerous and powerful also. To all this we must add, that his military services were of long standing, while Bonaparte was but a man of yesterday; by origin a foreigner, of an obscure family, and not supported by any powerful party. At one time he had the support of the Jacobin Club, but he had crushed his jacobin friends and mitralized them with grape-shot in the Rue St. Honoré, so that he was in point of connexions almost an insulated individual. As for his military friends, he had left the most part of them to perish on the sandy plains of Egypt. So superior and gigantic were the powers of Bonaparte, that he felt no obstacle from enemies, no disadvantage from the want of friends; all yielded to him the first place as a matter of right, and the event shewed that it was a matter of wisdom. The passage over the Alps in the most rapid manner*, and the signal victory gained over the Austrians at Marengo, re-established the French affairs in Italy; gave to the house of Lorrain a shock that it never recovered; astonished all Europe, and clearly pointed out Bonaparte as the man that was fittest to re-establish royalty in France, and

* See Appendix, Note E.

crush that spirit of revolt and disobedience, of cabal, intrigue, and wickedness, that had at one time alarmed the whole of civilized society.

Never was any general so careful before he took the field to ensure himself success. He foresaw all that he should want, and provided accordingly with no sparing hand. He lessened the number of his enemies by every means that gold, persuasion, or promises could diminish them, and then he fought the remainder with all the skill of which he was possessed, and regardless of the lives of his soldiers, provided he could gain the victory.

He endeared his officers to him by his splendid liberality, and his soldiers by enriching them with the plunder of the enemy. Rigorous to the extreme in military discipline, when the good of the service and subordination were in question, he permitted his soldiers to plunder and steal from the enemy, and from the inhabitants of those countries he invaded, without the least check. Every soldier in his army knew what he would punish, and what he would permit; and while they observed the most rigorous discipline when on duty, they indulged in the most shameful practices when they were not.

Under any other general, such a mixture of duty and obedience with marauding and disorderly practices, could not have existed; but Napoleon had the art to amalgamate the character

of a desperate banditti with that of regular and obedient soldiers.

This explains in some degree the cause of his success when in an enemy's country that was rich or fertile; and it likewise accounts for his failure in Egypt and in Russia, where his soldiers had nothing to stimulate their rapacity, and likewise when they fought in France, where they dared not give way to their propensity.

The most brilliant and astonishing part of the military career of Bonaparte is undoubtedly that immediately after his return from Egypt and his becoming First Consul, when he should have been shot for leaving his army to perish in the desert.

That the man who had the boldness and audacity to call the government by which he was employed to account, when after sustaining defeat he had abandoned his post, should, when he returned crowned with victory, place himself at the head of the government, by becoming First Consul, is by no means a matter of astonishment. He had displayed great capacity, while the government had shewn an imbecility of conduct, that proved decidedly their unfitness to conduct affairs in times of such internal and external difficulty.

It had been from the first establishment of anarchy under the name and form of a republic, predicted that the whole must terminate in the despotic power of one man.

While the asignats served for money, and the assembly, or convention, could by a decree create one hundred millions, power resided necessarily in those who directed or swayed the assembly; but when the return to payments in metallic money took place, taxes must be raised, and the assembly lost its creative power. The army then, from being merely an instrument in the hands of those who ruled, assumed a greater authority, and in the midst of war, beset as the nation was with enemies on all sides, the natural course of things was for the most fortunate and able general to assume the chief power. This was confirming the assertion of Voltaire—

"Le premier Roi fût un soldat heureux.'

The First Consul was also a fortunate soldier; and though there are a thousand tales about the intrigues by which Bonaparte rose to that dignity, yet those intrigues were only the natural attendants on such an event*. His superior abilities and claims to the confidence of the country were the real causes; but as the avowed system and constant practice of Bonaparte was to employ every possible means for procuring success, every thing that he could do, directly or indirectly, publicly or privately, was done.

In unremitting efforts, and mercurial activity, Bonaparte surpassed all men mentioned in his-

* See Appendix, Note F.

tory, and that activity was never employed but in advancing his interest. Other great men have loved pleasure, and occasionally, at least, relaxed into the enjoyments of life: Bonaparte never: to him, action was rest, and inaction the greatest of punishments. As his master-passion, ambition, swallowed all the rest; it followed, as a necessary consequence, that the feelings of his heart never led him from the execution of what he thought conducive to his interest.

As a general, that activity and that total indifference to who suffered, provided he succeeded, gave him prodigious advantages over a general who, with equal skill, had to contend with the feelings of his heart, or who was restrained by what he might think the rules of honour and humanity. Bonaparte's views were quite simple, clear, and direct, namely, to succeed by every possible means. His comprehensive mind suggested almost every thing, and his activity, energy, and talents, enabled him to put in execution whatever he thought necessary, unrestrained either by principles of honour, or feelings of humanity; so that to him things were not only possible, but easy, that to almost any other person would have been difficult or impracticable.

SECTION IV.

From the Second Return from Italy, to the Treaty of Tilsit.

After Bonaparte had risen to supreme power as First Consul, he had advantages as a general that none but himself enjoyed. Pichegru and Moreau, and Dumourier, (who were the first that taught the French to fight in a revolutionary manner,) were all annoyed, watched, and counteracted, by commissioners sent from the Convention, who assumed a power superior to the general, whenever, to their pride, ignorance, or caprice, it suited them so to do; notwithstanding all that, many of the battles gained in the early part of the Revolution, were scarcely inferior to the victories gained by Bonaparte when enjoying, without control, the power and command over the whole resources of the empire, and in latter times with the assistance of other nations.

Simply as a general, to lead an army into the field against an enemy, it is very doubtful whether there were not others his superiors or at least his equals; but in preparing every thing for taking the field with advantage, he had certainly no equal amongst the revolutionary generals of France.

His victories in Germany were achieved by

rapid movements, great masses, and a desperate mode of fighting, in which the lives of the soldiers he commanded were accounted as nothing.

The Emperor and King of Prussia acted so like selfish fools, that he beat them both separately, when it was their interest to have united their forces against him. Their jealousies of each other and selfish feelings were worked on by Bonaparte, who made his war in Germany a sort of amusement, until he dismembered the empire and made or unmade kings and princes according to his own will and pleasure.

Every ancient institution was obnoxious to Bonaparte, who would gladly have belonged to an ancient dynasty himself, but not being so, to pull down and re-organize were his great delight.

It is impossible to form any thing like a true estimate of the military merit of Bonaparte, or of any of the French generals, without always keeping in mind the energy of the nation at the beginning of their revolution, the apathy and want of union of the powers on the continent, together with the new method of carrying on war adopted by the French.

It is not a little singular that Austria and Prussia the two powers who had been the first to unite against France, should be so foolish as now to oppose her separately, and not make their defence a common object. Did they unite at first in the hopes of dividing France, as Poland had been

divided, and sharing the plunder of the first of European nations? The French have accused them of such designs, and their never acting in concert after they found that impracticable, gives an appearance of truth to the accusation.

When Bonaparte had resolved to attack the Emperor of Germany in that campaign which terminated with the battle of Austerlitz, Prussia might have cut off his communication with France; and as Russia had advanced to assist the Emperor Francis, the French army at such a distance from home, and with an enemy in the rear as well as in front, must have been in great peril, and probably forced to capitulate; but Frederick remained inactive, and saw the chief of that empire to which he belonged, compelled to make a disgraceful and disadvantageous peace.

This was neither wise nor honourable, and the less so that the French, without asking leave or making any apology, had marched through a part of the Prussian territory, violating the neutrality of that country, and thereby advancing into the heart of the empire by a way that the Austrian generals had not anticipated. It would be useless to deny that Bonaparte displayed great military talents in this attack on Austria, but his craft and cunning were still more conspicuous than his military talents.

In this case, however, he was warranted by all the laws of war to make use of stratagem. It was

not as when he deceived Venice, a friendly nation, obtaining leave to enter its territory on false pretences, and afterwards ruining the republic. It was rather a credit than a disgrace to make Austria capitulate and Russia retreat at the moment that he himself was with his whole forces in a very perilous situation.

The Arch-Duke Charles was not there, and the young and brave Emperor of Russia had not yet acquired experience; so that Francis was left to his own resources, and in steadiness, perseverance, and the art of undergoing hardship, he was very unequal to Bonaparte.

It was a very unfortunate thing for a sovereign accustomed to ease and the life led in courts and palaces, to be opposed to a general accustomed to war, to camps and to difficulties. The enervated mind of the former sinks under difficulties that to the other are scarcely felt; and in the case of Bonaparte could not be said to be felt at all, for he was in his greatest glory when humbling some crowned head, or pulling down some ancient dynasty.

When Bonaparte had humbled the Emperor of Germany, and exacted from him a very heavy sum of money, he had in view the destruction of the German empire, and the establishment of the confederation of the Rhine, towards which the humiliation of Prussia was nearly as necessary as that of the emperor himself.

Had the cabinet of Berlin been composed of men firmly attached to the interests of their master, or had the king been a man of much penetration, or even of sound judgment, he would have seen that the ambition of Bonaparte and the French nation would not leave him in full enjoyment of his power.

The Prussian monarch might also remember that France had not yet been revenged on him for his former hostility in the infancy of the revolution, but such was his blindness to what awaited him, that neither prudence nor provocation had the least effect on his conduct in respect to guarding against the designs of France. His own brother and most of the officers of his army, blamed a conduct which they thought both disgraced and endangered their country, but his majesty was resolved not to see what was passing in France or at his own court.

Amongst the wonders that took place during the revolution, not the smallest was the pacific conduct of the Prussian monarch, when he might have made war with great probability of success, having both Austria and Russia to assist, and his preparing for hostilities when he must bear the attack of the whole French force without being certain of any ally to aid him at the terrible onset.

The assistance of Russia had indeed been promised, but then Russia was at a great distance from France, and he might be quite ruined before

that power could come to his assistance. That was what might have been expected, and was precisely what took place; nor could it be otherwise, for Bonaparte was not the man to remain inactive and let his enemies unite at leisure and prepare for his attack. A man who was at such pains to separate his enemies when united, certainly could not be supposed to remain inactive while they were concentrating their strength. Neither his vigilance or activity warranted such an expectation.

What appeared unaccountable in the conduct of Prussia, arose from the secret manœuvres of Bonaparte, who could cajole that monarch into peace, or provoke him to war at pleasure.

The attack on Prussia, though not one of the greatest military exploits of Napoleon, was certainly managed with great political address; and the cunning by which the ruin of that monarch was accomplished, added to the cruel and faithless manner in which the king was treated after his fall, laid the first foundation for the general combination that took place against Napoleon*.

All Europe saw and felt after that, that his ambition had no bounds—that his word was not to be taken, and that there was no humiliation and injustice that might not be expected by those who had the misfortune to be conquered by him.

Previous to the overthrow of Prussia, he had brought over a great many persons, both military

* See Appendix, Note G.

and civil, who had it in their power to betray and ruin the king. In that country, which, for its extent, has long maintained a greater number of soldiers than any one in Europe, which therefore may be considered, and really is, essentially a military government, the fortified places were unprovided with every necessary for sustaining a siege, so that when by treachery, the battle of Jena was lost, the whole country was instantly overrun. There was but little glory in conquering so weak and improvident a government. It was the work of a few hours, and it is plain by the letter that Bonaparte wrote to the King of Prussia before the battle, that he made himself quite certain of victory. He wrote indeed as if the king were already in his power, and no doubt but that he knew well that he was so.

As Bonaparte had a supreme contempt for all men, and was a good judge of characters, he had tempted the King of Prussia, in the most insidious and artful way, to behave in the most ungrateful manner to England, by making him hope that he would get Hanover added to his dominions. This was done at the very time that he intended to humble that monarch on his throne at Berlin and give Westphalia to his brother Jerome. The King of Prussia betrayed by those in whom he put confidence, and following selfish views became an easy dupe to Napoleon*. The Emperor of Russia was assailed in a like manner, but with more sin-

* See Appendix, Note H.

cerity, and Finland was his reward for the treaty of Tilsit; a reward that cost the French Emperor nothing, but was highly acceptable to the northern autocrat.

The battle of Jena, a victory the most decisive and the most complete of modern times, (if we except that of Waterloo,) was the only military exploit of importance during that expedition; but it was not, like Waterloo, a well-contested field, for treason did more than half the business.

The battles that were fought at Pultusk and other places on the Russian frontiers were hard-fought battles; and there, as in all cases, the French armies displayed valour and skill; but though there was hard fighting, nothing occurred that could increase the reputation of the general who had twice conquered Italy and had fought the battles of Lodi and Marengo.

Prussia was now completely humbled, Russia was neutralized, and Austria stood alone; and this was an opportunity that the insolence of Bonaparte could not resist. Every thing that could be done by a man who did not choose to pass for an absolute barbarian, was done to humiliate the beautiful, accomplished, and amiable Queen of Prussia, as well as her husband. The whole of Europe sympathized with her majesty in her suffering, from the rudeness of an unpolished despot; but the king met with no pity, and all admitted that he deserved the treatment he received.

Prussia was actually treated as if it had been

a province of France, and not an independent state with which a treaty had been entered into. The king was actually a prisoner guarded by French troops, as fully appeared afterwards, for when the day of his emancipation came, he was literally obliged to run away, that is, to make his escape clandestinely from his own palace.

Russia could give no assistance: the treaty of Tilsit, and the occupation of Finland had reduced that colossal power to a state of inactivity, and Bonaparte was left at full liberty to continue his schemes for erecting the confederation of the Rhine on the ruins of the German empire.

The second military expedition of Bonaparte to Vienna, when by way of making love to Maria Louisa and getting her father's consent, he marched to Vienna with a large army, is so like the former one, that very little is to be said on the subject. The Emperor of Austria now stood alone and the Arch-Duke, one of the best generals in Europe, had, by some cabal or court intrigue, been put *hors du combat*, so that after former contests where much greater difficulties were in their way, the French could not find it any hard task to make Austria submit.

This was rather a rude manner of treating with an intended father-in-law, but it was very suitable to so impetuous and daring a man as Bonaparte: he succeeded, and became allied to one of the most ancient dynasties of Europe.

SECTION V.

From the Beginning of the War with Spain to the disastrous Retreat from Russia.

We have now seen Bonaparte raised by his extraordinary talents to the zenith of his power and prosperity; for though the war with Spain, and intrigues in that country had begun before the last campaign in Germany, they have been designedly left unnoticed, for they, as well as the expedition to Russia, belong to another class of expeditions and exploits from any of those that have been examined hitherto.

Till this time Bonaparte had been continually increasing in power, and in the affairs in which he had been engaged, that of Egypt excepted, he had always been victorious; but from this time his affairs began to go in a contrary direction.

Napoleon's want of moderation, and his disregard of justice—his perpetually changing the situation of those people who had the misfortune to be under his yoke, had prevented his power from ever being established on a very solid or permanent footing: but the first great error as a politician was, to attempt to subdue Spain, when he had the king so completely in his power that he could extort the money he levied in taxes from

him, in the same manner that the Grand Turk squeezes their wealth from the governors of his provinces.

It was evident that Spain, when at peace and under a legitimate king to whom she was attached, could furnish more money in contributions than if her tranquillity were disturbed and a king of another race put on the throne; particularly, as it was probable that in such an event the colonies in South America from which the greatest part of her revenues were derived, would be likely to revolt.

There could be little doubt but that Bonaparte could easily overturn the throne of Spain; but that he could place another king there with any advantage to himself, was not only very doubtful but highly improbable. In the first place, it was impossible that such an enterprise should not be resisted by a part, if not by the whole nation.

A people when in a state of civil war, particularly one such as the Spaniards, could never be expected to supply a great sum in the form of taxes, and still less in forced contributions; so that Bonaparte by disturbing the peace of the kingdom, was evidently abandoning the revenue that he derived from that country before he placed his brother on the throne.

Not only did he abandon the revenue, but he

subjected himself to a very great and expensive demand for men and money, besides running the risque of not ultimately succeeding in the enterprise which he had undertaken.

The attack on Spain, a most subservient ally, was moreover a very unpopular measure in France, and highly discreditable to himself as a man of honour and principle; and, he was not long of feeling the consequences, for, from that time his power, influence, and popularity began to decline even amongst his own soldiers.

Merely as a military enterprise, his conduct in that affair merits little notice. He never commanded them in person as he had done in Italy and Germany, nor indeed did the French armies distinguish themselves as they had done in former wars. There was no enthusiasm, they felt that they were fighting against liberty, and that they were engaged in a bad cause: that there was no hopes of obtaining either honour or advantage, and, that even the ultimate success was more than doubtful.

When Britain, as she had so often before done, sent over an army to assist an oppressed nation, and when the South American provinces from whence Spain derived her chief revenues revolted, the matter became almost desperate; yet in the midst of all that, Bonaparte, instead of applying his whole force and attention to bringing the

matter to an advantageous termination, occupied himself in preparing to attack his ally the Emperor of Russia.

This was of all his attempts the most arduous, and accordingly he prepared for it the most formidable means. Several years were employed in getting ready what was deemed necessary, and in the most critical moment of the Spanish war, did he collect in Germany an army of above three hundred and fifty thousand French, with whom were united more than two hundred and fifty thousand troops, furnished by those states that either felt or feared his power*.

In the summer of 1812 he marched for Russia, with forces amounting in all to 610,000. Never had the world seen so great and so well appointed an army. In his preparation Bonaparte displayed his well-known skill and his indefatigable activity, but except in that nothing of the great general was to be seen.

The Russian empire was assailed at the beginning of winter, when it should have been done in the latter part of the spring. Bonaparte neither seems to have understood the nature of the country he was going to invade, the people by whom it was inhabited, nor the climate he had to encounter. He expected that by proclamations he could make the Russians rebel against their emperor, and that by hasty marches he could

* See Appendix, Note I.

arrive at Moscow the ancient capital, when the emperor would be glad to sue for peace. So badly however had he calculated, that he was wrong or mistaken in every point. The people instead of rising in his favour fled before him, destroying or removing every thing that was necessary for the support of his army. The French had many hard battles to fight before they arrived at Moscow, and when they arrived at that ancient capital, it was set on fire by the Russians themselves; so decided were both the government and people to resist every attempt either to subdue the country, or even to negotiate or accept of terms!

As the fate of this formidable army is well known, it would be superfluous to enter into details, but instead of any display of military skill in the business, the whole was nothing but ignorance and error from the beginning to the end. No great military character in any age ever made so many mistakes, nor ever did any general or emperor pay so dearly for the mistakes which he committed.

One great error in judgment in Bonaparte was, in his not securing the means of retreat in case his attempt should fail. This was unpardonable, and not much less so was his risking a loss of that reputation for invincibility, that acted as a spell to keep the world in subjection. As Bonaparte had through life been at great pains to impose

upon the world by false appearances, and, as he knew well the importance of a reputation for being invincible; as in all his proclamations he tried to inspire his enemies with that belief, he must have known that he was playing a very deep and dangerous game when he risqued his reputation against any advantage that he could gain by a victory over Russia.

Madame de Staël says, "that the emperor had become so high and proud that none of his confidential servants dared even to tell him that the winter was cold in Russia." This must either be sarcasm or exaggeration; but as that able writer knew well what she meant, and was generally well informed on the subjects that she wrote upon, it probably signifies that he was become so haughty and wilful, that no one dared to tell him a truth, if it happened to be one to thwart his intentions, or induce him to change.

The retreat from Moscow was conducted without order or skill. It was delayed for more than fourteen days after all hopes of passing the winter at Moscow were at an end, and there was neither now to be seen that quick determination nor prompt execution that distinguished Napoleon in the early part of his military career. Except for his inordinate pride and vanity and immeasurable ambition, he seemed to have degenerated into an ordinary character. His cruelty and lavishness of human life indeed remained, as his hanging a

hundred Russians for setting fire to Moscow by order of the governor, and his blowing up the bridge of Beresina to save himself.

Leaving his army in the hour of danger, when matters became desperate, was a favourite practice of this renowned general. He did so on four great occasions, and always attended with circumstances of mean secrecy and ungenerous treachery. First, he left his army in Egypt under the most wretched circumstances, and next in Russia, for no sooner had he passed the bridge of Beresina, than he ordered it to be blown up, though crowded with fugitives of his own army, and though vast numbers were left on the other side, when he fled as fast as possible.

The two other occasions on which he left his army to their fate, were after the battle of Leipsig, and after the battle of Waterloo; so that if he is highly admired for leading his troops to victory, he merits no less admiration for the ingenuity, the secrecy, and the velocity, with which he knew how to make a personal escape.

On his return to Paris, Bonaparte, far from feeling ashamed or abashed at having sacrificed so fine an army, directly began to prepare for a new expedition, to demand more money and more men, and to practise all those tricks that impose on the vulgar, and captivate their admiration and confidence at the same time*.

* Without the smallest intention to depreciate the character

SECTION VI.

The Campaign in Germany in 1813, against the Allies; the Battles in France, and Abdication at Fontainbleau.

THE fortunes of Napoleon had now suffered a severe reverse. From marching from conquest to conquest as formerly, his exertions must now be made for self-preservation.

No sooner had he abandoned his army, and the Russians advanced victoriously into Poland, than Prussia threw off the galling yoke. The Poles were compelled to join them; Austria became neutral; Westphalia revolted against Jerome Bonaparte, and the Dutch against the empire of which they had been compelled to form a portion.

It was a general rising for a combined effort against Napoleon and France, and the last act of the piece was about to be performed. Great generalship was certainly required at this time, more than on any former occasion, for here the stake was to the French emperor of far greater

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of so extraordinary a man, there certainly may be said to be a great similarity between his mysterious manners and those of Cagliostro, Mesmer, Salmanazar, Mahomet, and other impostors; Oliver Cromwell had a tinge of the same colour in his composition.

importance than it had ever before been at any period of his eventful life.

To palliate the misfortune and disgrace, was a task to which scarcely any other man in a similar situation would have submitted, and which very few could have performed, but Bonaparte was quite at home in the business; it neither cost him a sigh for those he had sacrificed, nor a blush for himself. He was almost the only person in Paris who had not lost a relation. The city was clothed in mourning, but the great man who had caused all the mischief, repeated again what he said when the brave general Desaix fell at the battle of Marengo, "Why have I not time to weep?"

Though the army that marched against Russia amounted to more than 600,000 men, yet not the half of that number went on to Moscow. Numbers of the French were slain or taken prisoners. All the allies, except the Saxons and Bavarians, had quitted the French standard; and of those that remained, a great part were in Dantzig and other fortified places, where they were blockaded by the Russians or the other powers*.

It was necessary to have an almost entirely new army, and some officers and non-commissioned officers were brought from the army in Spain to mix with the new levies.

Bonaparte in recruiting and raising the new

* See Appendix, Note K.

army, displayed all that rigour in the conscription, and that order and activity in the organization, for which he was, from his first arrival in Italy, distinguished above all the other French generals, and all generals that ever existed.

No troops in the world are so soon or so easily taught military discipline as the French. The use of the musquet they learn with peculiar facility, and by mixing a few veterans with new levies, the whole become fit for service in a few weeks.

In the French armies they are very careful to have steady and good serjeants and corporals. Their pay is better in proportion to that of the men and of the commissioned officers, than in most other armies; and so able and attentive are they, that if all the superior officers were by any accident to be killed, they could manœuvre and fight the regiments themselves.

When at the beginning of the Revolution nearly all the commissioned officers quitted their regiments, the cry was that the army was disorganized and rendered useless; but that was far from being the case, for the non-commissioned officers filled their places, and most of the generals who distinguished themselves, were serjeants in the year 1792*. This is a fact that deserves attention,

* The present king of Sweden was one, and remarkable not only for his prominent nose, but for an oil-skin hat which he wore. He was called from it the *oil-skin* serjeant.

and when regiments are disbanded in time of peace, the good non-commissioned officers should always be kept in pay, for they will soon, in case of war, enable a nation to form good new armies.

In about four months Bonaparte was able again to take the field. He fought well, and very desperately, but it is singular to remark, that he had abandoned the old and advantageous modes of fighting, which had so well succeeded; those modes, first adopted in the beginning of the Revolution, were always to have large masses opposed, by quick and rapid movements, to inferior armies. The rapid movements were still practised, but of what use were those rapid movements without the superiority of numbers? Rapid movements are always attended with great fatigue; and frequently artillery and other things are wanting by the army that puts such movements in practice; so that unless those disadvantages are more than compensated by superiority of numbers, they are injurious to the army that adopts them.

How it could happen that a military genius, like Bonaparte, could commit such an error, it is difficult to conceive, although it is not a new thing to observe persons, who have been long successful by adhering to certain wise rules, abandon them all at once, and ruin their fortunes, by that strange species of madness.

ot being able to explain on any reasonable principles this sort of conduct, mankind have fixed on a very equivocal word for expressing what they mean. *Infatuation* is the term used: it does not imply madness, neither does it signify being forced on by fate or destiny, but it is considered as applying to the actions of a man, when he follows and persists in a mode of proceeding which evidently leads to his ruin, or to thwart the end he proposes to attain.

Though this moral phenomenon has not been explained, and the word infatuation seems adopted for the express purpose of evading any definition of the thing, and though it seems to imply unaccountable weakness or folly; yet it occurs too frequently to men under similar circumstances, not to proceed from some uniform cause.

It would be easy to give a number of examples found in history, from the lives of distinguished men, and even from men in the ordinary walks of life, but the inquiry would be long, and here it would be misplaced; however, that sort of error or misconduct that is termed infatuation, appears to be the effect of three causes—ambition, when disappointed, despair of success, and a feeling in the person acting, that the end he pursues is a wrong one, and disapproved of by those whose approbation he desires, and has been accustomed to enjoy.

In such cases uncertainty, hesitation, and a want of decision seem to be the first consequences; and hesitation and want of decision are the two most ruinous things possible in important affairs. In some cases a determined obstinacy as to the end, but vacillation in employing the means, are generally the symptoms attendant on this sort of infatuation. Charles I. of England and James II. were both instances of a mixture of obstinacy and changeableness. When those monarchs found that the nation disapproved of their conduct, they no longer had that firmness that belonged to them in better times. They seemed as if under the influence of that indescribable infatuation.

If the staunch adherents of what are termed legitimate governments should be displeased at making a comparison between two English monarchs and Bonaparte, let it be remembered that it is not as to their right to govern, nor is it as to moral character that the comparison is made. Masaniello the Neapolitan revolutionist and Robespierre when they had attained what they aimed at, became in the same manner infatuated, and their energy deserted them; they, after being the most resolute and determined became quite the opposite of what they had before been, and neglected the common precautions for their own safety.

However this might have been with Napoleon

Bonaparte, it is certain that instead of collecting all the forces belonging to him that were in Germany and uniting them in one great army, he not only left troops in garrison at the different places that were useless, but even the army that he brought from France was not kept together; so that after many hard and well-contested battles, when his last great effort was made at Leipsic, he lost the day chiefly owing to the division of his forces, for, had they all been there on that day he probably might have gained the victory.

His main object ought to have been to defeat the great body of the allies by meeting them with all his force in the neighbourhood of Leipsic or Dresden; but in place of that, General Vandamme was with considerable forces at a distance on his right, while other generals were again reducing to obedience Hamburgh and that part of the country on the lower Elbe that had revolted, though such measures were entirely useless; for, if he succeeded, the whole country would soon be subdued, and if he failed, their having been once more reduced to obedience, was of no sort of importance.

The errors he committed as a general admit of no excuse, and he soon found that they admitted of no remedy, for, when the Bavarians, the only ally that remained of any effectual importance, found that fortune had abandoned his standard,

and that he was only leading his followers to destruction, they abandoned him likewise.

All this probably would not have happened had he not, after beginning the campaign with vigour and with full as much success as he had any right to expect, agreed to an armistice which was the most fatal step that he could possibly take, and one for which there was no excuse.

He had no more forces to expect from France, whereas the Russians and Prussians were increasing in strength. On the day after the armistice was signed (the 5th of June), the King of Prussia issued an address to his army from his head-quarters at Obergradtz, in which he shews that he fully appreciated the advantage, and perceived the error into which the French emperor had fallen:

"The enemy," says his majesty, "has proposed an armistice; I have with my allies accepted it till the 20th of July. This has been done to the end that the national strength which my people have so laudably put forth may attain its full growth. An unwearied activity, and uninterrupted exertions will lead to this end. Hitherto the enemy has surpassed us in force; we could only regain our national honours; we must now avail ourselves of this short interval to become sufficiently strong, that in the end we may conquer our independence. Be firm in your reso-

lution, put confidence in your king, continue as you have done hitherto, and we shall gain our sacred point."

Can any thing more plainly shew than this does, the error into which Bonaparte had fallen; but still the king of Prussia only contemplated a part of the advantages. The emperor of Austria, who, though he had quitted the standard of Bonaparte, immediately after his reverse in Russia, still remained neuter; but during this armistice the allies gained him over, though not without difficulty, to their side.

After such an error, what was to be expected? With his newly-raised army, consisting chiefly of very young recruits, though in superior numbers, he had with difficulty been able to maintain the contest against an army of new allies scarcely amalgamated and combined. The crown prince of Sweden had not even had time to join the confederacy with his army of 45,000 men; and all, in short, that the allies wanted was obtained during this fatal cessation of hostilities.

It would be difficult with the energy and the means that Bonaparte must be allowed to have possessed, to commit greater mistakes, or push on with greater rapidity to certain ruin; and the end he took for that purpose was fully equal to the means employed, for nothing but misfortune followed on misfortune till the battle of Leipsig, after which he, according to custom, fled, leaving

his army to its fate, and blowing up the bridge over which he made his escape, that he might prosecute his journey with greater safety.

No attempt was made to retreat in a regular manner, and so fall back on France with forces that might defend the country. His army was, as might be expected, cut up and destroyed a second time, and he arrived, for the second time, a disgraced fugitive, having sacrificed a numerous army to his wild ambition and personal obstinacy, personal vanity, and personal safety!

Whatever may be said about the military talents of this wonder of the world, and however opinions may differ respecting them, there is no room whatever to contest or hold in doubt his matchless audacity and want of shame.

As on his return from Russia, after sacrificing the finest army, for numbers, equipments, and discipline, that ever took the field, his first step was to make known his disaster, without either disguise or palliation. On this, as on the former occasion, he rather exaggerated the extent of the calamity, stating at the same time "that he must have a fresh army, for that now the danger was nearer at the door, and that the conquerors would follow him into France."

The safety of the country and every thing was to be risked to gratify his personal pride, for the allies wanted nothing more than peace, and to leave him ruler of Old France, undiminished and

entire as it was before the revolution ; but though defeated twice with disgrace and disaster, he would listen to nothing of that sort; and such was the power he had over the miserable and enslaved nation, such was the want of firmness and honour in those who pretended to legislate for it, that they acquiesced in his unreasonable demands, and still more unreasonable pretensions.

The evil was done, and to grant supplies of men and money seemed necessary for national safety. Those who granted the supplies ought, had they felt either the dignity of men, or been possessed of the smallest share of integrity, to have insisted on a negotiation for the independence of the country, without any regard to the insolent pretensions of extended empire.

The allies were not long in following the hero into his own retreat; and, for the first time, the French felt, on their own ground, those evils that, for twenty years, they had been making other nations feel.

The contest could not be long, and to any common understanding, the issue could not be uncertain. The infatuation that hurried on the ruin of Bonaparte the year before, was now changed to desperation and madness; for though he was playing for his last stake, though the enemies were approaching Paris, and negotiators on the part of the allies were soliciting him to

be reasonable,—to spare his country and himself,—he would listen to nothing.

His conduct resembled that of the Jews when Titus besieged Jerusalem; when they had no hope of success, and the merciful Roman general requested them to have pity on themselves.

Bonaparte's obstinacy and desperation increased with the danger; and at last, when the combined armies found that negotiating with such a madman was in vain, they all at once, on the 22d of March, determined to advance by main force to Paris, the capital, which they reached on the last day of the month, and into which they entered without any resistance that deserves to be mentioned*.

The great general, that had for so many years astonished mankind by his victories, when he found himself cut off from the capital by the allies, turned suddenly off to the palace of Fontainbleau, to await the issue of what should happen in the capital.

It is not easy to say what was Bonaparte's intention by this step. Had he called all his forces together, he might, like Frederick the Great, have carried on the war, and perhaps retrieved his fortune; but, he thus gave up the contest, appearing to be more attentive to his own personal safety, than to any thing else. If

* See Appendix, Note L.

a judgment is to be formed by his conduct in abandoning his defeated army in Russia in 1813, —from his abandoning his defeated army in Germany in 1814,—and from his abandoning his defeated army after the battle of Waterloo in 1815, we are justified in concluding that he wished to be in safety, and let those remain in danger who did not possess the same means that he had.

Thus ended the grand scheme for subduing Europe, and after more than five millions of people had fallen victims to the ambition of one man, the country that had supported him in his wild unprincipled plans, had the disgrace of seeing its capital in the hands of those nations whom it had so long pillaged and insulted.

Those who have been enthusiastic admirers of the military talents of Napoleon, will think that he is here treated with too much severity; but, independent of party prejudice, there is a great difference between looking at his military exploits and those of other generals. Where are the generals of any continental state that had such enthusiastic armies to command, or could be so prodigal of life to obtain victory?

It may be said that the French generals were all greatly inferior to him, as they lost Italy when he was absent, and he regained it; but let such persons recollect that Bonaparte was under

no control, and other generals were. First of all, the Directory regulated the supplies both of men and money; Bonaparte, on the contrary, regulated the Directory: secondly, other generals respected, to a certain degree, the lives of their men, and of the inhabitants of the country; but Bonaparte cared for none of those things, and when that prodigality could no longer be practised, he found he could no longer conquer.

The great proof, however, of impartiality in this analysis is, that no disgraceful or doubtful accusation has been brought in against him; but all the conclusions are drawn from well-known, and avowed facts, not only such as are undeniable, but undenied.

No general was ever so changed by adversity, or gave up the point contested so suddenly when once his resources failed; when at the head of a powerful army, he had more presumption than almost any other man, but when deprived of that, no fallen man was ever so tame and crestfallen.

His abdication at Fontainbleau was conducted altogether in a theatrical style. He quitted empire with all that sort of unmeaning and unfeeling Charlatanism that had distinguished him through the whole of his public life. That he intended even then to return from Elba, when he should see occasion, is not doubtful; and except at the con-

vention of Cintra, never were conquerors so mistified and over-reached by those that they had conquered *.

Here folly dash'd to earth the victor's plume;
And policy regain'd what arms had lost,
For chiefs like those, in vain may laurels bloom.
Woe to the conquering, not the conquer'd, host.
Will not the French, and other nations, sneer,
To view those champions cheated of their fame,
By foes in fight o'erthrown, yet victors here,
Where scorn her finger points through many a coming year.

BYRON.

SECTION VII.

From the Commencement of Hostilities, in 1815, *to the Abdication at Paris.*

THE last and most desperate attempt of this astonishing man, was his return from the island of Elba. Then his boldness and audacity; his want of attention to his promise; his contempt for those whom he had conquered, and who had at last finished by conquering him; and his total indifference to the peace of mankind, were all manifested at once in a manner the most complete that it was possible to conceive.

On this occasion he was much more indebted

* See Appendix, Note M.

to the imbecility of his enemies than to any efforts of his friends. He returned to France and seated himself in the palace of the Thuilleries without any opposition; not that the nation wished for a return of the severe regimen under which he had held them, but because after his active and able reign the government of Louis XVIII. gave great dissatisfaction *.

Louis was not personally disliked, and his intentions were believed to be good, but he brought with him a multitude of the old nobility, who brought nothing with them but their ancient pride and prejudice, accompanied with hatred and contempt for the new order of things. Men more unfit to assist in governing France could not have been found. Pride is at all times and seasons, and under all circumstances, a bad qualification for public men; but when accompanied by ignorance and poverty, it is altogether intolerable. Wealth and talents alone can make men bear with patience the sway of men who have not modesty or wisdom sufficient to conceal their pride, but the emigrants had as little wisdom and modesty as they had talents and wealth; and, as the king had given them power, the nation was so disgusted that had not Bonaparte arrived from Elba, his majesty was on the very point of being assailed by his indignant subjects.

Bonaparte displayed his wonderful powers of

* See Appendix, Note N.

assembling an army, and creating military stores, weapons, and ammunition, of all which he found France nearly destitute, and in little more than two months he was in a condition to take the field, and boldly to wage offensive war against all the powers, by whose united efforts he had been hurled from his throne little more than a year before.

With such wonderful expedition and secrecy did he proceed, that only three days before the Prussians were attacked, there was not in that country the appearance of an enemy, or even the appearance of preparations for warlike enterprise.

Troops, and every thing necessary came from different points, and met on the frontier of Flanders, with that precision that is scarcely attained when an operation is often repeated, and which had never before been witnessed on such an occasion.

The army consisted of new levies of the wrecks of the old veterans, who had served under the emperor before his fall; of men who had enlisted in the service of Louis; but though they were so conquered, they all acted like Frenchmen fighting for the honour of their country, and to protect it from a second invasion*.

Admirable as this effort was, nothing could be more rash or ill-advised. It was an act of des-

* See Appendix, Note O.

peration. Now, though the greatest generals may be reduced to act with desperation, they do not usually lay down plans for that purpose. Necessity alone is a sufficient excuse for putting the safety of a state to the hazard of a single battle, and that by no means under favourable circumstances.

If the accounts published by Bonaparte himself are true, the allies, although Russia and Austria had not come up, were far superior in numbers to the French. I do not believe they were superior, but Bonaparte has said so, and therefore was a very rash man to attack such superior forces in the way he did.

If, on the contrary, Bonaparte did not state the matter truly, then he loses his claim to superior talents by allowing himself to be beat by an inferior force.

My readers will, I hope, observe, that I do not enter into the question of actual superiority of numbers. I should then be deviating from my plan; I confine myself to saying, that, which way soever the matter was, Bonaparte, by his conduct, forfeited his claim to the title of a first-rate general.

It may be said that Bonaparte was under the necessity of attacking the English and Prussians before the Russians and Austrians joined them; but who told him, when he first laid his plan, that the Prussians and Austrians would hang back, and

leave the whole burthen of the war to England and Prussia?

When Bonaparte defied all Europe in his Field of May, he expected to combat all Europe, and the whole of his plan depended on his being able to do so. One portion of the forces being advanced against him, and the other not, was an accidental occurrence, for which he had no right to hope; and though it might justify his assembling his forces, and beginning hostilities on the 15th of June, yet it by no means justified his general plan.

The most that can be said for him as a soldier in regard to the plan is, that he had determined to risk every thing, in order to reinstate himself on the throne of France; that he was totally indifferent to the welfare of the French nation, to what numbers might perish, not to procure him success, but merely the chance of succeeding! And this is the man who is thought to have been severely treated when he was sent to St. Helena, to prevent his ever again playing such a desperate game!

The Prussians were certainly attacked by superior forces on the 15th of June, and there was no great glory obtained by the French from that victory, nor from any thing that happened previous to the great and decisive day, when the two most famous generals of England and France met each other for the first time and the last.

So many accounts have been given of that battle by military men who did see it, and with such variations, that it would be vain presumption to determine which is the most true*; moreover it would be deviating from my plan to enter into the inquiry which could not advance the cause in which I am engaged.

It has been attempted by several French writers, and even by one who assumes the name of Napoleon himself, to be proved that Bonaparte did every thing like a great general on that day, though he failed; and that Wellington did every thing like a bad general, though he succeeded; in short, they wish to make it be believed that ignorance triumphed over the most consummate skill, not by accident, but by a chain of accidents or events that would have been completely miraculous had they been but true. The impertinence of publishing such an absurdity, and expecting that it would be believed by any man of sense, is beyond all common comprehension, and to attempt to answer it would be equally absurd †.

The details of that great contest being intricate and contradictory, I can only fix on some great points that serve to make us appreciate the military skill of Bonaparte.

As the Duke of Wellington had chosen an excellent position, and as it would have been

* See Appendix, Note P. † Ibid. Note Q.

very easy to draw him from it either by turning to the right, to give Prussia another drubbing, or by passing on to Brussels or Ghent, by the left.

On the morning of the 18th of June, Bonaparte had the choice of these two movements, or that of attacking the English in their chosen, (and well chosen,) position. The great and wonderful general determined on the most desperate and difficult of the three, and the fatal consequences to him and his army are too well known to be repeated.

Whether it might have been better to turn to the right or to the left, may be a matter of doubt; but that either of the two, by drawing Wellington from his excellent position, would have been better than attacking him in it (is clear), particularly as there was no doubt that the Prussian army would join, and it was very much to be doubted if General Grouchy would come up in time.

It is more than probable that Bonaparte knew that there was little chance of Grouchy coming to his aid, for though he did not know where that general really was, he knew perfectly well that he was at a considerable distance.

The only way of accounting for the conduct of Bonaparte on that decisive day, is, that in his vanity and pride, he despised both the English general and the army under his command.

The best excuse for this conduct, and a very

lame one it certainly is, consists in his never before having seen a British army engaged in a battle. He might, however, and indeed, as a good general, he ought to have recollected that, in equal numbers, the British troops never sustained a defeat;—that, with inferior numbers, they have often gained great victories, and that they were then under a general whose talents were well known, and in whom his army had the fullest confidence. Bonaparte might have remembered what the English army had done in Egypt, and how the brave troops that he had left there were handled and disposed of. The battles of Maida, of Barossa, of Talavera, and many others, were specimens of what English soldiers, when well officered, could do. Had the proud and vainglorious Napoleon wished to go farther back, he might refer for the character of British soldiers to the campaigns of the Duke of Marlborough, to those of our brave Henry at Agincourt, and the no less brave Black Edward on the field at Cressy.

Bonaparte was a fatalist, and he said that he had often observed a sort of obstinate madness seized on men when their last hour was near at hand. As the last hour of his political existence and power approached, he was perhaps under that influence, for he by no means conducted himself either with prudence or skill.

It is not very easy, from the different accounts

of that battle, to learn the true state of the matter, and some important circumstances seem either to have been overlooked by mistake, or suppressed with intention.

Between the main bodies of the two armies, it appears that there was a ravine or hollow, of such a width, that grape-shot or mitraille could produce little effect *. As the English were on the defensive, they had no occasion to descend into the hollow, and therefore the French cuirassiers, and other cavalry, had to come across to attack the impenetrable squares that were formed on the northern side of the ravine.

The Duke of Wellington knew perfectly that Prince Blucher would come to his aid, therefore all that he had to do, was to keep his position. Napoleon, on the other hand, though not equally certain, expected to be attacked either on his right or his rear by the Prussians, and as he had no hope of a reinforcement by the arrival of Grouchy, his business was to bring the contest to an issue as soon as possible; but this the steadiness, bravery, and advantageous position of the English rendered impossible. In vain did he give his positive and repeated orders to dispossess the English. The miserable victims of his ambition did what it was possible for them to do to obey his orders, but their efforts were vain; and if even Grouchy had arrived, and the Prussians

* See Appendix, Note R.

had not, the British would probably have kept their position. Bonaparte, however, is said to have confidently expected to arrive at Brussels that very evening, and this expectation he is said to have expressed, after the Prussians had appeared on his right, and not two hours before his final overthrow.

The unaccountable manner in which the French general left a corps of 20,000 men unemployed, when their assistance was so pressingly wanted, is a proof that he no longer possessed that ready and penetrating military skill that distinguished him so much on all former occasions, and particularly at the battles of Marengo and of Austerlitz.

He had indeed often found an advantage in keeping a powerful *corps de reserve*, that might be brought suddenly into action when the victory was doubtful, and decide the fortune of the day; but in this case the Prussians were approaching, and the fresh troops ought either to have been sent against them, or brought into action, to make one great effort before the Prussians arrived; but he did neither, and his army was discouraged and dismayed before he ordered the last grand attack, which was to him so fatal, and of such short duration.

The main body of the British army had sustained a number of severe attacks, but in comparison to those who assailed it was still unbroken

and unfatigued; so that when the French gave way the rout was one of the most terrible and most complete that ever was witnessed.

It is disputed, and certainly remains doubtful, whether or not Bonaparte headed his troops at the last great effort; but the probability is, that he did not, for he was amongst the foremost of those who fled, and his personal safety appears to have been by no means neglected, though he might easily have anticipated the ruin that followed, and the total impossibility of retrieving his fortune, or even of stopping the progress of the enemy *.

If he had weakened his army very improvidently by detaching General Grouchy, he had not diminished his force by leaving any troops behind to cover his retreat in case of disaster, and by that means the fugitive army had no means of rallying or stopping the progress of the enemy. Nothing of that sort was attempted, and to fly with speed, and disperse, were the only means left of preventing total destruction.

That Bonaparte was not aware of the great error that he had committed in giving battle when success would only have led to future struggles after the Russians and Austrians arrived, and when defeat was decisive of his fate, appears evident from the manner in which he acted on his return to Paris; for, when waited upon by a deputation from the assembly, he was in a warm

* See Appendix, Note S.

bath, eating from a basin of soup; when he coolly replied to the deputation that he must have three hundred thousand men, and three hundred millions of money. 'He seemed to expect that he had but to signify his wish, to have his misfortune and misconduct repaired by such a waste of men and of treasure. He did not see that with a victorious army of British and Prussians approaching the capital, and with the Russians and Austrians following fast after, there was not either time or means to raise the money or the men, even if the ruling powers at Paris had been disposed to overlook his misconduct and misfortunes, and still less did he apprehend that the will to do so would be wanting.

The altered state of France and the still greater alteration in the confidence and power he formerly enjoyed, appear not to have entered at all into his mind. The same confidence that he possessed after his return from Egypt and his terrible disasters in Russia remained with him still, and he seemed to have forgot that the allies had once before entered Paris, that he himself was a returned exile and not an emperor. That France had already felt her inability to combat a combined world in arms. That it had no longer the pride of conquest or the hopes of victory; and that both morally and physically France was unable to maintain the contest.

Accustomed as Bonaparte was to rule and to

receive implicit obedience, he had no reason to expect further support. Had he tried to rally his forces and make a stand against the armies that were advancing on the capital, he might have been entitled to support, and he might have expected that he would still enjoy some degree of confidence and consideration; but having, merely to gratify his own ambition entered into France that wanted repose, and a second time plunged it in war, knowing that to crush him personally was the great object of the allies in entering a second time into that distracted country; the wonder is that he did not see that he would be abandoned, if not sacrificed, in order to obtain peace, and avoid a second entrance of enemies into the capital.

The abandoning his defeated army, and leaving the capital uncovered and unprotected, was conduct of which no general but himself would have been guilty. Had he been put in prison on his arrival it would have been but right, and what he ought to have expected, for, on this occasion he was the sole cause of the misfortunes and dangers of the country. At present his conduct as a general only is to be considered, and as such no general ever quitted his defeated army in so disgraceful a manner. To call it cowardice is not sufficient; bravery and its opposite depend much on the nerves and the physical state of the man, but Bonaparte's

repeatedly quitting the army in the hour of disaster, arose evidently from that cool calculating selfishness which directed his actions at all times. To retire from danger, and leave those whom he had led into it to suffer, was with him merely a matter of policy. Fear or feeling seem to have had nothing to do with the matter; for, when it was necessary to rush into danger, he could do that with as much coolness as he could fly from it.

On this last occasion, however, his former penetration and judgment abandoned him entirely, and he not only did the thing that was the most disgraceful but the most ruinous for himself. What took place afterwards was what followed very naturally, and what any man with good sense and less vanity might have foreseen.

After exciting France to break the engagements she had entered into the year before, and dragging her armies to the frontiers, he left the armies to their fate, and expected that the country would still continue to support his fallen fortunes. Never was there a greater mistake, and with it ended the military and political career of Napoleon Bonaparte, before whom all the sovereigns of the Continent had bowed, and the people trembled.

Never was there a more complete fall. When a conqueror, from being at the head of an army is taken prisoner and sleeps on straw, the fall is not

half so great as was that of Napoleon Bonaparte, whose degradation was that of the mind. He had been haughty beyond measure but a few days before, and now he was humble to a degree that would excite pity for the object, if ever he had himself known what pity was.

It should be observed that the humiliation of this fallen man did not arise from a feeling of his own misconduct, for he asked unblushingly and without ceremony for more money and more men after his return. His pride, confidence, and haughtiness, only left him when he found his power and influence gone, and it was not now as at Fontainebleau. The allies did not act like quite such novices in the art of settling terms with the conquered. Their laurels were not this time quite thrown away, and Bonaparte felt the consequence of not keeping his promise. When at the head of a great army and a powerful nation, he could break his faith with impunity; but he found that when deprived of power, he must pay the forfeit incurred by his want of honour when he quitted the island of Elba.

The Duke of Wellington probably remembered the convention at Cintra, where he lost by negotiation what he had gained by fighting, and instead of the Emperor of Russia who arrived first in 1814, the Duke and Prince Blucher were the men to lay down the law to the conquered foe.

Vanity and the reputation of magnanimity were

not the guides of those great generals. Last year's blunders were not to be repeated, for, though the price those blunders would cost was not altogether known, yet the lives lost were ascertained, and that the expense in money would not be small was shrewdly suspected.

It has since been ascertained that the expense of the reign of one hundred days of Bonaparte has been to England and France together nearly about one hundred millions sterling *. This pretty adventure would not have taken place had not the officers who surrounded Bonaparte and negotiated for him, deceived or more properly overreached and outwitted their conquerors.'

There are various opinions on this subject, and there always will be; for, notwithstanding the mercifulness of the allies in the first instance of taking Paris, there are persons who think that Bonaparte personally was then treated with too much severity.

It would be useless to reason with those who

* The war taxes continued one year, and loans made in England came to more than sixty millions; and, first and last, the French had to pay about nearly as much, so that the little voyage of the Emperor Napoleon cost a million sterling a-day, which is equal to 40,000*l.* every hour. "In France they have calculated that about five millions of men fell to satiate his ambition, and they make that out to be one man per minute for fifteen years. This is a mistake, it is not so much, but Bonaparte very coolly used to say, "he expended ten thousand men a month."

think so, even if this were the place for doing it, and if there were sufficient time for the purpose, as the ideas of justice and moral rectitude of such persons must be too much perverted to admit of their understanding a fair argument founded on right and justice *.

Surely talents and the title of emperor did not entitle Bonaparte to seize on the Duc d'Enghien on neutral ground, to drag him to Paris, and have him murdered; for that alone he deserved to answer as brigands or the chiefs of banditti are always made to do when they are caught. I say nothing of the other murders he committed, for though they were many, one is quite sufficient to have warranted very different usage from what he met with.

When the peace of the world was at stake, the allies would have been fully warranted in taking whatever measures might be thought on a fair view of the matter, necessary to prevent the same recurrence of evils; but the truth is, that they were so dazzled by their unexpected success, and by having in their power the man who had so often made them tremble, that they were happy to make any arrangement to get him away from those troops, which, though defeated and scattered, were still very numerous, and might become desperate.

The spell by which the magician held Europe

* See Appendix, Note T.

in subjection had not then entirely lost its power; but in 1815, after the battle of Waterloo, matters were quite different, and accordingly he was treated in a very different manner. He had been a captive before, and was now considered merely as an ambitious disturber of the public peace of Europe. His invincibility had been fairly put to the test, and he was no longer looked upon as the hero who could command the destinies of the world.

The mild manner in which Paris had been treated the year before had now one good effect. The approach of the allies was looked upon without fear, even by those who were sorry for their success, and by many it was looked forward to as the hour of deliverance. So that no formidable resistance was attempted, and if it had been attempted, could not have been effectual.

Lucien Bonaparte, and several of his adherents did all they could to inspire courage into their fallen chief; but he seems to have very soon seen that his reign was at an end, and judging by what had before taken place, he thought that personally he had little to fear for his own dear self, for he was so vain and so ignorant of the broken faith of which he was guilty, that he thought himself still an object of admiration.

He might certainly have gone beyond the Loire, and putting himself at the head of the army, have made farther resistance; but as he was anxious

for personal safety, and his methods of fighting with great numbers of men, large resources in money, and treating the country in which he fought as if the lives and property of all it contained were at his command, he was probably enough aware that he was not calculated to succeed in that sort of warfare.

Great as his personal vanity was, the very maxims he pursued, and his mode of carrying on war, were such that he could have no hope of succeeding if the armies of the enemy were more numerous and better supplied than his own. It was probably owing to his being sensible of this, that he always abandoned his army when he found it inferior to that of the enemy.

On all occasions we find other great generals, when they met with heavy reverses, make exertions to overcome them, and there the greatest generalship has been shewn, but Bonaparte never made an attempt of the sort. While any means was within his reach of fighting with advantage, he would fight with vigour; while he had numbers, he had temerity; and, in an enemy's country, he could *kill* and *pillage*, but making war in France, where to kill and pillage would not answer, and with an army inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, he would have disgraced himself as a general at once, and probably have fallen a sacrifice to his own soldiers.

The tame manner in which Bonaparte abdicated

twice, and the shameful manner in which he abandoned his army on four different occasions, were all arising from the same motives. He felt himself in a situation, where the sort of talents that he possessed could not be exerted to advantage, and as he was a cool calculator, he resolved that they should not be exerted at all.

Bonaparte, by never struggling against adversity, or superior power, shewed what sort of talents he possessed. They were talents which, where his means were superior, enabled him to achieve the most brilliant victories; but when he could no longer astonish and command, he sunk at once into the sullen selfish hypocrite, trying to impose by an affectation of philosophy and resignation, on those around him, for in every situation, after he had attained rank and power, he was a perfect slave to his endeavours to be respected, and to keep others at a distance *.

SECTION VII.

General Reflections on Bonaparte as a military Character.

No comparison between the military career of Bonaparte, and other generals, either ancient or modern, can lead to a fair conclusion respecting

* See Appendix, Note U.

his merit and abilities, for never did any general or sovereign possess the means that he did of defeating his opponents.

His merit, or perhaps to speak more properly, the talent in which he surpassed all other men of every age, were in seizing on, and keeping possession of, supreme power, distancing his equals, keeping his superiors in awe, and gaining the complete confidence of the soldiers. The means he used for this was what stamped his character with the great, the extraordinary, and the wonderful.

From his earliest age, he was constantly reading the lives of great and ambitious men. Alexander, Cæsar, Hannibal, Charles XII. of Sweden, and Oliver Cromwell, all served him for models; and though he copied more from the two latter than the former, yet he had some resemblance to all, with this great advantage, that he never gave a loose to any passion but such as contributed to advance his interest and gratify his ambition.

To his attentive study of the lives of great warriors, he added the policy of Machiavel, whom he took for a master and a guide. He adopted maxims and rules contained in short sentences, such as have guided the ambitious and selfish in all ages, and his uncommon and superior mind enabled him to apply them with more steadiness and advantage than any other man,

and above all, he excelled in adapting them to his situation.

In his first campaign in Italy, he displayed at once, in their full force and vigour, those means by which he always gained an ascendency over the enemy.

The whole of the small and independent states were threatened by him in the most audacious manner, if they did not supply his army with every thing that it wanted. He made out lists with as great regularity of the supplies to be furnished by the Italian princes, as if he had been making out orders for contractors whom he was to pay for every thing they furnished, and he was more punctually obeyed than most generals are by the contractors whom they do pay.

To his soldiers he promised full liberty to pillage, ravish, and destroy, on condition that they would be strictly obedient and attentive to their duty as soldiers. The condition was gladly accepted, and rigorously enforced; but as the reward was of so terrible and unprincipled a nature, the inhabitants in some cases revolted in his absence, but the unfortunate people soon found a terrible result. At Pavia and Milan, the inhabitants resolved to make an effort to obtain relief; but the revenge of Bonaparte was terrible. The village of Benasco was given to the flames; Milan given up to pillage, and many of its prin-

cipal inhabitants put to death. The municipal officers of Pavia were all shot, and 200 of the most respectable inhabitants sent as hostages to France.

A proclamation was issued, that every person found with arms in his possession should be shot; and, as it was evident that the French general would keep his word, that fine country, and all that was in it, was as completely in his power, and at his disposal, as if it had been his property by purchase.

Against a leader of a desperate, but regularly trained and organized banditti, commanded by a number of able generals and incessantly recruited from a country containing near thirty millions of inhabitants, how could generals, fighting in a regular way, and respecting the rights of the people, carry on successful war?

The loss of men or of money was no object to the French general; the whole country had been trained to arms; he therefore could afford to gain victories at a price which no other general could afford to pay. We often see in common life a man of very ordinary talents, but with great pecuniary means, do things that make us overrate his abilities, and men's actions can only be compared when they are in similar circumstances.

The great thing then in which Bonaparte sur-

passed all others, was in a rigid and indefatigable attention, with a mind obstructed by no moral principle, and completely unfettered by feelings of humanity. This same mode of proceeding gained him success wherever it could be put in practice; but where that could not be done, his force failed him. He was like a bird fluttering in vacuo, in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump, when the flapping of its wings are of no avail.

Great talents were necessary to all this; but those talents were not essentially military. Amidst disorders of every kind, Bonaparte was diligently attentive to providing his army with all that was necessary; and he had an admirable talent for preserving that sort of order that was conducive to success.

The most distinguishing and astonishing part of his character was the ability with which he commanded officers that were abler than himself, maintaining a superiority to which they submitted without a murmur, as if it had been founded upon a right.

Perhaps this may be accounted for, by a consciousness of his superior talents for organizing, plunder, and pillage, yet still preserving discipline. The other generals, though brave and skilful, were willing to share in the plunder; but it would be doing them injustice to say that

any of them, Augereau excepted, would have taken the desperate, unfeeling and unprincipled means adopted by Napoleon.

The example of Julius Cæsar was followed by Bonaparte in his conduct to the officers of his army. He supplied them with money, or put them in the way to supply themselves, and he never gave them any reason to complain of his avarice. His ambition was of a higher order than that of amassing money; and, in that respect, he may rank with the first of the great men that have astonished the world. Money, to him, was only considered as a means of obtaining the end he had in view, and his confidence in himself made him part with it with an unsparing hand, as if he knew that he could always obtain more.

When he was to engage in any wars, he took care to be well informed, either by ambassadors or spies, of the force of the enemy; his resources; and the characters of the generals; their modes of fighting, *&c.*

He spared no expense to obtain information, and that through different channels, that he might not be deceived, for he had little confidence in men in general, and knew well the danger of proceeding on false information *.

He scarcely ever encountered an enemy in whose camp he had not bought over some of the officers; and there are instances where the vic-

* See Appendix, Note V.

tory was obtained chiefly by treachery. The battle of Jena is the most remarkable example; but in all cases, there was more or less of this ingredient in the composition of his success.

When he had got full information, and had indirectly by treachery and other means prepared the way, he endeavoured to collect an army one-third or one-half superior in numbers, at the same time that he carefully disguised his superiority from the enemy.

His regiments were reviewed with the greatest care, and every soldier provided with what was necessary, and he made the colonels and captains suffer severely whenever arms or necessaries were of a bad quality, or out of order.

Having thus taken every precaution that skill and most indefatigable attention and rigorous discipline enabled him to take, in order to ensure success; with French soldiers, full of enthusiasm and ambition, and able officers to second him, there is no wonder that great victories were achieved.

It must also be considered that independent of the skill of Bonaparte or of any individual officer, the French revolutionists must have been successful so long as the enthusiasm of the soldiers lasted, and the nations they attacked continued to follow their old modes of fighting, and their selfish plans. Not only were there jealousies between the nations attacked by the French, but

their generals were jealous of each other. Details of those would be too long, besides they were caused by and accompanied with intrigues that cannot for many years be perfectly understood—their effects however are known. Austria and Prussia, which were conquered separately, might have jointly conquered. The Archduke Charles, the best of the Austrian generals, and who might have been thought to be out of the reach of either envy or intrigue from his high imperial rank and high military service, was unaccountably made to resign his command.

Such men as the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia had no chance when placed in competition with Bonaparte. They followed a selfish system of policy and in a crooked and contemptible way. He followed a system still more selfish and unprincipled, but on the greatest and grandest plan.

Napoleon himself, when he wanted to terminate a conversation with a man who had given him a great deal of information, (but who was beginning to repeat what he had already said,) took out his watch, observing "that every thing must have an end." Now his successes, which had been so rapid and uninterrupted while the French had the energy of hope and plunder of the enemy, had an end also. Bonaparte was like an able swimmer, who went with the tide in his favour, till the French found that their victories did not pro-

duce the advantages that they expected, and that their fatigues and labours were likely to have no end*.

The conscription also, that terrible calamity, from which no family was exempted either by rank or fortune, made the French tired of a war that could never add to the military glory they had already gained, and, far from increasing, lessened their security.

The attack on Spain was highly impolitic, and nothing more unlike a great general could be done than that of marching against Russia before the war in Spain was brought to a termination. The discontented state of Prussia was well known to Bonaparte, and he laid the foundation for equally great discontents in Poland, by making promises which he never intended to keep.

It was evident to many that his career would not last long, and an English anonymous writer, in a paper called *Anticipation*, in the year 1808, predicts the general rising of Europe in a very particular manner, and nearly as it has taken place. I have given two extracts in the Appendix from that work, which prove that Bonaparte erred, both as a general and politician, and that an individual at a distance could see the error and its natural termination. In 1808 the war with Spain was but beginning, and nothing was more unlikely than hostilities with Russia;

* See Appendix, Note W.

so that it is fair to conclude, that even previous to the successes of the Spaniards, and their allies the English, the seeds of calamity were sown, and the result was foreseen.

As a general, there is no excuse for Bonaparte not seeing that the military career of France was nearly run; and when, for the sake of being the founder of a dynasty, he had divorced his wife, in order to marry the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, it is astonishing that he did not try to consolidate his empire, rather than to give it farther extension, and that at the risk of total ruin.

To conclude, then, the general view of the military talents of Bonaparte, I think it is fair to say, that if they had not been called into action in the most favourable period of the Revolution, and been supported by great armies, supplied lavishly by his cruelty and rapacity, he would not even have been a second-rate general. This conclusion seems fair, because as soon as those means failed him, his success failed him also.

It is useless to compare him with other generals, because no other general in the world ever possessed the means that were at his disposal; any comparison of that sort, would be like comparing a man armed with the club of Hercules to another wielding an ordinary cane.

In analyzing his character, his total want of moral

rectitude, and his want of feeling, which were great beyond example, are only to be so far considered as they influence his success and conduct as a general; and, therefore, in stating his extortions and cruelties in Italy, I only wished them to be considered as the means by which he combated his enemy with advantage. The enemy did not carry on the campaign on an equal footing with such a man, though, as is the case in common life, the rapid and wasteful career was not calculated to be of long duration, neither could it be practised in all countries.

In Spain the country afforded nothing like the fertile plains of Italy, either to supply the wants of his army, or to tempt the plundering soldiers, and there Bonaparte committed the warfare to his generals. It did not afford a prospect or possibility of obtaining such success as crowned his arms in Italy, and the same was the case in Russia, but then Bonaparte never expected to be obliged to fight with the Russians in the manner that he was compelled to do.

His idea was, that the terror of his arms and of his name would ensure him success. That the Emperor Alexander would, with that mildness of which he knew him to be possessed, prefer peace to war, and he mistook him much; but, as the political blunders of Bonaparte are not at present the object of our inquiry, it is as a military measure that the Russian expedition is to be viewed:

It was too late in the season before the march to Russia was begun, and whatever grounds Bonaparte might suppose he had for expecting that he would meet with no resistance, still he should have made some preparations for the means of retreating, in case it should be found to be necessary; for unless it was quite certain that the Emperor Alexander would be intimidated, his expedition to Russia at that season was, considering it merely as a military measure, contrary to every rule of war.

When Bonaparte's conduct and knowledge as a politician comes in question, then this error will appear doubly great, for it will then be seen that the personal disposition of the emperor, granting that he was right as to that, was not now the thing on which he had to depend.

The Russian nobility partake of the character of Asiatic and European aristocracies. In ordinary cases the European character prevails, but when matters become serious, and extremely important, they have recourse to the Asiatic mode of settling the business.

In England, and even in France, Spain, and other nations on the continent, when measures must be changed, the whole is done by a change of ministers, but the price that is paid for that supreme power which an absolute monarch enjoys and the possession of uncontrolled authority, is his life. We change the ministers in Europe. In

Asia they change the sovereign, not by electing another, but by conspiring against the life of the one who is obnoxious. The next heir succeeds, and he is in the hands of those who despatched his predecessor, and therefore follows a different policy. It was thus that the Emperor Paul fell, his father had fallen in the same way, the Empress Catherine acting the chief part in the plot; and this is a common practice in Russia when the emperors act contrary to the will of the nobility, so that if Alexander had not resisted Bonaparte, his nobility, much as he is personally esteemed, would have made him follow his father.

Bonaparte wished to prevent all intercourse between England and Russia. He might have just as well have tried to make the Russian nobility confine their wants to the production of their own cold country, for without commerce with England, they could carry on no commerce with any part of the world.

The mistake of taking Alexander for a weak man, because he was a mild man, was great enough, but was nothing to the error in thinking that in a matter of such vital importance to his nobility, he had the power to act as he thought proper. To think so was to be entirely ignorant of the nature of the Russian government*.

If, however, Bonaparte made that mistake as a politician, as a general he ought to have known,

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* See Appendix, Note X.

when he saw the enemy set fire to Moscow, that that enemy was desperate; and therefore he should not have waited three weeks for the return of the messengers he had despatched to induce the Emperor of Russia to make peace.

Well did the Russians know that, if he waited till the winter set in, he was a ruined man. They delayed answering him on purpose, at the same time that they were making every preparation for taking advantage of his situation, when he should find out his error.

As the business of a general is as intimately connected with stratagems of war, as with the manœuvring of soldiers on a field of battle, Bonaparte was here inferior to the Russians;—their stratagems through the whole were very able, and Bonaparte was constantly their dupe. When he, finding that a retreat was necessary, fell from his high tone, and asked to get leave to return in peace, accompanying the request with some sort of unintelligible threat, the Emperor Alexander very sarcastically answered, that the retreat was entirely his own business, as he had come unasked, and merely for his own pleasure. More bitter irony, or more properly applied, was impossible; and as the threat thrown out was not very intelligible, (for indeed there was no means of putting one in execution,) he was given to understand that he must there use his own pleasure also.

Will any one pretend to say, that the person who had above 600,000 soldiers at his command only three months before, with every thing necessary for carrying on war could reduce himself to so desperate and miserable a situation, if he had possessed those superlative talents as a general that the world supposes?

Is it not evident from this, that former victories which astonished the world, were owing to the circumstances under which he fought, and not to his own great abilities? He could do wonderful things with wonderful means; but in Egypt and Syria he did nothing wonderful; nor did he in Spain, nor at Lutzen, and Bautzen, or Leipsic, any more than in Russia and at Waterloo. His miracles were all where men and money can prevail and overcome obstacles, though at the same time it is certain, that scarcely any other man could, with the men and money, have performed equal wonders.

This, however, was not so much owing to superlative talents of any one kind or description, as it was to an unusual combination of talents, which is what is meant to be shewn by this analysis; and, I think, it has been made pretty plainly to appear, that as a general he was not particularly successful, except when he had such means at his disposal as his enemy had not.

After his great error in marching to Moscow, remaining there too long, and then losing his

army in his retreat, or rather flight, it was impossible to regain the situation that he had lost; but when offered terms in Germany in 1813, when he by a wonderful effort had collected a fresh army, he should certainly have accepted them, for no error in a general is more inexcusable, or more ruinous, than that of not appreciating his situation and acting accordingly.

To form a true notion of his strength, and that of the enemy, is one of the first and most necessary talents of a general. Bonaparte ought to have been sensible that his allies, or to speak more properly, his tributary kings, only assisted him from a fear of his power. That not one of them did it either from attachment to him, or to the cause in which he was engaged, and that therefore the first moment that he had a reverse of fortune, they would abandon his standard. This he ought to have known before he marched his great army against Russia; but if he did not know it then, he ought to have been convinced of it when he found Prussia join her efforts to Russia, that the Emperor of Austria was wavering, and Bernadotte, the Crown Prince of Sweden, marching against him. The revolt of the country of the Lower Elbe, and the reverses in Spain, all coming at the same time, would have made any reasonable man diminish his pretensions.

As Napoleon was a man who had derived great lessons from history, he should have studied

and imitated the Romans when their power began to decline. That great people, far from mistaking their situation and persisting in what they could no longer hope to accomplish, in a voluntary and dignified manner contracted their dominions. They withdrew their armies from Britain and from the left bank of the Euphrates, not contesting the possession, but in a voluntary manner, thereby accommodating themselves to the situation in which they were placed.

For Bonaparte to have the same pretensions in 1813 that he had in 1812 was the most supreme degree of folly. In the former period his force was immense, his reputation for invincibility untouched, Russia was an acquiescent ally, and, Spain excepted, all the rest of the Continent reduced to something very nearly approaching a state of vassalage*!

Such was his colossal power in the summer of 1812; but in 1813, previous to the battle of Leipsic, the spell of his invincibility was not only broken, it was shattered in pieces in an extreme degree. All his powerful allies had nearly forsaken him, and some were become his open enemies. His fortunes were completely changed with respect to other nations, and he had exhausted the strength of his own. His army of well-disciplined and well-equipped hardy veterans was lost, and in its place he had raw

* See Appendix, Note Y.

levies consisting mostly of boys; yet still he had the hardihood and folly to maintain his old pretensions, which even when his fortunes were in their most palmy state, were extravagantly great.

Can the most enthusiastic admirers of Napoleon consider these circumstances, and not account them as signs of a want of that solid and profound genius that secures him who has the happiness of being possessed of it, from making those blunders and mistakes into which only men of inferior talents are supposed to be liable to fall?

To judge fairly, an abatement must be made. Had Napoleon been afflicted with mental derangement, it would have been another thing; but no:—he preserved all his reasoning powers, as much as ever, though he applied them to a wrong purpose, and he was only indebted to his former credit and authority for the friends he had in France adhering to him in his altered fortunes.

It was evident to all that he was playing a desperate game. That he was in reality that sort of madman that Charles XII. of Sweden was in his latter years. This species of madness is of the romantic sort. The history of Don Quixotte, so admirably written, to turn it into ridicule, is only an exaggeration of the malady. The knight of La Mancha reasoned admirably and profoundly, except with respect to himself and chivalry; as did Bonaparte retain the whole of his abilities as entire as ever. His raising, fitting out, and

organizing his armies in 1814, after his return from Russia defeated; and again on his flight from Leipsic defeated,—that is twice within one year,—are really astonishing. In no part of his life had he made greater or more extraordinary efforts. Again, in 1815, the following year, on his return from Elba, he raised a great army in about two months, and got together cannon, arms of every sort, and all that was necessary; but on all those three occasions, in less than twenty months, he shewed as great folly in his manner of fighting those armies, as he had displayed abilities in raising them.

Not to see how his situation and that of France were changed, was a proof of a certain sort of derangement. The whole world saw it, and it filled his friends with fear, while it inspired hope into his enemies, but on himself it had no proper or due effect.

A fugitive from an army that he had led to destruction, he maintained the same haughty tone that he held when he ruled despotically over nearly all Europe, and when his word was a law to every continental sovereign; but still his armies in the field did wonders, which is a proof how much he owed to the ability of his generals, and the bravery and intrepidity of French soldiers.

During his last campaigns, he appears rather to have acted in a new character, and as director of

movements, more than as the acting and commanding general. He laid his plan, gave his orders, and looked on from a distance. At the battle of Leipsic, after the engagement was commenced, and while the contest raged with the utmost fury, he is said not to have been on the field, but close to the walls of Dresden waiting the result.

During the battle of Waterloo he acted as director or superintendent, but not like a general taking an active part in the difficulties and dangers of the day. The accounts given are various it is true, but none of them say that he was *in* the battle.

As to what has been said about cowardice, it was impossible that he could have done one-tenth part of what he did had he been a coward. On the contrary, he was a cool calculator, seeking to effect a certain purpose, and either rushing into danger or withdrawing from it, as occasion required and his judgment dictated.

As Generals Dumourier, Pichegru, Moreau, Hoche, and many more, gained wonderful victories, it seems injustice to the French nation not to give the soldiers a great share of the merit. It seems as if those who estimate the talents of Bonaparte, and other persons who assisted in ruling France, have not taken into account the wonderful energy and enthusiasm of that nation, and the inexcusable apathy of other people. When the situation of the nations changed, when

the French lost their enthusiasm, and other nations were stirred up to energy by repeated injuries, then the fortune of war changed, and the abilities of the generals were not sufficient to prevent defeat.

To sum up the whole of the military character of Napoleon Bonaparte, it appears—

1*st*. That sufficient allowance has not been made for the situation of Europe at the time that he took the command of the French armies.

2*d*. That owing to his resolute and unfeeling character, he obtained greater armies, was more lavish of life, and had a more easy way of exciting them to great exertion than any other general; so that with equal military talents, he enjoyed a great superiority.

3*d*. That for the order, discipline, and organization of an army, he had the very first-rate talents, as well as most uncommon facility in gaining and preserving the confidence and affection of the soldiers.

4*th*. That by his activity, resolution, and perseverance, he had done what no other general before ever did, combined all the discipline of a regular army with all the principles and practices of a marauding banditti.

5*th*. That when Bonaparte had the means of taking advantage of all these circumstances, and employing the talents enumerated, he was superior to any other general; but that there is no

reason for believing, that with equal armies brought into the field, where nothing but military skill could be practised, he was possessed of any very superior military talents, and that, therefore, the wonderful and astonishing are the result of a combination of circumstances and talents, such as never before took place.

As distance of time brings new truths to light as the judgment becomes more cool, and the exaggeration arising from mental perspective ceases to operate, the wonderful will disappear; but as to the feelings of party there is reason for fearing that they will not die away nor even suffer much diminution, for Napoleon will always be considered as the idol of those who are enemies to what are termed legitimate governments; and, as legitimate governments despise public opinion, they can never expect to have support from it; and, therefore, if it were only from a feeling of contradiction and opposition, Bonaparte will continue to have his admirers; but of this more is to be said in the review of his political talents and conduct.

All men are more or less guided by circumstances. As a mixture of the military and the political character, setting all rules of honour and morality aside to gain his purpose, he appears to have ruled over and controlled circumstances; but when he could not bring all those different talents into action he fell down nearer to the cha-

racter of an ordinary man, and circumstances ruled and controlled him.

If the beginning of his military career excited wonder, the end of it excited surprise in no less a degree, though those who are determined to admire all or condemn all, will shut their eyes to the merits of the one, and the faults of the other.

That circumstances had a great influence on him is to be proved from this, that his activity, his vigilance, and his talent for order and organization never deserted him or were diminished; yet, when the Revolution had exhausted its moral and physical strength in France, and other nations were roused, his fortune changed even more than the circumstances, both as to its degree and its rapidity.

What opinion can one form of a general whose only resource in extreme difficulty was to run away and leave his army? Neither Cæsar, Alexander, Hannibal, Frederick, or any other general, has given an example of such conduct. It was in the most extreme distress that their talents excited the greatest admiration; and, therefore, if no analogy in general is to be found between Bonaparte and any of those great men, here in particular there is not only no analogy but an absolute and complete dissimilarity. They are positively opposite in point of conduct in adversity, or under great difficulty, and hitherto adver-

sity and difficulty have been held to be the great triers of talents.

The situation of generals and emperors is so superior, and so unlike to the common affairs of life, that though we can judge of them, we have not the same feelings attached to the judgment that we have in reasoning on ordinary affairs. To make the matter, however, in some degree connected with our feelings, as well as understandings, let us consider how easily matters are conducted, when there are plenty of means and money to do what is wanted. What ordinary talents are then sufficient! But when money and means are scantily supplied, then comes the difficulty. Then comes the test of talents and skill. It is the true and indisputable test of talents of every sort, and it is the test that the talents of Bonaparte could not bear; and why could they not bear it?

The answer to this is;—that the principal talent that he possessed was that of procuring money and means where others would have been unable to do so; and that he used them most profusely, though never carelessly, or with unmeaning lavishness; that consequently, when the means of procuring them failed, he was completely incapacitated from exertion.

It cannot be too often repeated, that in any review of the talents of Bonaparte, made at this time, where the object is to come to a true esti-

mate of them, the reviewer will appear as is wishing or attempting to depreciate. Had Bonaparte's talents been underrated, like those of Dumourier, it would have been necessary to follow a different line of reasoning, though the attainment of truth would still have been the object.

In one circumstance the military talents of Bonaparte have not been done justice to. His great talent for order, for recollecting, in the most comprehensive, and, at the same time, the most minute and accurate manner, all that was necessary to be done. Not only did he never neglect, but he never forgot what he had to do; and this very uncommon talent, which he possessed in an eminent degree, was as useful to him as a general as it was as a politician. It enabled him to undertake and to accomplish what scarcely any other person could have done.

Perhaps the love of order, and his despising no means of obtaining his point, is one of the parts of his conduct the most worthy of imitation, and the most to be admired. In the first place, it is one of the few parts of his conduct, in which ordinary men may try to imitate him; and it is so common for men, who are famous either as generals or statesmen, artists, or those who possess genius of any sort, to undervalue what are termed counting-house acquirements, that he deserves admiration.

Bonaparte was far superior to the littleness of

those men of genius who affect to despise the knowledge and habits of men of business, and that order and routine that are serviceable in all the affairs of life. Other generals leave to those under them the care of details, and think, that if they can manage their troops when in the field, it is enough; but Bonaparte considered, that as the perfection of the whole depended on attention to the different parts, nothing was to be neglected, and to leave to another what he could do himself, he considered as negligence, and that is a fault of which he never was guilty.

It is not possible for the greatest admirers of Napoleon to think more highly of him than I do for this uncommon and admirable attachment to order and arrangement. In the first place, it shewed a mind that was completely above all the pride and prejudice of his profession as a military man. Such generally despise the habits of a man of business; and, it is one thing in which justice has not been done to his character, even by those who have extolled him above his merit in other respects.

The commissariat department is a very material one in every army, and with his rapid movements and great masses it was as difficult as it was important. Bonaparte did not leave that to the money-making contractors and careless clerks; he first of all determined what should be done; pointed out how it could be done; and then

gave orders, on pain of a punishment equally severe and certain, for its execution.

To *numbers* and *temerity* Bonaparte owed much, but he was indefatigable in taking means to apply them to the best purpose. Whenever any thing remarkable struck him relative to an individual, one of his aides-de-camp put it in writing, and at night he himself examined all the notes made. He, by this means, gained an intimate knowledge of his army and those about him, which enabled him to employ every man in the way that was the most useful.

Above all others, Bonaparte excelled in understanding how to make use of gold by employing it to advantage; most other generals give themselves no trouble about that. It was known that Bonaparte would always pay well for true information, and punish severely those who brought him any that was false. He of consequence was informed of every thing, while other generals were ignorant of almost every thing, or what is worse than being ignorant, were often misinformed.

Bonaparte, who carried his pride the length of insolence with kings and princes, paid every attention to the man who brought him any useful intelligence; but with most part of generals and commanders the case is different, they are too obsequious to kings and princes, and receive men who can give them good information or advice with insolence, or at best with negligence.

Both in war and politics the best information is obtained from persons who have picked it up by accident, and the most doubtful from those who are employed to procure information.

Regular governments seem ignorant of this; they pay no attention to a friendly informant who might save them a great deal, but they listen to their own spies and servants with complacency and attention; and their own spies and servants take good care either to collect or invent what is agreeable to their employers, and to suppress what may not be so.

That the best information is obtained from persons who are not employed purposely is very natural, because the most valuable information is obtained either by bribery or by chance. Bonaparte obtained it both ways, and was always ready to pay well for it, which gave him in all his affairs, whether military or not, a great advantage.

The last of all the advantages to be mentioned consisted in the galaxy of able generals he had under his orders. At the battle of Jena, for example, the army was divided into seven bodies, all of which were led by first-rate generals; and at Austerlitz it was nearly the same.

1st. *Marshal Bernadotte*, and under him Rivaud, Drouet, and Kellerman.

2d. *General Marmont*, and under him Baudet, Grouchy, Lacoste, and Dumonceau.

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3d. *General Davoust*, and under him Morand, Friand, Gudin, and Vialanes.

4th. *General Soult*, and under him St. Hilaire, Vandamme, Legrand, and Margaron.

5th. *Marshal Lannes*, and under him Gazan, Suchet, and Lasalles.

6th. *Marshal Ney*, and under him Dupont, Marchand, Malher, and Dupré.

7th. *Marshal Augereau*, Desjardins, Sarrazin, and General Augereau.

Besides these, twenty-four regiments of dragoons commanded by generals Klein, Walther, Beker, and Beaumont.

A corps of grenadiers and voltigeurs by *Oudinot*, and two regiments of carabineers and eight of cuirassiers, by Hautpoult, Nansouty, and Murat.

Here are forty generals of great reputation and talents at one battle! Berthier was general-in-chief, and the Emperor was absent, having returned to Paris. (I mean the battle of Jena.)

No general had ever under him such a number of able military men. A battle could not be badly conducted where such generals commanded, and many of the colonels who served that day, have since distinguished themselves.

There was something no doubt magical in overturning in a few hours the armies of Prussia, to which all military men had looked up with admiration for about half a century as the *ne plus ultra* of discipline and skill. This was one of the

miracles of Bonaparte. Bribery had gained over traitors and confederates amongst the Prussians. The body of the army was discontented with the government, and the officers who commanded were of the old school, unable to make head against a French army and French officers. Had the Prussians not been sold, and had they had a few officers like General Blucher, the day would have terminated differently, though still Prussia must in the end have been defeated, for the contest was too unequal.

As Bonaparte was not there, this miracle was performed by Berthier, who himself was certainly no great conjurer. Berthier's talent consisted in preserving order, conciliating differences, and obeying, with great punctuality and strictness, the orders he received;—likewise, in never contradicting Bonaparte. But Bonaparte had on this, as on many other occasions, prepared the way for success. It was not by his superior skill on the field of battle that he obtained victories, but by his unprecedented ability in managing matters, so as to be superior to the enemy.

PART II.

OF BONAPARTE AS A RULER, A POLITICIAN, AND A STATESMAN.

SECTION I.

General Observations.

The main and original errors in those who have formed opinions of Bonaparte consist in their considering all his actions as emanating from himself; that he created circumstances, and guided the destinies of mankind.

The very contrary was the case; Bonaparte was the child of Jacobinism, and became the champion of the Revolution—with the Revolution he rose, and when its volcanic energy was exhausted he fell.

His chief error was the same as that into which the world has fallen. He considered himself as the primary cause of the extended victories of the French nation, when with all his power and dominion he was but the splendid instrument by which those victories were gained.

I have already said, and all the world knows, that nothing either in external conquest nor in-

ternal energy could surpass what was witnessed before the name of Bonaparte was known to the public; the business now is to see whether, as some man must be a leader, Bonaparte did justice to his situation.

The natural course of the Revolution, and it was traced out and published in 1793 here in England, was, a few years of democracy, during which the power of creating assignats would be exhausted, and the French armies would be victorious. Then anarchy and discontent would succeed, during which period the French armies would meet with reverses, and that danger and necessity would oblige all parties to commit the management of affairs to one single man, who would become the founder of a new race of kings, if he was moderate and reasonable, but if not, that Europe at length would rise in a mass and vindicate its rights*.

The foundation of all greatness is to aim at what is practicable, so far as greatness and abilities are connected. I do not insist upon a man of great talents being a good man, because great-

* So far as I can remember, the prediction finished by saying "that France would be like one of those strong madmen who break loose, beat and disturb all their neighbours, who not being aware of the extent of their danger, have neither at first strength nor means for their own protection, but who finish at last by stirring up the whole against themselves, and are then put in a strait-waistcoat."

ness and goodness are very different things, and may exist separately; but greatness and wisdom, to a certain degree at least, are inseparable.

So long as Bonaparte's actions suited the situation of the people he ruled over, and those he combated, he was a wise man, as well as a great man; but when the actions no longer suited his situation, he ceased to be wise, and soon after that he ceased to be great.

In deducting much from the greatness of Bonaparte, it is but doing him justice to deduct much also from his crimes. He was not the primary cause of the atrocities of the Revolution, and if he was to act at all, as a general or a leader, he must be under a necessity of participating in them.

Bonaparte has been blamed for not having the moderation of General Washington. Those who blame him in that manner, know nothing of the nature of the situation that he was in. It would be as well to say, that the chief police magistrate of a great city should imitate a shepherd, who attends a flock of sheep, in a country where there were neither robbers to steal nor wolves to destroy.

If Bonaparte had thought that by imitating Washington he would have succeeded better than by imitating Alexander, no doubt he would have done so, for though he committed many crimes, and was guilty of many cruelties, he has never

been accused of either the one or the other, when it was not for some end that he had in view.

In analyzing the character of Bonaparte, it is therefore necessary to keep always in mind, that though he had power over France, he could not alter the nature of the people, neither could he alter the geographical situation of the country, nor the unfriendly feelings of the rulers of neighbouring nations.

The man who rose to eminence by his talents in war, and the services he had rendered, could not be expected to resign his command, or voluntarily sink into insignificance.

General Washington fought against him who was once his king, as long as he had any thing to fight for, and he became of necessity a man of peace when there was not an enemy to contend with. He was raised by his fellow-citizens to the highest honour the country afforded, and he knew his power and his people too well not to be moderate. In him moderation was ambition, at least it was the only way by which he could gratify his ambition.

Had Washington shewn any disposition to stretch his prerogatives, limited as they were, the least degree beyond the limits assigned by the constitution, he would soon have ceased to be President; or had he made an attempt, or signified a wish, to make his Presidency for life, he must

have prepared to quit the chair at the first election, with every curse and malediction that republican equality and scurrility could bestow.

Those persons who blame Bonaparte for not imitating the moderation of Washington, are not considering the case. I cannot call it ignorance, because I have heard, repeatedly, many well-informed persons lament that he did not do so. Those persons, however well-informed they may be in other matters, must permit me to say, that in this they are mistaken, and that they do great injustice to Bonaparte, though probably without knowing or intending it.

Again there are certain persons who blame Bonaparte for not doing more good than he did. Now though I have the vanity to attempt analyzing his character, judging from what he did do, I am by no means vain enough to pretend to blame him for what he did not do, because his power, though great, was not unlimited.

The *Code Napoleon*, though it requires alteration, is on an admirable plan, and the alterations it requires, are owing to its being adapted to his mode of government, and not to that of a free state under ordinary circumstances.

The restoration of religion, and the public works he performed, were wonderful, in such a nation as France, that had pulled down both the throne and the altar, and was engaged in such

expensive wars*. Whatever his enemies may be inclined to say, let them not forget that he re-established both the throne and the altar; he re-instated the altar first, and made great exertions to endow the clergy, whose revenues had been wasted at the beginning of the Revolution.

Being engaged constantly in war, as Bonaparte was, he could not encourage the arts of peace as he might have done, and as he probably would have done; but allowing for the pressing business, and great objects he had on his hand, where is the monarch who has done half so much?

With respect to literature and the fine arts, he did all that he could, and his munificence throws in the shade that of all the kings and princes of Europe. It may be said, that he acted thus through vanity, which is not only possible, but probable enough; it is, however, a good sort of vanity that leads a man to perform praise-worthy actions; besides this, as he encouraged what are termed the useful arts, where vanity was not the motive, it is not fair to impute that as a cause of action in patronizing the fine arts.

Bonaparte has been contrasted with Oliver

* As to his public works, while we in England have been talking for nearly twenty years of removing that great nuisance, Smithfield-market, the whole of the sale and slaughter of cattle are removed from Paris, and twelve very clean and excellent markets, are either constructed entirely, or augmented, embellished, and improved. All our great works are the speculations of individuals united in companies.

Cromwell; and the moderation and justice of Oliver have been vaunted by those, who in any other case would execrate the man: but this comparison is not a fair one, though not quite so unfair, and even absurd, as that with General Washington.

In the first part of his career, Cromwell was a rebel to his king, and subsequently the chief of the regicides. Bonaparte was never a rebel to his king; on the contrary, he was the first who did any thing effectual towards the bringing to order the jacobins who had brought the king to the scaffold.

In the first instance, then, Bonaparte was far less guilty than Cromwell; and, as to their conduct afterwards, though, in point of resolution, in purpose, and inflexibility, there was a considerable resemblance, they were so differently circumstanced, that their conduct cannot be compared.

The French nation was full as much bent on making conquests as Bonaparte; and, till its fury was exhausted, even he could not have controlled it: and probable enough it is that it will never be discovered, whether his wars were not rather made for the purpose of preserving peace at home than from inclination.

It will be remembered that, during the short repose that he enjoyed after his marriage with the daughter of the Emperor, the people began

to say he had become indolent, uxorious, &c.; and all the governments of Europe being enemies to him personally, (though most of them submitted through fear,) had he allowed himself to fall into contempt at home, he would have soon been hurled from his throne.

There is even some reason to suppose, that in his last useless but desperate struggle, when he refused all the proposals made to let him reign over Old France, that he was led to that strange conduct, not so much by ambition as by suspecting that the allies would find a means of dethroning him afterwards.

He knew that he was both hated and feared, and that if the fear was over, the hatred would no longer be under any control.

As he had a thorough contempt for mankind, and set no value on keeping a promise himself, he certainly could not be expected to trust to the honour of the allies; and, therefore, what he did was perhaps more from an idea of its necessity than from ambition.

A monarch who is absolute, peremptory, and despotic, has certainly the appearance of acting according to his own will; but what may control or direct that apparent will is often a secret, concealed from all observers.

As no man was ever under circumstances similar to those of Bonaparte, he cannot be compared to any one, nor can a fair judgment of his

real merit be formed by any attempt to make a comparison between him and other rulers or conquerors.

SECTION II.

Of Bonaparte, as a Ruler and Intriguer.

The same intrigues that were employed by Bonaparte to acquire power, were employed by him to maintain it; and he seems to have had no original talent for creating opportunity, but a very wonderful one of improving opportunity when presented to him.

Those who have since witnessed the energy, the activity, and the audacity of Bonaparte, must be astonished at his not appearing on the revolutionary stage at an earlier period than he did; for the jacobin club was open to all desperate and resolute men, and many who had far less means than Bonaparte, had raised themselves to importance before the king was dethroned in 1792.

If that is surprising, it is still more so that, having distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon, he should again sink into obscurity until the affair of the sections, as it is called, when he was appointed by Barras to command the troops that were to defend the convention against the

people of Paris, or, to speak more distinctly, the members of the jacobin club, headed by the national guards.

On this occasion, when resolution and courage unalloyed by any sort of clemency were wanted, Bonaparte was chosen in preference to any other*. A more fit choice could not have been made; and, without giving credit to any particular details of cruelty, said to have been committed by him, it is positively certain that he, without any mercy, fired with grape-shot, both on the quay and on the river-side, and in the Rue St. Honoré, upon the wretched people after they were flying.

To meet them with grape-shot, when they advanced against the assembly, was quite neces-

* Though I have constantly and carefully avoided forming a judgment on unauthenticated reports, yet I must here note that Bonaparte was called from a very obscure situation to take this command. One account of the matter is, that Barras employed him as a sort of spy, and consequently had no difficulty of finding him. Another is, that Barras did not know where he was to be found; but said, that if they could find him, he was the best man for determination and cruelty: on which Tallien said he could find him. That he did so, clothes were lent him fit to appear in, and he rode a coach-horse on that famous day when he slaughtered without mercy above 7,000 of the Parisians. I should think the first account is the most likely to be true, as Bonaparte certainly would not so far forget his own interest, as to allow his connexion with Barras to drop. At any rate, the vigilance of his future conduct makes it very unlikely; but that he was called from a state of great obscurity is certain.

sary, if the business was to be done at all; but, when they were repulsed and flying, pity and mercy both might have led him to spare men, who, though misled, were, in other respects, for the most part, respectable citizens and fathers of families.

Bonaparte's business was then done: he was already commandant of the troops in Paris, and, unlike all other men that have risen, he did not do so by degrees. He started up into importance at once; and, concealing under a modest exterior his inordinate ambition, he acted as if power and command were perfectly familiar to him.

He seems from the first to have completely understood the character of the French, and to have resolved to act with audacity and determination; and indeed no other method would have succeeded, nor was there ever produced by the world any person so capable of acting up to the character of the inflexible ruler and master.

There is something more uncommon and extraordinary in this part of Bonaparte's life, than in any that followed it. When in penury, and want, in short, in a mean and miserable situation, he does not appear to have made any of those efforts to better his situation, that even ordinary men, with a common share of ambition, would have done; but no sooner did fortune or chance put him in the way to rise, than he acted as if he had been born to command. He did not for-

get himself, nor behave with pride or insolence, but with modesty, wisdom, and propriety, until by his marrying the mistress of Barras, he obtained, as a marriage portion, the command of the army of Italy.

With the hand of Madame de Beauharnois he received the means of becoming initiated in all the intrigues in the higher circles in Paris, and she was a very able helpmate to an ambitious man. Barras did not know what he lost in getting rid of such a woman, but Bonaparte soon found what he had gained.

Unlike the wife of Marc Antony, who stirred up in her husband's absence troubles at Rome, or like the Duchess of Marlborough, whose intrigues in London undermined the power of the greatest general of the age, Madame Beauharnois, when she became the wife of Bonaparte, exerted her good sense, conciliating disposition, and talents for useful intrigue, in promoting the interests of her husband, and preventing his enemies from taking advantage of his absence.

Bonaparte's manner of governing and intriguing were nearly the same, and the secret in both cases consisted in making his abilities be highly respected, his determination considered as unalterable, and, therefore, fear and confidence both assisted him in his enterprises. After he had been successful in Italy, fear and confidence assisted more than ever, and as he soon got a command of

money, and knew perfectly well how to make use of it, his efforts to obtain power were very successful.

One thing that favoured his efforts exceedingly was, that those who had risen to power in France since the Revolution, had found that it was more dangerous than durable, and that even while it lasted, attended with great trouble; so that amongst the generals of merit, there were not any desirous of obtaining it, and the time was come, when, (by the nature of things, as it displays itself in revolutions,) a man must be chosen to rule, and that man chosen in the army.

Bonaparte, in rising to power, had one thing greatly in his favour. All his predecessors had been constantly going from bad to worse; and in reality, they had got to the worst, so that things could not but get better, even under a much less able man than Napoleon.

His policy with the nation was to encourage a military spirit, and substitute a love of military glory for a love of liberty, which are as incompatible as any two things can well be.

He restored the Roman Catholic worship, feeling, as any man of his judgment must do, that a nation without religion can never be either great or happy.

He affected to be a profound thinker, and designated himself member of the Institute; a most absurd measure in itself, but just calculated

for the meridian of Paris. The men of science and letters, who, in that city, are looked up to as much as they are looked down upon in London, considered Bonaparte a patron, a pattern, and a prodigy; there was a sort of a cloud of mystery and glory that enveloped and surrounded him, and he seemed less sensible of his great talents, actions, and importance, than any man in France.

Never was a prouder or more haughty spirit concealed under a more modest exterior, and certainly at that time he understood completely how to act to the best purpose.

When in Italy the first time, he had treated both the King of Sardinia and the Grand Duke of Tuscany as his inferiors. It was not then that pride and haughtiness had not already taken possession of him, but that he knew perfectly well when to be humble, and when to put on the great man, and what is more, whether he assumed the one or the other character, they became him wonderfully well.

By degrees, however, this changed, and he became habitually haughty; and, though sometimes familiar, never with any appearance of diffidence or modesty, and, least of all, any thing like humility.

In this, also, there was judgment; for, having once raised himself to the highest power, it was necessary to act as if he was in his proper place,

and not as if he were elevated above what he was entitled to expect.

Those who have, in speaking of his character, named Alexander, Cæsar, Frederic of Prussia, &c., &c., have not named Louis XIV., who was imitated by the Emperor in nearly every one of those qualities, for which he was adored by the French people.

As a conqueror, he could not imitate Louis; for in that character he ranked far above him. In his attention to men of merit, men of letters, and of artists, he resembled Louis, who would talk with them all, and excite their admiration, when he frequently knew very little of the subject.

Louis XIV. always spoke on business as if what he said was profound, and the result of deep thinking; so did Bonaparte. Louis had the most splendid court in Europe: so had Bonaparte; and he hunted and built palaces exactly like the grand monarque. He built triumphal columns and arches, and adorned Paris; was attended by comedians: and, in short, as near as possible, had all the manners, of Louis XIV., and in that he acted very wisely*.

* So little does the present king understand his people, and so well did Bonaparte know what pleased them, that one of the greatest causes of lamentation at the change is, that Bonaparte kept a brilliant court, laid out large sums on building, and gratified national pride (say, vanity); whereas Louis has nothing

Lord Bolingbroke foretold, nearly a century ago, that the first king who mounted the throne of France, and was what they term a *bon enfant*, would share a similar fate with Charles I. of England; and he was not mistaken: for Louis XVI. was exactly that *bon enfant*. The same noble writer says, that Louis XIV. was just the right sort of king for France—haughty, despotic, and magnificent: an encourager of war and the fine arts, but by no means punctilious in matters of civil liberty. Such was Louis, and such also was the Emperor Napoleon.

Bonaparte, however, had great business-abilities, and his ministers knew that therein he was superior to them all, as well as in the indefatigable industry with which he exerted those abilities.

He was his own Minister of Finance, Minister at War, and Minister of the Interior, as well as for Foreign Affairs: in short, he was ruler singly and alone, asking advice sometimes, but always following his own opinion. He wanted no act of council to give force to his decrees; and even his enemies allow, that, except when he was mistaken, he did the best that he could for the glory and prosperity of France.

He had a thorough contempt for the human race; and, indeed, if any man ever had a right to

splendid or expensive about him, and yet they say he spends a great deal of money. This shews, at least, how wisely Bonaparte acted.

that way of feeling and thinking, it was Napoleon; for the more he tyrannized over the kings and princes of the continent, the more obedient they became; and he found the same to be the case with his own subjects, so that he might well assume as a principle that men were made to be ruled with a rod of iron*.

Bonaparte never could forget that he sat upon a throne to which there was a legitimate heir; and he knew that he did not sit there by the united will of the people; otherwise he would not have endeavoured to get Louis XVIII. to resign his claim, in which attempt the King of Prussia degradingly and meanly acted as the instrument. The noble and spirited answer of the king is a fine contrast of an honourable honest man with the cunning and wily conduct of Bonaparte. "I am far," said the king, "from confounding Bonaparte with those who have preceded him. I think highly of his valour and his military talents; neither do I feel ungrateful for many acts of his administration; for whatever is done for the benefit of my people, shall always be dear to my heart. I cannot pretend to know what may be the intention of the Almighty respecting my race and myself, but I am well apprized of the obligations imposed upon me by the rank to which he was pleased I should be born. As a Christian, I will continue to fulfil

* See Appendix, Note Z.

these obligations to my latest breath. As a descendant of St. Louis, I will endeavour to imitate his example, by respecting myself, even in captivity. As a successor of Francis I., I will, at least, aspire to say with him, 'We have lost every thing but our honour.'"

This letter I produce as an evidence of Bonaparte's conviction that he did not occupy the throne of France by the will or the consent of the people. Would William the Third have written to the unfortunate James who had been king and sat upon the throne, to give up his right to him? Certainly not; William knew that he reigned by the consent of the people, and the recognition of James would have tended rather to weaken than to strengthen his right.

The bulk of the French wished for a republic, and those who did not had no desire to have a king or emperor from a new family. The republic had been established, and the nation had been deprived of it by stealth and underhand means.

The consulate was a republican institution, and the deviation of giving the consulate for life to Bonaparte was considered both as a matter of gratitude and prudence. As the former, to reward his great services, and as the latter, to prevent a return of the confusion and misrule that had taken place under the Directory.

As to the imperial dignity that was obtained in a very indirect way, and as a lasting proof of the juggling and deception practised, the coin that

was struck for several years had the head of Bonaparte engraved upon it, with *Napoléon Empereur* for the inscription, but on the obverse was struck *République Française*. It was not till 1810 that this latter inscription was altered to *Empire Française*. A better proof it is not necessary to give of the indirect, dishonest means by which the form of government was altered.

The consequence of this feeling, of not being legally elected or reigning by the will of the people, was a constant suspicion and uneasiness. There were some real plots against him, and many imaginary or fabricated ones, and by that means the mind of the Emperor was never at ease.

The police (which was contrived by Talleyrand) was made up of men totally unknown to each other, though not so to Bonaparte. They acted as spies on each other and on society, and existed for the work of destruction. They swarmed through France, and even the whole of Europe, insinuating themselves into the houses of the great, to pamper their luxury and vanity, to watch over their actions, company, and conversation, and give in to their employer the result of their treachery. They filled shops, theatres, churches, and counting-houses, in consequence of which they imparted a sort of omniscience to Bonaparte, which was only to be employed for his own advantage.

The *gens-d'armes* were a kind of supplement,

consisting of twenty-eight legions, one of them called emphatically the *chosen band:* the rest of them were stationed through the whole of France, patroling the high-ways both day and night, stopping every traveller to examine his pass, and were not amenable to any man but their general officer for whatever enormities they might think proper to commit, and he again to the minister of police, the fountain of his instructions. They were selected from the most abandoned and atrocious characters in the whole army, in which they must have served at least three campaigns. The chosen band resided in the seat of government, under the ministers of the secret police, who likewise guarded the Temple and other state prisoners, as well as the secret agents of torture and of murder. They could not be advanced to such *dignity* before a five years' service in the *honourable* employment of spies.

By these, and ten thousand more, who were emphatically called his own guard, was that Emperor defended on his throne, who was denominated by French newspapers the *idol of the nation*, and described as *reigning in the affections of his people!*

Though Bonaparte made it be represented that he reigned in the hearts of his people, he knew that such was far from being the case. The brilliancy of his victories, and the great sums of money that came from foreign countries and circulated chiefly in Paris, tended, nevertheless, to

counterbalance the evil; besides, every one remembered the Reign of Terror under Robespierre, when matters were much worse.

The First Consul, who knew mankind well in a certain way, was perfectly aware of the advantage gained by making promises, and giving hope. Hope and fear supply the wants that are real. That was his belief and his maxim, and he was never negligent in exciting both.

As he rose in rank and became emperor, he applied himself still more to uniting his personal glory with that of France; and, he knew well that extension of dominion and the ruin of England were with the people the two great objects of desire and ambition.

Knowing, however, that blessings of that species which he bestowed on the French required some explanation to be understood, (for, with all his powers he could not render them tangible); he occasionally had elaborate and highly-flattering harangues pronounced, or state-papers published, to inform the good people of the great works he was performing for their happiness and glory. As the weight of taxation and the rigorous cruelty of the conscription, which tore children from their parents at the age of fifteen and sixteen, were both visible and tangible evils, it was necessary to make great exertions to render them supportable.

After the treaty of Tilsit, when he might indulge

ing their hopes as a nation, while he treated them in the hope of peace with great and extended power and dominion, he, in March 1807, sent a message to the senate, saying, "That the army must be recruited and kept up in consequence of the unrelenting and mercenary policy of Britain, whose monopoly was purchased by the blood of the Continent." So said the message. In his address to the Legislative Body and the Tribunate, which met according to the usual forms on the following day, the Emperor observed, "That since their last meeting, new wars, triumphs, and trophies, had changed the political relations of Europe; that the house of Brandenburgh, the first to combine against French independence, was only permitted to reign through the friendship of the emperor of the north; that a French prince would speedily reign on the Elbe; that the house of Saxony again possessed the independence it had lost for fifty years; that the inhabitants of the duchy of Warsaw and Dantzic had recovered their country; and that all nations concurred in joy at the extinction of the pernicious influence of Britain on the Continent. By the Confederation of the Rhine, France was united with Germany; by her own peculiar system of federation, she was united with Spain, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. Her new relations with Russia were founded on the mutual esteem of two great nations. The tranquillity of the French nation during his absence, had excited his ardent grati-

tude. He had contrived the means of simplifying their institutions, he had extended the principle on which he had founded the Legion of Honour; the finances were prosperous; the contributions on land were diminished; various public works had been completed; and it was his resolution, that, in the remotest parts of his empire, and even in the smallest hamlet, the comforts of the citizen and the value of the land should be increased by the developement of a general system of improvement."

On the same day was delivered the report on the state of the empire. Mention was made of the internal improvements which had taken place; the establishments for preventing mendicity; the zeal with which taxes were levied and the conscription executed; the erection of bridges; reparation of roads; extended navigation of rivers; the attention bestowed on agriculture; the institution of veterinary schools and thirty-five new colleges, and the exertions made to complete the meridian circle. France was now surrounded by a chain of friendly nations, and her finances were in a flourishing condition. She alone, amongst all the states of Europe, possessed no paper-money*.

It was thus that, by neglecting nothing to keep the people in a state of ignorance as to the real situation of things, flattering their vanity, and feed-

* See Appendix, Note AA.

individually as slaves, he continued to rule over them, and make them submit to every privation; till the world, indignant and unable longer to bear the insolence and injustice of France, rose up, as with general consent, to put an end to protracted and accumulated insult and injustice.

As the press was completely at the command of Bonaparte, and suppressed the truth, at the same time that lies were unsparingly disseminated, the people of Paris were not aware of their danger till they got orders to fortify the town; and that even was useless, it being simply an impossibility.

So reduced were the acute minds of the French people by the system of government that Bonaparte had put in practice, that they boasted of their fortifications on Montmartre, and the barricade of wood and loop-holes of the Porte St. Antoine!!

This is only mentioned to shew how much the Parisian minds were kept down, and fettered by the system of Bonaparte. As for the rest of France, it was enveloped in complete ignorance.

Such a state of things, however, could not have been brought to bear, had not the system of espionage, attended with rigorous punishment wherever there was suspicion, prevented one person from putting confidence in another. Without combination there can be no effort, and without communication of opinion there could

be no combination: and as the spies assumed all forms and shapes, both male and female, no one knew who to trust, or who to fear. There is much reason for believing, that to such an extent was this fear carried, that it is very doubtful whether, of all the plots that were said to exist, any one was real, except that which took place when he was at Moscow; and that was laid by some military men, who anticipated the disaster, that really was commenced at the time when they began the putting their plot in execution.

The exterior policy of Bonaparte, was only an improvement of that begun by the jacobins under Robespierre, and continued, by the Directory, a main feature of which was to trample upon all established rules between nations.

The arresting all the British subjects, who were unfortunate enough to remain in France after the Peace of Amiens was broken, the insulting foreign ambassadors, seizing persons on neutral territories, all that was so like a desperate madman who defied the world, that combined with the abilities displayed in other matters, exhibits a strong inconsistency; but it tended to increase his power over individuals, and by sowing distrust he had reduced the whole of those he governed to an insulated, unconnected, and unassisted state.

Nobody that ventured in any way to counteract his designs was safe on the Continent of

Europe; for it was well and generally understood, that no action was too cruel, too mean, or too unlawful, not to be performed, if it answered his purpose, or gratified his revenge.

This violent and unnatural state of things, it was well known, could not be of long duration. It was harsh, cruel, and irregular; but, under the pressure of fear, it answered the purpose, until the grand catastrophe arrived that put an end to the whole.

Though there is a great predominance of what is bad, in the manner in which Bonaparte ruled, yet there are many parts that are good, and some that are excellent.

The employing efficient and able men, encouraging in every case abilities, and treating with contempt the old routine of regular and rotten governments, where the public money goes to the ignorant and idle, and the business is neglected, is a plan that well deserves imitation. His vigilance in making every one do his duty, and his regularity in rewarding service, and punishing those who neglected duty, is admirable in its nature. The end to which the service was applied is another thing; but had that been as good as the means employed, language could scarcely have been found to express the praise that would then have been due to Napoleon.

What the immortal Nelson said when he attacked the enemy at the battle of Trafalgar,

"England expects every man to do his duty," may, with a very little variation, be truly applied to the administration of France under Bonaparte, and all that were employed by him understood perfectly his ideas and will on that subject, "Napoleon expected every man to do his duty;" that is, to obey his will without hesitation, murmur, or complaint.

As the revenues of Bonaparte amounted to about 1,500,000,000 francs, or about sixty-two millions sterling, during the latter years of his reign, and as he subsisted his armies, in a great measure, at the expense of other nations, and had, besides his regular, many indirect ways of getting money, this sum was immense.

In England, though the expenditure in war was, in some of the latter years, one hundred and twenty millions, yet forty-five of these went for the interest of debt; and the pay of every sort of service in this country is so incomparably higher, that I believe it may safely be said that he had such funds at his disposal as no ruler of a nation ever had, unless it might have been, during a short period, the Roman emperors.

Bonaparte's administration was founded on the principle that all men are vicious and venal, and are to be kept in order by fear and force, and induced to exert themselves by exciting their passions and their interest. Upon these principles, did he hold in subjection those who disliked him, and excite

those whom he employed to serve him well and willingly. As to the nation in a mass being always at war, it the more readily submitted to a suspension of rights, which it was supposed was only temporary, and which national glory and national safety rendered necessary.

The French people, it must also be considered, never lived under a free government, for the little time that intervened between the meeting of the states-general in 1789, and the massacre of the Sections in 1795, was not quite six years; and these six years were the most unhappy and miserable that it is possible to conceive. If, then, they compared their state under Bonaparte with any period since the revolution began, it was vastly preferable. Vanity prevented them from acknowledging the happiness they enjoyed under what they termed the old régime.

The manner of Bonaparte, as well as his appearance, changed greatly during his eventful life. In the early period of his career, his countenance was that of a sullen, designing man, clothed in puritanical and simple sort of dress and manners.

By degrees his countenance assumed a very manly and commanding appearance, and his manners became haughty and overbearing, except to common soldiers and non-commissioned officers, whom he addressed with kindness and even familiarity.

That he had the art and address to gain their confidence and affection, though he did not value their lives so much as those of a dog, and talked with coolness of sacrificing ten thousand a month, is a greater proof of their want of thought than it is even of his want of humanity.

Never did any man shew such contempt for the human race, when he lost an army by a mad expedition, he ordered 300,000 men to be put at the disposition of the Minister of War.

When his army wanted provisions, he ordered them to plunder the inhabitants, and kill those who resisted.

When his army had been long away from any well-peopled country, he would order two or three thousand unfortunate girls of the town to be put in requisition in Paris, and sent to the army.

When he quitted Egypt, he left orders with General Dessaix to put the sçavants in requisition whenever he wanted them, and to make them go by force on such expeditions, as they were not inclined to attend with good-will.

In taxing the people, he fixed the sum to be raised by each particular tax. The Minister of Finance was obliged, without remonstrance, to raise it; but then, it is true, he left to his minister the liberty of doing it as he pleased, and the manner was as simple as it was severe.

Each district, or department, was commanded

by the minister to raise a certain proportion, and the prefects, with their adjoints, made a distribution of those sums amongst the municipalities or arrondissements, and again the mayors, with the aid of their adjoints, taxed the individuals, fixing the sum each was to pay.

Every thing was fixed and imperative, and Bonaparte cared nothing for the vexation, oppression, or injustice, provided the money arrived at his treasury.

With such rude, but powerful, means did Bonaparte govern France, that every thing bent before his order and his will; and by having a mysterious way of announcing himself and with the assistance of thousands of flatterers, he appeared a superior sort of being.

Never did men of letters so debase themselves in any country, or on any occasion, as those of France did, with respect to their pretended idol Napoleon, whom they exalted above all other men as a man of genius and knowledge; deeply read in history, a man of profound science, and a critic and judge of the first order in matters of taste, and the belles-lettres; and, in short, a most profound thinker, while he was the most acute observer that ever existed.

Bonaparte imitated sovereigns in their manners, and some sovereigns have since been at great pains to imitate him. Amongst other things he asked questions with great rapidity, but allowed

no one to put any to him, and he actually possessed that ready sort of gift and smattering of general knowledge that excites surprise in inferiors, particularly when they are previously prepossessed in favour of a great personage.

Where a country has the resources that France possesses, the difficulty is not great in raising a large revenue or large armies, provided the people can be got to submit to the means necessary. The fear of external enemies, an idea of military glory, want of confidence in each other from the system of espionage, and the able and rigorous measures taken by Bonaparte, obtained that submission: though the grief and vexation of individuals was extreme, they were ineffectual, for there could be nothing like co-operation or combination to alter affairs*.

To sum up in a short way the nature of Bonaparte's government,—he had all the people of talents on his side, and in his pay; and he compelled them to exert those talents in the way that was most advantageous to his views. Other governments, in general, employ men without regard to their talents; and even those they do not oblige them to exert. Bonaparte taking such efficient means, and having to act against governments that employed means so inefficient, the wonder that he succeeded cannot be great: had he failed, it would truly have been wonderful.

* See Appendix, Note BB.

What is admirable in the man is his preserving those habits of industry and self-denial, and that equanimity during so prodigious a rise of fortune. Not one man in a million could have borne the change; but when on a throne, where nearly all the wealth and strength of Europe was at his command, he went through fatigue and labour of the most difficult and disagreeable sort, that few men in ordinary life would submit to, even with the hope of the most ample reward.

It was in his habits, his perseverance, and continued and minute attention to doing every thing necessary to attain the end he proposed, that he is admirable and surprising, rather than in his genius or talents. The combination of talents was wonderful, but separately they are by no means surprising. He certainly was not superior, or equal, to some other of the French generals; therefore, as a military man, did not hold the highest rank. It now remains to be seen whether, as a politician and statesman, he was entitled to that high distinction.

SECTION III.

Abilities of Napoleon Bonaparte as a Politician.

The talents of a politician consist of a combination of different sorts of ability.

Wisdom or sagacity is indispensable, and to that must be joined self-command, and a certain degree of art or cunning, as all political matters are managed by a sort of trial of skill. Deception to a certain degree is permitted and not thought dishonourable, and politicians may properly enough be termed mental prize-fighters.

The French and Italians are considered as being the most able negotiators, but not the most able as to their plans and projects; and, indeed, if this was ever fairly proved to be the case, it was in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte.

No man ever was more artful and cunning, or contrived by bribery, persuasion, threats, and a combination of all the means likely to procure success, to overreach his opponent. As he had a perfect knowledge of the weak side and the wrong side of mankind, he succeeded in every case where he had to do with weak or bad men; but, where he met with men of firmness and honour he did not succeed, for he mistook them always, thinking them either weak men or bad men; and, he never could bring himself to believe that any man was guided in his actions by pure principle, or was firm enough not to be intimidated by his threats.

His well-known character for decision and obstinacy made him frequently gain his point, but he was still more indebted to his hypocrisy, cunning, and want of honour, for his success in particular instances.

He studied Machiavel, and followed his instructions in politics as far as his natural disposition would permit him, but his propensity for deceit led him to make no distinction between duplicity and an open breach of promise.

He treated the states he had conquered with such a want of honour and good faith, that he by that alone would have brought on his own downfall, even if he had not marched against Russia.

The manner in which he proceeded with Venice, with Sardinia, Austria, Prussia, the royal family of Spain, and many others, was attended with a want of honour and veracity that are by no means allowed or allowable in the transactions of men with each other.

When, for example, Bonaparte disarmed Prussia by making its king believe that he would give him possession of Hanover, though he had no intention of doing so, he was only acting as politicians are permitted to do, that is, with duplicity; as he had not entered into any agreement for the purpose, he was at liberty to act as he did, but when on the defeat of the king of Prussia at Jena, he entered into an armistice, but did not suspend his operations on that account, he was doing what was not allowable; it was a breach of faith; and the breach of faith was still greater when after the definitive peace with Prussia he overran that kingdom, and treated it as he would a conquered province contrary to agreement.

That Bonaparte was placed in a very difficult and dangerous situation can never be denied. He had the whole of Europe for enemies, and therefore he had most undoubtedly a right to carry deception and cunning to as great a length as they could be carried; but cunning and that sort of deception are very different from a direct breach of promise, which is never allowable nor can be admitted, as it strikes at the root of the welfare of society.

The republican generals from the very commencement of the Revolution were not very nice on this point, and even Moreau and Pichegru who have been always reckoned two of the most honourable amongst them, were guilty of actions which I believe none of the regular governments of Europe would permit*.

If I have spoken of the regular and legitimate governments of Europe as following a line of policy with respect to the persons they employ and the manner of rewarding them, that is far inferior to the efficient and able policy of Bonaparte in that respect: I am happy to be able to say, that in honourable conduct those regular governments leave him as far behind.

I do not mean to say that any government is very strict, they all practise deceit when it is their interest, but then they are very tenacious of not passing the line that is understood to be

* See Appendix, Note CC.

allowed. Bonaparte on the contrary considered himself bound by no sort of rule, and as in war, he made use of every means that could promote his end, so in diplomacy he stuck at nothing that tended to gain his purpose.

At first this practice was attended with some success, or at least apparent success. England was overreached in the treaty of Amiens, but as the mission of Sebastiani and other acts contrary to the spirit of the treaty took place immediately after, the treaty was soon at an end; and, from that time he was looked upon by England as a man with whom no treaty ought to be made, as he was incapable of keeping one.

England made up her mind at once on this business, and had Bonaparte continued on the throne of France for fifty years, she would never have again entered into a negotiation with him.

The return from Elba contrary to an agreement made on terms far more advantageous than any that Bonaparte had a right to expect, was a sort of solemn and public declaration of his contempt for all treaties, promises, and faith. It was like sealing in the presence of God and man his own perfidy and want of honour; and, the consequence to himself was, that he from that time was treated as a man divested of every moral principle, who was therefore to be held by physical force, as wild beasts are in a cage, or criminals who have transgressed the law.

The treatment of the king of Spain and his family was one of the most disgraceful acts that ever was committed, and at the same time one of the most foolish, ill-judged, and short-sighted.

It may bear the name of a political manœuvre, but it would be more properly assimilated to the conduct of banditti, who insnare an unsuspecting stranger, in order to rob and plunder him of what he has got.

The silly simplicity of the royal family of Spain, is no excuse for the dishonourable conduct of Bonaparte, though unfortunately their imbecility, by making them objects of scorn, rather than of pity, has the effect of diminishing the detestation in which the conduct of Bonaparte would otherwise be held.

The same is the case with his return from Elba, for though that return cost 100 millions of money, and an immense number of lives; though it was very unprincipled in itself, yet the absurdity of the most powerful states and sovereigns of Europe being thus insulted and ill treated by a single man is so great, that one actually feels their detestation of the act greatly diminished by that absurdity. Bonaparte first over-reached and then defied the whole of the allies, and if he was guilty he was great.

"He deserves it for being so foolish," is too common an expression not to have some foundation in truth; and if the men, who were foolish

enough to agree in 1814 to send Bonaparte to Elba, had been to be the only sufferers, it would have been all very well, but the innocent suffered for the guilty. Britain had but a small share in this improvident arrangement, for, as it appears since, her negotiator did not arrive till the business was settled; she, however, came in for her full share of the blame in allowing him to escape, and she came in for more than a double share of the penalty paid for the error, as more than a tenth part of the debt that loads her industry so heavily at this day, was occasioned by the negligence of the one party, and the want of faith and honour in the other.

There may appear to be great political skill in, first, getting himself artfully made Consul for life; then getting the right to name his successor; and lastly of procuring himself to be proclaimed Emperor. But this requires examination.

That a politician, like a mountebank or charlatan on a stage, may play a great many wonderful tricks that plain men do not well understand, is not a new thing; but though tricks are incomprehensible, they are not therefore miracles. In the same manner, though great address, and skill, and deception, were practised to rise in this manner to the highest degree of rank, dignity, and power, yet to be a great politician something more was necessary. Bonaparte should have first considered, whether what he was attempting would

ultimately come to good? The nomination for life might be really advantageous, because the country was at war, and he had shewn himself to be the most capable of defending it, but why name his successor, and by that act virtually overturn the Republic? Why get himself after that made Emperor, to destroy the Republic in appearance, as well as in reality, and thereby at once alienate all the most active and energetic part of the population of France?

Those who know the country best, and who saw the effect produced at the time, all agree that the revolutionary energy, so useful to Bonaparte, and so dangerous to Europe, began to decline from that moment. The coronation as Emperor, by the Pope, in the cathedral of Notre-Dame, in 1804, was in fact the prelude to his banishment to the island of Elba in 1814.

The plan of the Revolution was overturned, and it scarcely, even to the most ignorant, seemed worth while to have shed so much blood, to get a fierce, cold-hearted, and despotic man from Corsica, to sit as Emperor on the throne of the mild and merciful Louis XVI.

The French people, speaking of them in general, always looked on the death of the king as a disgrace to the country; and the excuse, that they wanted a republican government, diminished, in their minds, in some degree, both the shame and the criminality of the sad transaction

The nomination of an Emperor, left pride humiliated, conscience unappeased, and cruelty without apology. It unsettled the minds of the whole population of France, which became cool and indifferent to forms of government, and only submitted to necessity.

This accounts in a great measure for the indifference with which the French people afterwards saw the imperial government overturned, and the Bourbon family restored. Their favourite republic, to which they had waded through so much blood, had been before destroyed; and at any rate, the hour of mortification was past, for in receiving Louis XVIII. the Revolution was in fact as nearly as possible restored to the principle adopted in 1789, which was never considered, even by the republicans, as being a bad one, for it gave a constitution and representation to France.

As an able political transaction, the elevation to empire was artfully conducted, but it was by no means a wise political measure, it was by the same operation ornamenting the structure and undermining its base.

The encroachments made on Italy, and the occupation of Switzerland in the time of peace, were doing as much in the great European nation, as the elevation to the imperial dignity did in France. Those measures shewed plainly that the tranquillity of Europe, and the existence of Bonaparte at the head of the affairs of France, were incompatible; so that both without and within,

all waited only for an opportunity to throw off the yoke and obtain a change.

If I were to follow Bonaparte through the whole of his policy, it would be found to be extremely artful; conducted, with much cunning, bad faith, and trick, attended with temporary success, but nothing solid, estimable, or durable.

The perpetual changes of those of his favourites, that he advanced from one elevated situation to another, had not even the semblance of good policy. Murat, made Duke of Berg and Cleves, and his brother, Joseph, King of Naples; and then brother Joseph removed from Naples to Spain, and Murat from Berg to Naples.

Another brother, Louis, who it appears is a good man, was made King of Holland, and as he would not consent to be the minister of his brother's exactions, he was compelled to resign, and Holland incorporated into the great empire.

The durability of institutions always adds to their stability; therefore the perpetual removals were, even to a common observer, highly impolitic and unwise, and in themselves cruel and unjust.

The violating neutral territories, and seizing ambassadors and public despatches; insulting foreign ambassadors at his own court, and such acts, were neither suitable to the dignity of a man who sat on a throne, nor to one who set any value on the peace and tranquillity of his own country*.

* See Appendix, Note DD.

There is not any necessity to making an apology for language, which, though rude, is very suitable to the subject; Bonaparte's conduct and policy were exactly those of the leader of a band of robbers or banditti, who found himself in so strong a position, that no power on earth could call him to account.

Even in his attempts to improve the situation of the French, and encourage agriculture and manufactures, which Bonaparte pretended to do, his schemes and plans were only plausible, but without solidity.

The basis of industry of every description is the security of property. Without that, all the rest is but *clinquant*, a mere glittering tinsel; and if fairly examined, such were most of the great benefits that he bestowed on France, the public works and code of laws excepted *.

Until mankind are degraded and altered, no crowned head in Europe can long act on dishonourable principles. Society must unite in self-defence against any such monster, and either he must fall or they must. Any compromise, with such a ruler, must be temporary, and but of short duration; and it is believed that Talleyrand, and those who assisted Bonaparte with their counsel, were of that opinion, and that had he taken their advice, he would have acted very differently from what he did.

* See Appendix, Note EE.

The most fatal political mistake, however, that Bonaparte committed when he took Machiavel for his guide, was his not following that part of his advice, where he exhorts princes to keep their word sacredly when they have once given it. Whether or not it was that Bonaparte made no distinction between dissimulation and an open breach of promise, or that he despised the distinction, it is quite certain that in his actions he made none, although every man of common sense knows that in no line of life can a man long succeed if his word cannot be taken; and, the higher his situation and more important his transactions, the more necessary is an honourable fulfilment of promise to their success.

The errors of Bonaparte in his conduct and policy are altogether inexcusable as well as unaccountable in a man of his great abilities, his penetration, and knowledge of human nature. His imprisoning the Pope by whom he was crowned, and so degrading the chief of the church which he had boasted of re-establishing. The murdering the Duke d'Enghien without motive of revenge or utility, and thus shewing all mankind that he set their good opinion at naught, at the same time that he made incredible efforts to obtain the praise and flattery of literary men. All those are contradictory, unaccountable, and very unlike the policy and conduct of a really great man.

Great abilities and address may be displayed in

effecting what is bad as well as in effecting what is good; in producing what is only flimsy and temporary as well as in what is solid and lasting, and such was at best the merit of Bonaparte. Of all that he did, scarcely any thing remains, although he was assisted by the ablest men in Europe.

At the same time that he must be blamed for always occupying himself in cunning schemes to disturb the peace of society and ruin princes and nations, he has been unjustly censured for not having employed his colossal power in doing good. He had it not in his power to do much good, for to have done that, he must have been at peace. Now, there was too much fermentation in the interior and ill-will and envy without, for him to have maintained peace with neighbouring nations. All his faults and errors must not be attributed to himself, for he was with all his power obliged to submit to circumstances. He had it not in his power to imitate Washington or Cromwell. His enemies have not in that done him justice, though his admirers are still more to be blamed, for approving of, and admiring all that he has done.

The policy of divorcing the wife to whom he owed his first elevation, and who conducted his intrigues and counteracted his enemies in Paris, in order to marry the daughter of the Emperor of Austria, is the most doubtful of any action of his variegated life.

The advantages were certainly considerable and many, but the disadvantages were not a few. It alienated from him more than any thing he ever did the affections of the people of France who hate Austria, but at the same time it did certainly promise him some support in case of need; and, as a son was the offspring of the marriage, it gave some additional stability to his throne, though certainly not much even of that.

On this part of the policy of Bonaparte, I think it would be rash to determine as to its wisdom. As to its being a cold-blooded ungrateful policy, that is by by no means doubtful, and indeed there is not amongst all the actions of the man a single one that proceeded from goodness of heart or feeling. No man ever had a heart that interfered so little with the prosecution of his interest. He was the most unfeeling of men, but by no means the most cruel. Every thing with him was a matter of calculation, and he sacrificed men as he would have sacrificed mice. He was attentive to the interests of his family, and is said not to have been without affection; but, after his conduct to Josephine and to Louis his brother, I think that is not to be much relied upon.

As to the rest, Bonaparte was so much of the hypocrite, the dissembler, and the concealed conspirator, that it is only by his actions that he can be judged. In him appearances were nothing, at least they were no indications of the real man.

Bonaparte is supposed to have intended to dethrone all the sovereigns of Europe, and replace them by his favourite generals, and, undoubtedly his actions sanction such a belief. He might be superior in power to kings of the ancient race; he might be superior also in ability, but all that only made his inferiority in other respects more galling to his haughty mind.

Besides all that, he felt that the kings of all the old dynasties would ever remain his enemies, and he had insulted or injured every one of them far beyond forgiveness. Whether or not, he seriously had such an intention is uncertain, though it is very likely, and at all events, one thing is certain, that he had followed such a line of policy, that he must either rule over Europe, or Europe must conquer him. There was no alternative, and surely that is enough to stamp his policy with the name of cruel, imprudent in its progress, and in its end impracticable.

SECTION IV.

Of Bonaparte as a Statesman.

THOUGH the character of statesman and politician are intimately connected, and indeed, in some degree, blended together, yet the terms are by no means synonymous.

The most upright and correct character in existence might be a great statesman, who might form great plans, and find means of putting them in execution. The Duke of Sully in France, and both Lord Chatham and his son William Pitt were great statesmen; but Sir Robert Walpole and Prince Talleyrand are what may properly be termed great politicians: and it would not be very easy for an upright and correct character to resemble either of them.

Bonaparte must have justice done him when it is his due; and it would be very unfair not to admit that he had many difficulties that stood between him and the accomplishment, or even projecting, of those plans that entitle a man to be called a great statesman.

France was so involved in difficulties, internally and externally, that the pressing business of the time required the whole of the exertions of Bonaparte; and it was only an indefatigable and extraordinary man like himself that could have been able to manage matters so as to prevent total confusion and ruin.

The sad state to which France was reduced during the short reign of the Directory, is sufficient to shew the difficulty of the situation that Bonaparte had to fill.

A great statesman lays plans for producing permanent advantage to his country, and he takes care that they are founded on solid principles.

Previous to becoming First Consul, Bonaparte had no opportunity of shewing his talents as a statesman, and then he certainly began well. His restoring the church, and endeavouring to obtain peace with England and other nations, were actions worthy of the greatest statesman: but then his intrigues to deceive England at the Treaty of Amiens, and his restless and suspicious conduct after the treaty was concluded, as well as his humiliating and imprisoning the Pope, entirely did away both the merit and tendency of the first actions which were so statesman-like. The latter, on the contrary, were rude and unprincipled, as well as very unwise; and the whole of his conduct afterwards was that of a restless, turbulent, ambitious man, without any thing of the true character of the statesman.

There was no foundation for thinking even for one moment that France could conquer and keep in subjection the whole of Europe. It was a mad plan, formed by the first revolutionists when they were literally in a state of mental derangement: yet even they did not expect to do it by brute force, but by persuasion, and shewing all mankind that it was their interest to make Paris a common capital or centre.

This was nothing better than a wild reverie; yet the strong mind of Bonaparte, led on by personal vanity, adopted a plan still more absurd, that of conquering and keeping in subjection the

whole, or, at any rate, the greater portion Europe by mere force, unaided by opinion.

Perhaps the most reasonable part of his plan, as the Ruler of France, was his attempt to ruin England; but, if the design was wise, the means by which it was attempted were highly absurd. His scheme of invasion was quite ridiculous: besides, he was too impatient and impetuous. He was for doing quickly what required a length of time. It was evident, and he knew it well, that Britain had contracted a debt, which she could never expect to be able to pay, and that in a few years, she would not even be able to pay the interest: he therefore might have expected every thing from continuing to exhaust her resources,—whereas by violent measures, and particularly by compelling Russia to shut her ports against British ships, he was running a great risque for a very uncertain advantage.

The Milan and Berlin decrees against British manufactures, and against colonial produce, had distressed the continent from one extremity to the other. Even the soldiers in his army laughed at his foolish mode of attempting to ruin Britain, and called the war with Russia the sugar and coffee war; and it was in vain for Bonaparte, a Corsican by birth, to hope to instil into the French army the hatred or contempt that he himself had for the English. As for contempt, the French soldiery never had, nor ever can

have, it for the English; and as for hatred, amidst all their marauding and plundering, there is a sort of gallantry and desire to do justice to merit, in French military men, that prevents that rancour and hatred that Bonaparte encouraged and hoped to promote.

Had Bonaparte even succeeded in forcing Russia to shut her ports against England, that would not have made any great alteration to this country, but would have been highly injurious to Russia; Bonaparte was therefore running a great risque for a very small eventual advantage, which he must have known, if he was acquainted with the real state of the Russian trade. And if he was not acquainted with it, he was still more to blame; for then he was running a great risque, without knowing for what he was doing so.

The marriage with an Arch-Duchess of Austria, and the continuation of the system of conquering and fighting, were quite incompatible with each other; inasmuch as the one was with a view of becoming the founder of a dynasty, and therefore ought to have been accompanied with plans for the durability and solidity of the throne of France, instead of plans of ambition and conquest, which, to say the least of them, were subjecting him and his family to the risk of a reverse of fortune.

A statesman thinks and acts for his country, and not for himself. Queen Elizabeth was a stateswoman, and Peter the Great a statesman;

both of them of the first rank. Their plans were all solid, and all for the aggrandizement of their country*.

Louis XIV., William III., and Queen Anne, may be placed in a second rank; for they all made great and well-directed efforts for the good of their countries.

Bonaparte in the first place was selfish, and in the second he was too wilful and impetuous at the same time, that he did not possess that degree of caution and circumspection that are necessary for the statesman. Pope speaking of the qualities bestowed on men in high situations says,

> "Fear to the statesman; rashness to the chief;
> To kings presumption, and to crowds belief."

Bonaparte had the rashness of the chiefs, and the presumption of the kings in a superlative degree; but as to fear or caution they had not in any instance an influence over his conduct.

Had all his schemes succeeded, it could have only been for a very short time. The world was not in a state to submit long to slavery under any one nation; therefore to make great efforts to establish an order of things that would be all overturned soon after his death, was very unstatesman-like. I cannot, therefore, see any claim that he had to that title.

The absurdity, if I may use the expression, of

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* See Appendix, Note FF.

the plan of Bonaparte for extending the dominion of France over Europe, and at the same time extinguishing liberty in that country itself, was the greater that he knew, that even with all his energy and talents there was a constant difficulty of preventing a fresh revolution. The only plan then that had common sense for its basis, not to speak of great wisdom, was one that might be put in execution in his life-time, and maintained afterward with the ordinary share of abilities that falls to the lot of mankind. Such a plan must be one in which the nature of things would be consulted, and not one of those gigantic plans that require great abilities and continual exertion, but which are overturned as soon as the abilities are wanting, or the exertions cease.

Had Bonaparte never married with the hopes of founding a dynasty, there would have been less inconsistency in his conduct; he would then have been merely a conqueror and hero on his own account, carrying on plans of ambition to gratify himself, and determined to be all or nothing; but that was not his view, and, therefore leaving the good and prosperity of France entirely out of the question, he was acting altogether inconsistently.

The political life of Bonaparte began at the time when the love of liberty had electrified all France. He found that the people had mistaken the true nature of liberty, and that their scheme

had miscarried; and, under these circumstances he had great merit in turning the national enthusiasm into another channel, and substituting a love of military glory for a love of liberty; but, though he succeeded in that, it was folly to imagine that any thing would ever reconcile France to a long course of slavery.

The history of the world shews that extended empire is always of short duration, and followed by distress; and, no country showed it more than France itself, for, in less than a century after the reign of Charlemagne, France was in so weak and impoverished a state that the Danes sailed twice up the river Seine to Paris, burning the city the first time, and the second making it pay a ransom, in order to avoid a similar fate*.

The conquests of Louis XIV. though permanent were also followed by great distress, and Bonaparte could not be ignorant of the danger that must be brought upon his successor by his immeasurable plans of ambition and extended empire, he, therefore, could lay no claim to the

* France must have been reduced to a very wretched state of weakness to admit of two such invasions. It is scarcely possible to conceive how in a running river, shallow in summer and rapid in the winter, boats could ascend so far from the sea, carrying a force that was sufficient for such an exploit; as, however, the fact is indisputable, it proves the weakness that follows after a country has extended its conquests too far, and by that means wasted its strength.

title of a great statesman; and, they who have considered him as such must be admitted to have done so without any due consideration, or without knowing what qualities are requisite to form such a character.

Never were conquests extended with greater rapidity than those of the French, but it must likewise be observed, that never was an empire so badly constructed for the purpose of durability; and, had Russia been overcome, the matter would have been still worse.

Had the conquests made been made completely, the matter would not have been quite so bad as it was, but nothing was effectually finished. Prussia was evidently only subdued in a temporary manner, and Italy was in a similar situation. Indeed, so badly was the whole arranged, that men who had not one-tenth of the penetration of Bonaparte, saw that there was neither solidity nor durability in any thing that he had done.

This great conqueror and despotic ruler must be considered, even allowing him talents of a very uncommon description, to have been nothing more than one of those ephemeral phenomena that the French Revolution produced: that he was the most extraordinary of all must be admitted, but nothing more, and scarcely any thing of what he did remains, his combinations being all nearly as evanescent as himself.

SECTION V.

Conclusion.

THE wonderful assemblage of talents and uncommon dispositions and propensities combined in one person, could scarcely fail to obtain for Napoleon Bonaparte a reputation for being the greatest of men and of heroes; particularly when to that combination were added the great deeds he performed, and the pains that he took to envelope himself in mystery, and to purchase the adulation and praise of most of the men of talents in his time.

When the sovereigns of the Continent of ancient families and seated on thrones long established, found themselves humbled and treated as inferiors by a man who a few years before had been in a low and mean situation, it was far from unnatural to attribute to him talents almost super-human.

When the most complicated and wonderful of machines is taken to pieces, and examined in detail, it is then that its nature is known; and it is thus with Bonaparte, that, when analyzed, his talents, taken separately, excite no great wonder, though the whole were such as astonished mankind, and will continue to do so.

I have carefully avoided imputing to him any

crimes of a dubious authenticity, and have had nothing in view but to make as fair an estimate as I can of his real merit. That he was the wonder of the age will never be denied; but much is to be set down for the exaggeration of flatterers, and the fears and apprehensions he excited.

When he was placed in an ordinary situation, before his rise and after his fall, he neither did nor said any thing that distinguished him from an ordinary man. He shewed no signs, and gave no marks of that superior genius, that have been observed to attend some men on all occasions, and under all circumstances; it was, therefore, to his situation that he owed his great reputation, rather than to any thing inherent in himself.

While in power, he took great care to keep all around him at such a respectful distance, and enveloped himself so carefully in a mysterious conduct, that it was not easy to ascertain his real qualities and character.

Never almost was there any man whom so many persons were interested in, misrepresenting, either from fear or from interest. As his haughty pride was accompanied with an unexampled degree of vanity, his favour was sought for by the most fulsome praise and flattery. The great actions he performed opened a wide field for those who sought the way to his favour by adulation; and so high was his opinion of himself, that he was never known to blush or to shew the smallest

sign of modesty when addressed even in a style that compared him with the Divinity. He even appeared to think, that the praises bestowed were below what his merit required, and to think that a new language should be invented to describe the perfection and qualities of a person, such as the world had never before produced.

The first literary men of the age having become his flatterers, and the propagators of his fame, at the same time that the wonders he performed astonished the world, the whole of the general effect was a conviction and belief that so great a man never before existed.

To destroy this illusion is not unimportant, in order that men may never again fall into a similar error; and that they may know, that to their own want of courage to view him as he was, much of his apparent greatness is to be attributed.

When brought in contact with men who did not fear him, he was not that extraordinary personage that he had been represented. Sir Sidney Smith did not find him so irresistible as he was supposed to be; and the Duke of Wellington certainly proved himself superior to him at the Battle of Waterloo. I only compare them as generals; for, in other parts of their character, there is not only no analogy or similitude, but they are directly different.

The Duke of Wellington was as careful to prevent his soldiers from plundering the people

of the country in which he made war, as he was of making them do their duty on the day of battle; and he always acted with the greatest humanity and most strict honour, which Bonaparte did not even affect to do. He appears rather to have prided himself on his great and superlative genius, that prompted him to take the readiest and most effectual means of gaining his end, without considering whether the means were what men in general deem honourable or not.

There were, nevertheless, many parts in the character and conduct of Bonaparte that deserve to be imitated, both by generals and the rulers of nations.

As a general, his attention to the details of the administration, and taking care that every soldier was well provided with shoes and other necessaries; his being as attentive to rewarding merit, as he was to punishing misconduct; his paying well for information that was true, and punishing those who brought what was false: all those things were excellent in a general, and deserve to be imitated.

As an emperor, his hearing all complaints himself—his encouraging merit, and employing men for their talents, and not their patronage—his making every one do his duty, and rewarding each according to what he did do—his activity, and never suffering any thing to be delayed that he thought it was necessary to do: all that was excellent, and merits well to be imitated.

It may be thought, that, in the best parts of his character he was an imitator of others, and that the worst parts were his own. On this subject I will not attempt to decide; but it appears to me fair to believe, that the circumstances under which he acted were the cause of a great many of his blameable actions.

Had he been scrupulous in his means, he would not have been successful; and to expect that attention to justice and order in either a French general or a French ruler during the Revolution, that is to be met with in the generals and rulers of other countries, is absurd, and indeed unfair; for they had it not in their power at that period.

At the same time that Bonaparte never was guilty of cruelty or oppression without a motive, it must equally be allowed, that he never did a good or generous action from a motive of goodness or generosity. Self-interest was always at the bottom of every thing that he did, and in this he is different from almost all other men.

There have been very few men in the world who have not felt a struggle and reluctance when they found it necessary to be cruel and severe, and few also who did not feel pleasure when their duty permitted them to do what would make others happy. Such feelings, indeed, though variously modified and proportioned, appear to be inseparable from the human character: but Bonaparte was an exception, and a very singular one; for, though there are to be found monsters who

seem to take a pleasure in evil, yet I do not know of another character in history totally indifferent to good or evil, and so much superior to all the feelings of good and evil, that he executed on every occasion, what he had planned without the least consideration of who gained or who suffered by his operations.

The admirers of Bonaparte attribute this part of his character, in which he differs so much from all other men, to that superior scientific genius, that made him act according to calculation, like a pure mathematician. He was himself at great pains to have it so thought, and to make it be believed, that he was quite superior to being led out of the way by his feelings.

That this was not the case, however, is plain, for his vanity and revenge led him into very great errors, and in fact ruined him; it is not then that he was superior to his feelings and passions, and had an absolute control over them, but that he had few of those feelings and passions that generally influence the actions of other men.

Had Bonaparte known the feelings of gratitude, or of pity, or of generosity, they would certainly have had sometimes an influence on his conduct, as anger, pride, and vanity had. He was, therefore, not that man above the influence of his propensities or passions that he pretended to be, though he had a very different combination of passions from most other men.

The mysterious and hypocritical conduct of Bo-

naparte, were employed chiefly for the purpose either of disguising his feelings, or making it be thought that he was above their influence, and that he was always guided and regulated by what he himself thought right. The idea that we have of superior beings is, that they are guided by what is right, and not led astray by passions as we are; and Bonaparte appears to have formed a regular plan for imposing himself upon the world as a sort of superior being, above the failings and weaknesses to which human nature is generally subject.*

This was doing in a more eminent degree, and in a greater style, what is more or less done through the whole world; men of weak passions are men with few virtues and few faults, but they do not allow that. They take to themselves the merit of keeping their passions within bounds, and feel a great pride in comparing themselves with men whose passions have led them into error. Such men are innocent impostors.

If we could really find a man of violent passions but still of a faultless life and perfectly correct behaviour, he would be very justly entitled to our highest esteem; but, though we find great virtues in men of strong passions, we generally find them attended with great defects and irregularities of conduct.

Bonaparte not only was unable to control his passions, but they had a complete power over

* See Appendix, Note GG.

him; and his appearing to have a great control over them, most undoubtedly arose from the absence of those passions that have so powerful an influence over the conduct and characters of other men. He had only the selfish passions.

The analysis of the character and talents of this wonderful man will not tend to lessen our astonishment; for though it shews that he was neither the great general, great politician, or great statesman, that he has been represented to be, yet the wonder is by no means diminished. It is transferred from the greatness of individual talents, to the astonishing combination of the whole, and not the smallest part of the wonder is, *that every species of talent was displayed in its full force, and to its utmost extent, on the first occasion for its exertion.*

Napoleon was as much a general, a politician, and a statesman, from the first, as at any period of his wonderful career. In that he was as different from all other men, as in that unexampled combination of talents that were concentrated in him*.

His hypocrisy only made him appear different from what he was, but not in reality greater. It was a greatness, differently composed from what he made it appear, but not on that account the less astonishing and wonderful.

Great lessons may be learnt by the rulers of nations from his important history. Bonaparte

* See Appendix Note IIII.

trampled upon kings, and he might have done so with impunity long enough, but he attempted to alter the nature of men. To trample on their rights, and either to change by force, or to restrain them in the indulgence of their reasonable propensities.

If with his gigantic means he failed and ruined himself, what can ordinarily-gifted men expect in similar enterprises? Had Bonaparte, when he humiliated the kings, compelled them to improve the condition of their people, he would never have finished his race, a prisoner and an exile, on a barren rock in the midst of the ocean. But the attempt to coerce all those he ruled over, was unprofitable in its progress, and ruinous in its termination. Such contests must always have a similar result sooner or later, and to those who say that "the king's name is a tower of strength," it may be answered, that "kings will find the people's love is a tower impregnable."

I have now done with this important subject, and if I appear to have spoken too freely of one whose power is gone, and whose race is run, it will be fair to observe, that I have done no less so of those whose power is not gone, and whose races are not run; with a hope, that what I have said, may be to their advantage, and for the general benefit of mankind.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

Note A., p. 13.

Bonaparte adopted the plan with enthusiasm. Preparations were made with the utmost activity, and every thing was ready for the commencement of this hazardous enterprise, in the month of April, 1797. On the 21st, arriving at Toulon, he addressed his army as follows; "Frenchmen, officers, and soldiers! you form one of the wings of the army of England; you have been engaged in wars of different descriptions, of mountains, plains, and sieges: you are now to make a maritime war. The Roman legions, which you have sometimes imitated, but not yet equalled, combated Carthage, by turns, on this very sea, and on the plains of Zama. Soldiers! the eyes of Europe are upon you; you have grand destinies to fulfil, battles to fight, dangers and fatigues to overcome; you must do even more than you have yet done, and endure more than you have yet endured, for the prosperity of your native country, the happiness of the human race, and your own glory. Soldiers, sailors, cannoniers, infantry, and cavalry, be all united, be as one man, recollect, that in the day of battle you will stand in need of each other. Marines, you have been hitherto neglected; now the greatest solicitude of the Republic is for you; you will be worthy of the the army of which you form a part; the genius of the

Republic, from her birth the arbitrator of Europe, wishes to be the arbitress of seas also, and of countries the most distant."

This address was received with the loudest acclamations, and a strong squadron sailed from the port of Toulon, on the 20th May. The fleet was commanded by Admiral Brueys, who was on board the L'Orient, of 120 guns, and in which ship Bonaparte also embarked. On the 10th of June, they were within sight of the island of Gozza: the next day the French troops effected a landing, notwithstanding a brisk cannonade: the whole island was in the evening completely subjected, and the town of Malta invested on every side; but next day a suspension of hostilities for twenty-four hours was granted, and, on the night of the 22nd, a definitive agreement was concluded, whereby the island of Malta, and the islands of Gozza and Cumino, were delivered up to the French; and the succeeding day they entered the town and forts of Malta.

On the 26th of June, the French squadron sailed from Malta, to continue its progress towards the coast of Africa. On the 2nd of July, they entered the road of Alexandria, where the English squadron, under the command of Nelson, had been three days before, expecting to find them. The landing took place the same night. Notwithstanding the sea and wind were both unfavourable, Bonaparte entered a galley after the troops, at eleven at night; the army was then 30,000 strong. In the night they reached Alexandria; and at day-break the attack commenced. Hereupon the Turks fled for refuge into the triangular fort, the pharos, and new town. Every house was a citadel; but before the end of the day the two castles capitulated, and the French found themselves in complete possession of the place, and of

the forts and harbours of Alexandria. An alliance was then entered into between the Mufti, the principal chieks of Alexandria, and Bonaparte.

On the 5th of July, General Desaix set out with his division for Damanhour; and, on the 6th, the division of General Kleber received orders to march to Rosetta, to take possession of that town, to leave a garrison there, and to ascend the left shore of the Nile, in order to reach the heights of Damanhour. On the 18th, in the evening, Bonaparte set out with the army from Alexandria to reach Cairo, by the way of Damanhour, which was the shortest, but at the same time the most difficult and painful, route. The Arabs perpetually harassed the rear of the army, and killed about thirty men. At last, after a forced march across this desert, accompanied with great fatigues, his army arrived, scorched by excessive heat, and in want of almost every thing. On the morning of July 21st, they perceived the pyramids, and in the evening they were within six leagues of Cairo, which city, on the 23d, surrendered to the French.

Having got possession of Cairo, Bonaparte marched forward to complete the conquest of Egypt, and pursue the obstinate Beys, who were flying before him. Ibrahim, the chief of them, betook himself for safety to the deserts of Syria. General Desaix pursued Mourad Bey; but although his troops were very much dispersed by the engagements he had sustained, they could not be said to be either taken or conquered. About the end of October, a serious insurrection broke out among the inhabitants of Cairo, who did not appear to be satisfied with their French masters. General Dupuis being informed on the morning of the 22d, that a multitude had assembled in the vicinity of one of the chief mosques, went to disperse them at the head of twelve of his cavalry; but they

declared that they were not satisfied with the taxes, which was the sole cause of their meeting. Perceiving that they discovered no inclination to disperse, General Dupuis attacked them, which they returned with stones and other weapons of a similar nature, one of which wounded the French general so severely, that it terminated his existence in a very short time. The number of the Turks continued to increase, retiring to their mosques, which they continued to fortify, but the French forced the greater part of their gates, and the unhappy insurgents were put to death. Fresh numbers supplied the place of the slain, and the carnage continued for three days, during which upwards of 3,000 men, women, and children, were put to the sword. Bonaparte, after quelling this insurrection, issued the following proclamation :—

"People of Cairo, perverse men have led you astray, and they have perished. God hath commanded me to be mild and merciful towards the people, and I have been so towards you all. Is there a man among you so blind as not to see that fate directs all my operations? Is there a man among you so incredulous as to doubt, that the whole of the universe is subject to the empire of destiny? Let the enemies of the people know, that when the world began, it was written, that after having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and overthrown the cross, I should come from the farthest part of the west, to fulfil the task which is imposed upon me. Make the people see, that in more than twenty passages of the Koran, that which has happened has been foretold, and that which will happen is equally explained. I might demand of each of you to tell the most secret thoughts of his heart, for I know them all, even those which you have never divulged to any one; but the day will come,

when all the world shall know, by evidence too strong to be denied, that I am conducted by orders from above, and that no human efforts can prevail against me. Happy they who are the first to attach themselves to me."

Bonaparte committed many acts of hostility against the Porte, yet he still professed himself anxious to preserve the friendship which had subsisted between it and the French Republic. To prevent the Turks, if possible, from forming any alliance with Great Britain, was his grand object by such pretences; for if such an alliance should have taken place, the forces of both countries would be united against France. The Turks did form this treaty, and it seemed the determination of both to drive the French out of Egypt. Bonaparte on his part was not idle, but used every effort in his power to thwart the designs of his enemies; to accomplish which he prepared an expedition into Syria, to take vengeance on Djezzar Pacha for giving a friendly reception to Ibrahim Bey; and to destroy the preparations made in Egypt against the French by the British and Turks. On the 22d of December he marched for Suez, of which he got possession on the 6th of January. There he obtained information that the Djezzar had been appointed Pacha of Damascus and Egypt, and that a part of the troops he had collected there had reached El Arish, only a day's journey from the desert. The battering train of artillery was sent by Bonaparte to be shipped at Alexandria, and he wrote the following letter to the Djezzar before his departure: "Since I came into Egypt, I have told you many times that my intention was not to make war against you, but against the Mamelukes. You have given no answer to my repeated overtures. I told you, that I desire you to drive Ibrahim Bey from the frontiers of Egypt. So far from that, you have sent troops to

Gaza, and even to El Arish, which is six leagues within the territory of Egypt. I will march in a few days against St. John d'Acre. But why should I take away the few years that remain from the life of an old man whom I have never seen. I wish to be merciful, not only towards the people, but towards the great. You have no reason to be my enemy, for you were formerly the enemy of the Mamelukes; become again my friend and the enemy of the Mamelukes and the English, and I will do you as much good as I intend to do you harm. Send me your answer by the messenger, who has full powers to treat with you. I shall set out for St. Jean d'Acre the 24th of the month; I must, before that time, have your answer." It is certain, however, that no answer was sent to this letter.

The assault of General Regnier's troops was opposed for some days by the garrison of El Arish, but it surrendered at last to the remainder of the army under General Bonaparte. No farther opposition was experienced by the French army, which continued its march through the desert, and after reaching Gaza, from which the enemy retired, the French entered the town, where they found large quantities of provision and military stores. It was treated in a friendly manner, and immediately placed under military authority. The army then marched through a sandy desert of vast extent, to the town of Jaffa (the ancient Joppa), where the enemy made a formidable appearance. The French immediately began the siege of the place, which was taken after an obstinate resistance, and the greater part of the garrison put to the sword; but as the remainder took refuge in their mosques, the French officers and soldiers refused to pursue the helpless fugitives, and spared every individual who implored their clemency.

After a siege of sixty-six days, Bonaparte finding success impossible, quitted St. Jean d'Acre in the night favoured by the darkness, and on his return to Egypt, he either by way of amusement, or to gratify revenge burned such villages as lay on his road.

This useless and unsuccessful expedition cost the lives of about 7,000 soldiers, and rendered him highly obnoxious; though he proclaimed a triumph, and attempted to impose on the army that he had left there.

Soon after his return to Cairo, he found that the Turks were determined, if possible, to retake Egypt, having brought for that purpose an hundred ships into the bay of Aboukir, from which they landed 10,000 troops, gained possession of the castle of Aboukir, and were constantly receiving new accessions of strength. This induced him to leave Cairo, on the 16th of July, and in ten days he was in a situation to give them battle. The action terminated in the defeat of the Turks, 10,000 of whom were destroyed, and in a few days the garrison laid down their arms, which was taken possession of by the French. This may be considered as the last military transaction of Bonaparte in Egypt: for being made acquainted with the disorderly state of affairs in France, whose armies were vanquished abroad, he resolved to leave the army and return home, where he had now the most flattering prospects of reaching the zenith of his ambition. None but General Berthier was made acquainted with his design, and he sent orders to Admiral Gantheaume to provide him with a frigate, and let him know when the British and Turkish fleets were out of sight. This agreeable information he received about six in the evening of the 18th of August, and at nine he sent orders to all those whom he designed should accompany him to Europe, to meet him at the time and place agreed on, and not on any

account to open their instructions, prior to their arrival. They instantly obeyed, left behind them what property they had, and their horses on the beach. Sealed orders were sent to General Kleber, appointing him to the chief command of the army then in Egypt, and on the 23d of August 1799, Buonaparte went on board; but adverse winds detained him in the bay of Aboukir till the 25th; and he reached Ajaccio in the island of Corsica on the 1st of October, where he lay wind-bound till the 7th; and after he had escaped the vigilance of all the British cruizers, he made the port of Frejus on the 9th of the same month.

Note B., p. 14.

The attack by Julius Cæsar on Great Britain, when he with difficulty kept Gaul in subjection, was certainly an error, considering him merely as a general; and indeed it has always been so considered; but as a political character, wishing to excite surprise and wonder, it was for him a very useful enterprise.

It was not over the great people and the Senate at Rome that Cæsar wanted to triumph, but over the opinion of the people and of the army, which his having carried the conquests of the republic into an almost unknown country, tended greatly to do.

The Roman people thought of nothing so much as of military glory and extended dominion. The wisdom and utility of what was done, was to them a matter of very secondary importance. The splendid and wonderful, when united with military enterprise, were what they wished for and admired.

Cæsar did not conquer any part of the island, but he laid the foundation for its future conquest, by generals less able than himself, and the people or populace of Rome were highly pleased with what he had done.

There was a sort of good fortune or luck that attended all the enterprises of Bonaparte through the greater part of his life, and the interception of the letters from his deserted and miserable army to their friends at home, had prevented the truth from being known at Paris, respecting the Egyptian expedition. He made it be believed in Paris, that he had conquered Egypt, when he had in fact run away from misery and misfortune, leaving the army and the *sçavants*, who were there to get out of the difficulty the best way they could. Cæsar brought his army back; he was not a man to leave it in distress, and save himself; but the Parisians were not like the Romans, and thought nothing of Bonaparte's misconduct in quitting his post without leave. They saw in him the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, and the man who was the most likely, by his daring genius, to free them from the despotism and misrule of the Directory, which had fallen into contempt, and was detested for its arrogance, its blunders, and unsteady conduct.

NOTE C, p. 15.

On Bonaparte's return to France, every friend of that country expressed joy and exultation, because he was considered as the enemy of anarchy and confusion, and the chief support of well-regulated liberty. He passed through no place where the cry of "peace, peace," did not resound, and he might be said to have

enjoyed a perpetual triumph from Frejus to Paris. On his arrival in the metropolis, he had an interview with the Directory; the courts and streets through which there was a direct passage to the Luxemburg, were filled with spectators, who discovered the utmost impatience to behold him again, and their expressions of joy seemed to give him much more satisfaction than when he returned from Italy.

He reached Paris on the 10th of October, and in less than a month the constitution of 1795 was totally subverted. It is believed that Sieyes made the first proposal for subverting the Directorial government to Moreau, by whom it was rejected, but readily agreed to by Bonaparte, and on the 7th of November there was a meeting of a number of the deputies in the house of Le Mercier, where the proper measures were concerted, and the 9th of the same month was fixed on for the grand enterprise. To hasten the execution of the plan, the committee of conspirators sent messages to about 150 chosen members of the council, charging them to meet in the Thuilleries at eight o'clock in the morning of that day, although very few of them were made acquainted with the purpose. When they met, in pursuance of the invitation received, it was found that about a hundred of the most furious jacobins had been left out of the list, no doubt intentionally. Carnot, reporter of the committee, opened the meeting by an able speech, stating fully the imminent dangers which threatened the existence of the Republic, as well as the alarming conduct of the factious, and concluded by moving that the assembly should adjourn to St. Cloud, agreeably to the 102d and 103d articles of the Constitution; that the execution of the decree should be committed to Bonaparte, and to him be given the chief command of all the troops in

Paris, whether belonging to the line or the national guard. This decree was carried by a great majority, and that instant Bonaparte appeared at the bar, attended by Berthier, Moreau, Lefobre, Macdonald, and other French generals. When the President informed Bonaparte of his appointment, he delivered the following speech:—"The Republic was upon the brink of ruin, but your decree has saved it. Woe to those who wish for anarchy, whoever they be. I and my brave companions in arms will arrest their course. Let us not seek in the past for examples to justify the present. Nothing in history resembles the conclusion of the 18th century, and nothing in that resembles the present moment. We wish for a Republic founded on liberty, on civil liberty, and national representation, and we will have it. I swear it, and I swear it also in the names of my brave comrades."—"I swear it," was instantly repeated by the other generals, and the sitting closed amidst the acclamations of "Long live the Republic."

Then the Directory was overthrown, and a consular government established in its stead, composed of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger Ducos. Barras, the director, who was the chief instrument of Bonaparte's elevation, sent his secretary with his resignation, and waited in his carriage to know the result. The unfeeling and ungrateful answer of the First Consul was, "Tell him that I desire to hear no more of *him*, and that I trust I shall ever make the authority respected which is intrusted to me." Upon this he raised his voice so as to be distinctly heard by the grenadiers at the door, and exclaimed, "What have you done with the country which I left you so flourishing? I left you peace, and I have found war. I left you victory, and I have found defeat. I left you the treasures of Italy, and I find nothing

but oppression and poverty. Where are the 100,000 heroes, my companions in arms, whom I left covered with glory? What is become of them? Alas! they are no more. This state of things cannot last long; in three years it will end in despotism. But we are for a Republic, founded on the basis of equality, civil liberty, and political toleration. If you believe the assertions of the factious, we are the enemies of the Republic; we, who have strengthened it by our labours, and cemented it by our blood; but we wish for no better patriots than the brave men who have suffered in its service." This speech was highly applauded by all who were within hearing of it, and the secretary of Barras went away in confusion to report what he heard. Barras resolved to repair instantly to his country-house; but as he was rather apprehensive for his personal safety, he requested that a party of horse might be allowed to escort him, which was readily granted.

On the 10th of November the two Councils met at St. Cloud, where the troops were assembled, planting themselves in every avenue which led to the castle, in consequence of which none of the deputies could pass without producing his medal, nor any person whatever who could not produce a ticket signed by the committee, and of those the number was but small. The business was opened by a speech from Gaudin, who proposed a committee of seven members, to consider the most proper means of providing for the public safety, which motion, it was expected, would be instantly carried; but as the meeting was uncommonly full, it was warmly opposed by the restless and turbulent Jacobins, who were the wretched authors of all the political mischief. The committee in this respect was to blame; for on the preceding night it had been pro-

posed, that a ticket signed by the inspectors should alone entitle any man to admission; but this was opposed by Bonaparte, who never apprehended that the Jacobins possessed so much power, and whose very admission he could easily have prevented, had he exerted his abilities. They were a set of miscreants, with whom no measures could be taken. He entered the Council of Ancients under a strong impression of his danger, and with more apparent agitation of mind than he ever shewed in the hottest of battles, amidst rivers of blood, and fields of carnage. He thus addressed the assembly:—

"Representatives of the people! you are placed in no common circumstances; you are on the mouth of a volcano, which is ready to devour you. Permit me to speak to you, with the frankness of a soldier, and the candour of a citizen, zealous for the welfare of his country. You informed me of your dangers, and I hastened to your assistance with my brother soldiers. Is not the blood which we have shed in battle, a sufficient proof of our devoted attachment to the Republic? Have they who dare to lift their voices against us, given similar pledges? They speak of a military government, and a conspiracy. Alas! the most dangerous of all is that which surrounds us every where, that of the public misery, which continues to increase. Have not ignorance, folly, and treason reigned long enough in our country? Have they not committed sufficient ravages? What class has not in turn suffered by them? Have not Frenchmen been long enough divided into parties, eager and desirous to oppress each other? The time is at length arrived to put an end to those disasters. You have charged me to present you with the means, and I will not deceive your expectations. If I had any per-

sonal or ambitious objects in view, I needed not to have waited till this time to realize them. Before my departure, and since my return, I have been often solicited to take the reins of government. I could make discoveries which would silence the greatest part of my calumniators; but I will content myself with saying, that Barras and Moulins entreated me to overturn the government, and place myself at the head of affairs. I rejected their overtures, because liberty alone is dear to me, and because I never wish to serve any faction or any party whatever; I wish to serve the French people alone. Let us not then be divided. Unite your wisdom and your firmness to the force which surrounds me, and I will devote myself to the service of the Republic."—"And to the constitution," said Linglet. "The constitution!" said Buonaparte, in the heat of indignation, "Does it become you to name it? What is it but a heap of ruins? Has it not been successively the sport of every party? Have you not trampled upon it on the 18th Fructidor, the 28th Floreal, and 28th Prairial? The constitution! has not every kind of tyranny been exercised in its name since the day of its establishment? Who can be safe under it? Is not its insufficiency manifested by the numerous crimes which have been committed in its name, even by those who are swearing to it a contemptuous fidelity? All the rights of the people have been unworthily violated, and to establish them on an immovable basis, we must endeavour to establish in France Republican liberty."

This speech was admirably adapted to the occasion. True as to the past and the present, but completely false as to Bonaparte's real and future intentions. It is evidently a prepared speech.

Here he was in great danger of being assassinated, but still more so in the Council of Five Hundred, to which he next repaired. In this dangerous situation, General Lefebre advanced at the head of the grenadiers, and carried him out. He then mounted his horse, and made an effort to address the troops, but in such a feeble tone as was scarcely audible. The Council of Five Hundred decreed, that the Council of Ancients had far exceeded its powers in appointing Bonaparte to the chief command of the troops, since it exclusively belonged to the Directory; but it did not know that the Directory no longer existed. At this awful moment he was in great danger, when his brother Lucien, during this solemn pause between destruction and triumph, mounted a horse, and delivered an oration to the troops, in which he stated, in strong and energetic language, the dangers of the country if the Jacobins triumphed, and concluded with these memorable words: "Generals, soldiers, and citizens, they only are the representatives who have followed me out of that seditious assembly; those who remain there must be expelled by force." The troops immediately exclaimed, "Long live Bonaparte, long live the Republic." The chamber was instantly ordered to be cleared by a company of grenadiers, whereupon the spectators leaped out at the windows, but the members waited their arrival. Every member who valued his own preservation, was requested by the general of brigade to leave the chamber, and join the president, with which request many deemed it wise to comply. Another officer declared from the chair of the president, "Representatives, the commander-in-chief requires that you will quit this hall." As numbers shewed signs of reluctance, the officer exclaimed, "Grenadiers, advance." On the beating of

drums, the grenadiers came forward, and a shameful scene of confusion immediately ensued; but the chamber was cleared in the course of a few minutes. The members, as they fled out at the doors and windows, were received by the people with hisses and other marks of hatred; and such was the shame with which numbers of them were covered, that they tore away the badges of office as fast as possible, which were next day found in the surrounding ditches and plantations. The Directory was thus superseded by a consular government, consisting of Bonaparte, Sieyes, and Roger Ducos.

The Consuls held their first sitting at the Luxemburg. In the first acts of his authority after he attained the dignity of first Consul, Bonaparte aimed at being popular. He wrote a letter to the King of Britain on the subject of peace, which was rejected, as he probably foresaw it would be. The great object of the chief Consul was to inspire confidence by the first acts of his government, and to give the people the most favourable opinion of his moderation, clemency, and justice. A decree was immediately passed for the honourable interment of the Pope, whose body had lain for six months at Valence. He naturally expected that such a measure would conciliate the favour of all those who were zealously attached to the Catholic religion. The pathetic terms in which this decree was expressed, were designed to convince the world how much he respected the memory of the unfortunate Pontiff.

To prosecute the war with redoubled energy, Bonaparte formed an army of reserve at Dijon, composed of conscripts, and troops which had returned from La Vendée, to the amount of nearly 50,000 men, commanded by General Berthier. As Bonaparte had resolved to open the campaign in Italy in his own person,

he ordered the army to wait for him at Geneva, where on the 12th of June he reviewed the vanguard, commanded by general Lannes, the whole being next day in motion for mount St. Bernard.

Note D, p. 16.

The letters from the army of Egypt had been nearly all interrupted by English cruizers, which was a fortunate circumstance for Bonaparte, as they were nearly all of them full of complaints, lamentations, and giving account of the wretched state of the country, and of the French army.

Bonaparte brought back with him a fine flourishing account of the expedition of his visit to the pyramids, and the discoveries made by scientific men in Upper Egypt. By these means his disasters were concealed for the time, and French vanity was flattered by the idea that France would have the glory of restoring the most ancient of all the nations, of which any records have been brought down by history. The pretended hero was thus covered with a false glory, when he would have been covered with disgrace had the truth been known: but, before that took place, he had reaped the fruits of the false reputation, and intervening circumstances prevented any inconvenient effect to him, when the real state of affairs was discovered.

NOTE E, p. 20.

THERE are so many, and such contradictory, accounts of the passage over the Alps, and all of them in such a style of enthusiastic admiration, that it is scarcely possible to believe that truth is contained in the language of romance. That it was one of the boldest attempts, and the best executed that history records, is certain; but the comparison between that passage and Hannibal's is one where there are no analogies. Hannibal was quite a stranger to the difficulties he had to encounter, and to the road that it was best to take. Many of the officers in Bonaparte's army, as well as himself, knew both; and a model of the Alps, which was exhibited at Paris, made with great labour and accuracy, is said to have greatly facilitated the enterprise.

NOTE F, p. 23.

THE manner in which the becoming consul was effected has already been detailed in a note; but the intrigues attending it are so differently told, and on such doubtful authority, that little credit can be given to any of them. What is certain is, that the whole nation, and the people of Paris in particular, felt that the public affairs could not go on under the Directory which had mismanaged every thing, and was fallen into contempt. The Directors themselves saw that their government could not long go on; and, as danger was very likely to attend a change, they were very ready to quit their post quietly.

As to the nomination of three Consuls, that was done with the evident design of giving all the real power to one, and that one was Bonaparte. Thinking men had long foreseen and foretold that the power must centre in one person, and continue so, at least, as long as the war lasted. Bonaparte was a Dictator, under the title of First Consul.

Note G, p. 30.

The sudden and complete overturn of a military nation like Prussia, held for nearly half a century in high esteem for every sort of military science, was one of those *miraculous* events that tended not a little to augment the reputation of Bonaparte.

In former times, jugglers who, by means of their confederates, performed feats that the spectators did not understand, were accounted workers of miracles, but the performing on a stage for money, and their ignorance when they mixed in ordinary society, brought them down to their true level even before the increase of knowledge had time to unveil the apparent mysteries.

Had those Charlatans been in high situations, and preserved a severe exterior, as some few have done, the age of miracles would not yet be over.

As it is, though Bonaparte was not really considered as working miracles which are supposed to be effected by supernatural powers, and without the ordinary means; yet he was considered as having a supernatural degree of skill, which he employed to effect by natural means things that appeared miraculous, and of this sort the humiliation of Prussia was not the least.

A kingdom, where there were not ten millions of subjects had long kept up a greater army than was maintained by the Romans in the time of Augustus. For doing this, and for a few witticisms, and a contempt for religion, the monarch received the title of *Frederic the Great!!* Had the word tyrant been added, the title would have been applicable enough, for it would have been just: but, as that was not added, the title, as it was given, and as it stands, shews the way of thinking of the age. A title like that is, not the work of a few courtiers, it is the act of mankind, either of cotemporaries or of posterity.

The French made many efforts to obtain for their favourite monarch Louis XIV. the title of Great; but other nations would not give it: and even amongst themselves, he is only known and distinguished by his *number*. A similar attempt has been made in favour of Henry IV.; but that would not do. Mankind have only, as if by general consent, agreed to give that title to *Alexander of Macedon, Alfred of England*, and *Peter of Russia*. Courtiers had nothing to do with the business; and we hope mankind will place its veto, (from which there is no appeal) on the title already more than half granted to Frederic of Prussia.

The life and character of that king, and his military manœuvres at Potsdam, with what has since followed, were it not true history, would be considered as written to turn into ridicule pretended military skill, as well as the manner of thinking of mankind, and the way in which reputations are sometimes obtained. Frederick had deservedly obtained military reputation in the seven years' war. He had done nothing wonderful it is true, for his enemies did nothing well; but he had displayed courage and military talents at a time when the latter were very

rare. The praises and flattery he received rendered him vain to excess, and he became a military coxcomb of the first order. As Frederick had some eccentricity of character, and was not without genius, and as he had drawn round him men of talents, he did not carry on his military manœuvres in the beaten tract.

In his simplicity of manners, and way of passing his time, he copied both from Peter the Great and Charles XII. of Sweden; and I remember well when Potzdam was considered as the great military school of the civilized world. To have been only witness to a review there was enough to make an officer be considered as a man of skill, and give him a pretence to look down on all his brother officers in the same regiment with some degree of contempt. Never were idolatry, for what was termed a system and admiration of a man, carried to a greater or a more absurd length: but those admirers did not know, that the whole was a *solemn and a very serious farce*. The soldiers who manœuvred so expertly were more miserable ten times over than negro slaves on a West-India plantation. They cursed inwardly their king, their officers, and their own existence; and well did many of the officers of that army know that, whenever the renowned armies of Prussia should appear in the field of real action, their great reputation would disappear. The whole of the people of Prussia were *persecuted, taxed*, and *vexed*, in a thousand ways, to gratify the absurd pretensions of their monarch, who, happily for himself, did not live to see the fallacy of his military system, and the humiliation of his family and kingdom.

No sooner did hostilities break out, and the veterans of Prussia (an army that, for nearly thirty years, had been exercised every day, almost from the rising to the setting of the sun; an army that was in the field of parade at

four in the morning, in bad weather as in good, with their king, eager to pass them in review,) come into the field, than they were defeated by raw lads, who had not quitted the streets of Paris or their father's cottages two months. I saw those recruits mustered in Paris for the first time in the end of July, 1792, who in September, in the same year, beat back with disgrace the veterans of Frederick the Great, commanded by the king in person, his nephew and his old companion in war, the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick.

Never was the reputation of an army got with so much pains to itself, or lost with less trouble to its enemies. And why was this?—the reputation was a false one, founded on appearances, not realities. The plan of reducing soldiers to mere machines,—a plan so much in vogue with Frederick and his philosophical companions was founded in the grossest error: it was founded on theory, not in practice and experience. The fields of Champagne bore witness to the disgrace of those armies, and the Marquis D'Argence, who was at the court of Frederick, and one of his companions, has since rendered the service to mankind, of shewing by what system of despotism and wretchedness that military parade was kept up.

The battle of Jena was, in the language of the drama, the *finale* of the military system of the great Frederick, that military Mentor before whom the world had bowed.

A more signal or sudden overthrow never took place. The main army was defeated in half an hour, scattered in all directions in half a day, and the kingdom overrun by the enemy in less than a week. Thus was a sudden period put to a military force, that had been drilled and exercised unremittingly for almost forty years!!

What must the admirers and companions of the great

man have said had they witnessed the battle, which was still more fatal to the reputation of the Prussian arms than the fields of Champagne? As if fortune had been determined to destroy the absurd idea of drilling men for half a life-time, in order to enable them to fight well for half a day, it has so happened since, that, after Prussia had recovered from her disgrace; her armies who obtained victories were nearly wholly composed of raw troops who had seen no actual service, and had scarcely had time to learn their exercise! Since the invention of gunpowder, veterans have very little advantage over raw troops, provided the latter have had time to learn their exercise well, and are properly officered, and mixed with men who have been long in the service. It is not now as it was in the time of the Romans. The individual soldier has not the same important part to act; he only forms a part of the corps or mass, and individually has nothing depending on his particular strength, courage, or exertion.

The revolutionary war overturned at once, and that most completely, all the systems of military automata and mechanical obedience. The moral feelings and sensibilities of man renewed their claim, and that in a voice so loud, and language so intelligible, that it was heard from one end of Europe to the other, and will never be forgotten.

The Prussians were driven from a strong position on the road between Jena and Weimar, at the commencement of the action, which enabled the French to extend their line in order of battle upon the plain. Fifty thousand of the Prussian army, sent to cover the defiles of Naumburg, and take possession of Koasin, were anticipated by Marshal Davoust. Another army of 80,000 men opposed themselves to the French, who had drawn

out on the heights of Jena. When the mist dispelled, by which both armies were covered, they found themselves within cannon-shot of each other; and in less than an hour the action became general. Every manœuvre, on both sides, was performed with precision, while 250,000 men and 700 pieces of cannon were scattering death on every side, and displaying one of the most affecting spectacles ever witnessed on the theatre of the world. When the reserve of the French cavalry and two other fresh divisions came into action, the Prussians were thrown into disorder, which, however, they corrected for about an hour; and at this crisis of the battle, as the French themselves admitted, there was room for a moment's doubt. When, however, a fresh reinforcement of dragoons and cuirassiers, under the Duke of Berg, came into action, every effort of the Prussians to maintain their ground was useless: they were completely overwhelmed by the rapidity and force of the onset, both of cavalry and infantry. Their loss in this battle amounted to almost 40,000 in killed, wounded, and taken, including about twenty generals, among whom were Ruchel and the Duke of Brunswick, both wounded! The loss on the part of the French, according to their own statement, was nearly 5,000, but in reality 15,000. The victory was decisive, and followed up with rapidity to the very gates of Weimar.

On the 16th, Erfurth, to which Mollendorf had retreated, surrendered with 14,000 men; of whom 8,000 were wounded—Spandau followed that example on the 24th, and Magdeburg on the 27th. Stettin, a strong fortress, in which was a garrison of 6,000 men, and 160 pieces of cannon, gave up without any effectual resistance. The remains of the army under the Prince of Hohinloe, who had reached Prentzlow, were vanquished in the

suburbs, and the Prince, who had just entered the town, was summoned to surrender, and that very day entered on terms of capitulation, and became prisoners of war. The gallant General Blucher, through many perils, effected a very masterly retreat to Lubeck, into which the enemy had been admitted by treachery. This place in consequence became a scene of the most horrid carnage and bloodshed in its squares, its streets, and even its churches. Being exhausted in strength and in numbers, and entirely in want of ammunition, further resistance became impracticable, and he was obliged to capitulate. The French entered Leipsic on the 18th of October, from whence, having thrown a bridge over the Elbe, at that place, Marshal Davoust directed his march by Wittenburg (of which he gained possession by surprise,) to Berlin, which he entered on the 25th.

It has been affirmed, that both the war department and the commissariat of Prussia were under the control of Bonaparte; and that by his injunctions the fortresses of Spandau, Custrin, Stettin, and Magdeburg, were not provided with artillery, stores, and provisions; besides, that, before the battle was fought, Bonaparte was informed by special messengers continually from the Prussian head-quarters, what were the intentions of the Prussian council of war. Lucchesini and Haugwitz thwarted the designs of the Duke of Brunswick, who proposed that the first attack should be made on the corps of Bernadotte, which was in Anspach, at a distance from the main army.—Even while the French were forming at Jena, the Duke intended to attack, but was prevented, on the pretence that Bonaparte had not above 120,000 men in the field, and would not attack the Prussians first, and that it would be easy for the Duke to take them in the rear, and make the whole army prisoners. The pro-

visions, too, were three days' march in the rear of the Prussian army, so that it was not difficult for Bonaparte with 300,000 men, to intercept their provisions, and cut them off from their capital. The fortresses were taken with ease, because they were not supplied with necessaries to enable them to sustain the siege.

The King of Prussia's dominions were thus swept away, partly by his own infatuation, and partly by the treachery of the leading men in his own cabinet. Having found every effort to recover his capital unavailing, he despatched the Marquis Lucchesini and General Zarstrow, to solicit an armistice, which was granted on such terms as Bonaparte thought proper to dictate. It was signed on the 30th of October, and was to serve as the basis of a definitive treaty of peace.

Note H, p. 20.

As soon as Bonaparte had signed a preliminary treaty with the king of Prussia after the battle of Jena, without waiting a moment his troops marched with all expedition towards Poland; and, in order to excite the Poles to join his standard, a proclamation dated the 1st of November, 1806, in the name of their gallant and beloved General Kosciusko, and bearing his signature, was issued from Napoleon's head-quarters. Kosciusko was wholly ignorant of this proclamation and the use made of his name; he was still in retirement near Fontainebleau, and had, on account of his infirmities and republican principles, declined an invitation he had received, to follow the fortunes of the emperor of France in his native land. When he saw this proclamation in the Paris papers, he waited on the editors, and requested the insertion of the most

positive contradiction of this forgery; but as it was inserted by the orders of Mr. Maret, secretary of state, they durst not provoke the vengeance of their master.

The triumph of Bonaparte, and the gratification of his subjects, naturally vain, bore proportion to Prussia's humiliation. With the force of a mighty empire, with its whole resources at his absolute disposal, and the nomination of his subordinate agents depending wholly on himself; taking into the account at the same time, the influence which he possessed in the cabinets and in the armies of those kingdoms which he had marked out for his prey, the rapidity and extent of the conquests of this extraordinary man, will appear less surprising. Before the complicated springs by which the allies were actuated could be put fully in motion, he had nearly completed the destruction of one, when another appeared to add fresh laurels to the victor. In little more than two months, he finished his campaign against Prussia.

NOTE I., p. 23.

THE army of Bonaparte amounted to 300,000 men, although the war-office at Paris made them more than double that number, viz., 100,000 Poles, Confederation 120,000, French 250,000, Italians 50,000, Austrians 90,000, Prussians 30,000, making a grand total of 640,000 men! Bonaparte left Paris on the 9th of May, and on the 6th of June he crossed the Vistula, and joined his army. He crossed the Niemen on the 23d, on the banks of which river the Russians had arranged their whole force. Bonaparte made his entry into Wilna on the 28th, fixing his head-quarters where the Russian court had

been held for six months. From this place he continued to advance on the great road to Smolensk. Here began a most desperate engagement on the morning of the 17th of August. The city was soon in flames, which was described by Bonaparte in his bulletin in the following words: "In the midst of a fine night in August, Smolensk offered to the eyes of the French, the spectacle that presents itself to the inhabitants of Naples during an eruption of Vesuvius." Two hours after the commencement of the conflagration, General Korff destroyed the communication with the right bank of the Dnieper; and then followed the steps of the leading columns.

In passing over the ashes of this city, Bonaparte was heard to exclaim, "Never was a war prosecuted with such ferocity, never did defence put on so horrible a shape against the feelings of self-preservation. These people treat their own country as if they were its enemies." Two large armies were engaged in this conflict, and the loss on both sides must have been immense. The Russians retreated unbroken from this terrific scene. This was the only fortified place that had remained in possession of the Russians, to cover Moscow; the officers were therefore displeased because it was so soon given up, for which reason Kutusoff, a veteran of 75, was invested with the chief command. When he approached the capital, he determined to make a stand, taking up a strong position at Borodino, where he waited the attack of the enemy. Bonaparte led his troops to battle, and addressed them in the following manner: "Soldiers! behold the field of battle you have so much desired! henceforth victory depends on you; it is necessary for us; it will give us plenty, good quarters for the winter, and a speedy return to our country. Behave yourselves as you did at Austerlitz, at Friedland, at Witepsk, at Smolensk;

and that the latest posterity may speak of your conduct this day with pride—that it may say of you "He was at that great battle under the walls of Moscow.". The dead bodies of the Russians killed the day before, covered the ground on which they stood. This tremendous contest commenced at six o'clock, and a scene of human carnage more awful is scarcely presented in the records of destruction. Sixty thousand lay dead and wounded on the field, and yet its fortune remained undecided.

Moscow was soon after occupied; and, as by its being burned, and the emperor refusing to treat, Bonaparte was obliged to return to France, the following is a pretty accurate account of the loss with which that was attended:

Forty-one generals, 1,298 officers of inferior ranks, 167,510 men, and 1,131 pieces of cannon, besides above 60,000 horses, and baggage and stores of every description.

Note K., p. 30.

While Bonaparte was using his utmost endeavours to recruit his army, the Russians continued to advance with rapidity, and to diminish by all possible means the miserable remains of the French army. They were in a short time in possession of Memel, Tilsit, and Koningsberg; the French being utterly incapable of making any effectual resistance, retreated in the best manner they were able. In proportion as the Russians advanced, the Prussians began to discover the most pointed hostility to the French, and anxiously expected the arrival of the Russians. When they obtained possession of Warsaw,

they did not stop there, but proceeded boldly to Posen, where an action of some importance took place, in which they were victorious; and on the 20th of February, two days after the battle, they occupied Berlin with 19,000 men.

NOTE L, p. 31.

WHILE the allies were making their way in France slowly towards the capital, and at the same time attempting to negotiate with Bonaparte, (who might have retained possession of the throne of Old France in all its integrity,) he thought he would once more shew his superior skill and frighten his enemies, but in this case he only facilitated what he meant to prevent.

His grand and great plan was to place troops between the allies and Germany, in order to make retreat impossible. To execute this project, he even drained the metropolis of nearly its whole defence, wishing to compel the allies to give up their designs upon the capital. That he might the more effectually accomplish this favourite object, the corps of Marmont and Mortier, which ought to have covered Paris, were summoned to his assistance; but they were intercepted by the allies, and thus exposed to destruction. This completely cleared the road to the French metropolis, in consequence of which the allies felt no longer any alarm about what might be passing in their rear. About their communication with Germany they were no longer concerned, being now within reach of the immense stores which would be furnished them by the possession of Paris. They accordingly made their way to it at once, and entered without difficulty.

Note M, p. 37.

The real terms on which Bonaparte abdicated are not certainly known. He had commissioners to attend him to Elba from the different powers, and all Europe believed that they were to prevent him from escaping, and that he was a sort of prisoner. When, however, he did make his escape and returned to France, Lord Castlereagh informed the British House of Commons that he was an emperor free to go where he thought proper; that, no one had a right to stop him, &c. It may then be well said that the allies were overreached. It is true that many people doubted this explanation, as it only was made when the English ministers were defending themselves for not having prevented the escape of Bonaparte. What, prevent the emperor of Elba from invading France, and dethroning Louis XVIII!! That would have indeed been a violation of the rights of independent monarchs. Bonaparte aware of his importance, addressed the following circular to his brother sovereigns:

"Sire and my Brother,—You must have learned in the course of the last month, my return to the coasts of France, my entry into Paris, and the departure of the Bourbon family. The true nature of these events must be known to your majesty. They are the work of a resistless power, the result of the unanimous will of a great nation, conscious of its duties and its rights. The dynasty which force had imposed on the French people, was no longer made for them. The Bourbons would associate themselves neither with their sentiments nor manners. France has therefore thought fit to separate herself from them. Her voice invoked a deliverer: the

hope which had induced me to make the greatest of sacrifices, had been deceived. I am come, and from the spot where I touched the shore, the love of my people carried me to the bosom of my capital. The first want of my heart is to repay so much affection by maintaining an honourable tranquillity. The restoration of the imperial throne was necessary to the happiness of the French. My dearest hope is to render it useful at the same time to the consolidation of the repose of Europe. Sufficient glory has alternately illustrated the standards of all the nations; and the vicissitudes of fortune have sufficiently repaid great successes by great reverses. A nobler career lies now open to the sovereigns, and I am the first to enter it. After having presented to the world the spectacle of grand battles, it will be sweeter to know now no other rivalry than that of increasing the advantages of peace: no other struggle than a sacred contest to make the felicity of nations. France is pleased to proclaim with frankness this noble end of all its wishes. Jealous of its independence, the invariable principle of its policy shall be the most absolute respect for the independence of other nations.—If such are, as I entertain the happy confidence, the personal sentiments of your majesty, the general tranquillity is secured for a long time; and justice, seated at the confines of the several states, will singly be sufficient to guard their frontiers.—I seize with eagerness, &c.

NAPOLEON."

NOTE N., p. 42.

THE returned emigrants were as ignorant of the manner in which official situation should be filled in France, as they were insolent and overbearing. They would understand nothing about a constitution or a charter, but that the king was to reign absolutely as his predecessors had done. With such ignorance, such principles, and a hatred of the population of France generally, as composed of republicans or subjects of Bonaparte, it was impossible that government could be liked. To the most vigilant and vigorous government that ever existed succeeded one composed of inactive and ignorant men. Three thousand letters were sometimes received in one day at the Thuilleries. What did M. de Blacas do? Did he get them examined,—burn the useless ones, and answer the others? No. The faithful friend of Louis, who was very fit to superintend his house at Hartwell, to get his master's clothes kept in repair, and see the beds of strangers properly aired, when he became the favourite and trusty minister of a King of France, knew nothing of the importance of the situation, and knowing the letters received did not contain money, he ordered them to be burned without examining their contents!! If this method was not so good as that of Bonaparte, it at least was full as expeditious.

The only good the return from Elba did was to shew Louis XVIII. that he could not reign in France, if he employed such idle and ignorant men to manage its affairs.

Note O., p. 50.

One of the most surprising circumstances that attended the battle of Waterloo, was the intrepidity, the order, and discipline, of the French soldiers. Their army was hastily assembled, and might truly and properly be said to be composed of "shreds and patches,"—the remains of the old armies that had served under Napoleon in Germany and Russia; some new levies, made by Louis XVIII., and some raw recruits, gathered together in haste within the last two months. Yet all were animated by the same spirit: they fought for France; that was sufficient!—and never did any veteran army behave better till the overthrow, when, indeed, a confusion took place, that scarcely could have happened in a well-disciplined army. Such an army would not actually have run away as a mob does. It would have made a stand, when night came on, to prevent an indiscriminate slaughter; but raw troops did not know the danger attending such a flight, and the veterans were not sufficiently numerous to make a stand by themselves alone.

Note P., p. 55.

In reading the different accounts of the battle of Waterloo, one is tempted to make the conclusion, that the histories of great battles, as to details, are mere fictions. The reality of the battles is certain, and their results known; but as to the transactions and manœuvres that took place during the engagements there seems to be no certainty, if we may judge from the battle of Waterloo.

It is not necessary for a victorious general to enter into very minute details; and, when an overthrow is so complete as that of Napoleon, it is by no means agreeable for him to do so. The result speaks for itself, and is indeed the only thing attended to. In one fact, however, all agree; and from it all nearly make the same conclusion.

The fact alluded to is, that the Prussians came up to the assistance of the English when victory was doubtful; from which it is concluded that they decided the fate of the day, which would have been different had they not come up so opportunely for the English.

As to the fact, it is true the Prussians did come up at a very lucky moment: but the conclusion is unfair, namely, that they decided the fortune of the day. In order that such a conclusion may be right, it should be proved that, had the Prussians not come up, no victory would have been gained at all, or, if there was, that the French would have gained it; both which must be quite uncertain.

The appearance of the Prussians dispirited the French army, and occasioned the havoc during the retreat, or the flight, to be terrible; but they do not appear to have had it in their power otherwise to decide the fate of that day, which was decided by a vigorous attack of the French having failed, when, on their retreating in great disorder, the Duke of Wellington, with his usual promptitude and judgment, ordered a general attack to be made on them before they recovered from their confusion.

Note Q., p. 55.

One of the most singular consequences of the Revolution is, that having been so long accustomed to the inflated and boasting style of Bonaparte, the French think other

nations give them credit for reports, that are only held in derision, or considered as wild reveries.

Though, as has been observed in a previous note, the general who conquers has no occasion to boast, and the general who is conquered has no room to do so; yet those important personages, who have attached their fortunes to the fate of Napoleon, and who, on that account, think themselves a sacred and a superior sort of beings, have been occupied in shewing that, if causes had followed their effects in the usual way, the English would have been beaten. The folly and impertinence of such a publication are about equally great; yet so distorted are men's minds by party prejudices, that not only does the absurdity not appear, but the enemies of what is termed legitimate government actually think that Napoleon's merits and conduct were such as to entitle him to have gained the victory at Waterloo

This is a strong proof, indeed, of how far party prejudices will carry men; and it is, also, a very serious proof of the strength of that hatred that has arisen to legitimate governments: yet those governments are not aware of it; and take no measures to render their rule something more acceptable.

Those who have force and power appear to despise argument, or to think it either useless or beneath their dignity to have recourse to it; and the consequence is, that the whole of the civilized world is divided into two parties, one in favour of, and the other opposing, what is termed legitimate authority: and a greater proof of the wideness of this breach cannot be adduced than in the determined resolution of the opponents of legitimacy, to take for granted every thing that is said in favour of Napoleon, and to contest the truth of whatever is said against him, of which the strongest instance is the credit given to the ridiculous

and inflated relation of the battle of Waterloo, first published by General Gourgaud, and again in a work said to be written by Bonaparte himself, in which Gourgaud's absurdities are repeated, with some additions but little variation.

The great difference between the two parties seems to consist in their ways of thinking, in respect to the liberty of the press. This is a subject that will not cease to be contested until one of the parties gets the victory; and it is not very difficult to foresee on which side that victory will be.

The importance of disseminating opinions by the invention of printing had been gradually developing itself for two centuries; but it was not till about the middle of the last century that it manifested itself distinctly: and the French Revolution was the first great and tremendous effect that it produced.

As mankind have proceeded too far in the way of enlightening themselves to recede, it is clear they will proceed, and there is no human power that can stop their progress. Though the efforts made in Italy to obtain an alteration in the governments of some minor states have failed, those of Spain and Portugal have succeeded, and the Italian states will succeed at a future day. Liberty in France is, at this time, in a state of abeyance; but it cannot remain so very long, and an opportunity of advancing will soon be found.

The Holy Alliance has already deviated from its avowed purpose, and it will soon cease to exist. England and France seem to be well-wishers to its success; though nominal parties, they dare not abet the schemes of the active members, who by their ambitious projects will soon convert England and France into open enemies.

Note R., p. 56.

Had the grape-shot of the French been near enough to produce any considerable effect, the English army could not have remained exposed to it in solid bodies for so many hours. The great advantage of the position was for the purpose of defence. It evidently was not the interest of the Duke of Wellington to advance until the arrival of the Prussians; and it would have been still more dangerous to retreat: he, therefore, chose exactly the position that suited the circumstances in which he was placed, and the ravine in front constituted the great advantage of that position. The French have, during the whole of the Revolution, trusted much to the destruction of the enemy by grape-shot; and to their way of fighting it is very favourable. If they advance so near the enemy as to make that sort of shot produce any great effect, when they find themselves better provided with cannon than the enemy, they fire away as quick as possible; and the slow movements of the Germans (their most common opponents) give them a great advantage: but if they find, which has sometimes happened, that the enemy has a numerous field artillery, well served,—they then endeavour to rush on, and come to close quarters. At the battle of Waterloo they could practise neither of those manœuvres.

Note S., p. 57.

There have been many disputes about the cause of the panic amongst the French, although it is a subject on

which there is no occasion for any. A cry of *sauve qui peut* was said to have been heard; and it has even been alleged, that enemies got in among the French in order to raise an alarm!!

It is an old French practice, to lay to the door of strangers all actions of which they are ashamed. The excesses of the first revolutionists were all said to have been committed by strangers; and the innocent Parisians, who by-the-by know a stranger at the first glance, let themselves be conducted in the most simple and silly manner by those wicked foreigners.

Had the cry of *sauve qui peut* been the cause of any great movement, its reality could be well attested; and, as it has only been spoken of as a matter of report, there can be nothing more certain, than that the fright did not arise from that cause.

In the French account of this disastrous moment, the panic and alarm is represented as more complete than it appears in the Duke of Wellington's despatches. It is as follows: "A complete panic spread itself throughout the whole field of battle, and the troops threw themselves in the greatest disorder on the line of communication; soldiers, cannoneers, caissons, all hurry to this point; the old guard, which was in reserve, was attacked, and completely cut up. In an instant the whole army was nothing but a mass of confusion; all the soldiers and arms were mixed *pel-mel*, and it was utterly impossible to form a single corps." "The squadrons," continues this account, "placed on the side of the Emperor were disorganized, and destroyed by an overwhelming force, and there was nothing left but to follow the torrent. The park of reserve, all the baggage which had repassed the Sambre, in short, every thing on the field of battle remained in the power of the enemy."

NOTE T., p. 59.

BONAPARTE through life has been a singular instance of the blindness and enthusiasm of those attached to his cause. Though his talents have been great and astonishing, as even his enemies confess, yet that was no reason for the French people not taking into consideration his ruinous practices. When he abandoned his army basely for the fourth time, and thrice within the space of two years, sacrificing in those two years nearly a million of men to his ambition, and bringing foreign armies into the capital twice as conquerors, still he met with no reproach; and the want of physical means to support him seems to have been the real cause why he was with reluctance abandoned at last.

To what is this to be attributed? Is it to natural character? or to the feeling that Bonaparte only conducted the armies upon adventures of which the bulk of the nation approved? If the nation itself was as ambitious and insatiable of conquest as the emperor, then they had no right to blame him; but, in not laying the blame on him they tacitly take it to themselves, and confess that they wished to rule over Europe, making every nation contribute to their power and grandeur.

This is a subject that still merits attention and ought to be reflected upon, for, though Napoleon is gone, the French nation exists, and exists in renovated vigour.

It is now no longer the same France that it was before the Revolution. The conscription gives it a ten-fold power. The means employed by Bonaparte will never be forgotten, and the popular form of a government with representation, will give the first ambitious king who is upon the throne a means of calling out all its latent energies.

On the first abdication of Bonaparte, the following just reflections were made by an English writer at the time:

"¶ There is something in the conduct of the French people on this occasion peculiarly astonishing; if it cannot be accounted for from that versatility and fickleness, for which in all ages they have been so proverbially distinguished. They waded through rivers of blood, and fields of carnage; they endured every privation and misery; had their bravest warriors destroyed, their greatest patriots and philosophers sacrificed, and proclaimed to the universe that the family of the Bourbons were not qualified to reign, on account of their multiplied crimes. They submitted for almost fourteen years to the government of a man who had rescued them from imminent dangers, and laid all their enemies prostrate at their feet.—After all these things, (however astonishing,) have actually taken place, what is the wonderful result? In one day they deserted the object of their own choice, to whom they had sworn allegiance, and who, till the moment of his sudden reverses, had been the subject of their numerous panegyrics,—for no other reason which we can assign, but that fortune had at length declared herself on the side of his enemies, and overwhelmed him by such a prodigious superiority of numbers." The true answer is, that he was not really the man of their choice, and that they wanted a Republic.

NOTE U, p. 60.

"No man knew better than Bonaparte how to apply money to a good purpose, and particularly in exciting men to make great exertions, and in purchasing secrets. His enemies were deficient in both. In regular governments as they are termed, immense sums are expended on the

ordinary routine of the day, or upon useless men in power and place; but, if any man renders a voluntary service he is laughed at, and never has any reward to expect. If he proceeds on a more interested plan and stipulates for a reward for a service that he can render, even if the reward asked is conditional and only to be received when the service is rendered, he will not be listened to with difficulty and distrust.

The great distinction between the government of Bonaparte and that of the men he had to oppose, consisted in his granting much to service performed, and nothing to idle and useless pretensions, while they grant little to real service, and a great deal to useless pretension.

A contest between parties acting on such principles must be very unequal, and so it proved to be: it is, however, necessary to observe, that Bonaparte had not the merit of inventing or of being the first to practise this mode of acting. The revolutionists began with it in war and in politics, and in every department of public affairs. Bonaparte had the wisdom to adopt it, and he had the talent as well as the means of practising it to greater advantage than any other. He was under no control, and possessed talents that enabled him to act with greater judgment than his predecessors. His success in a bad cause is a proof how advantageous the same mode of proceeding would be in a good one.

Note V, p. 63.

All nations were watched over and infested by spies, called commercial agents. They pretended to be travelling on business for mercantile houses, but their real business

was that of political agents. When General Hedouville returned from St. Petersburgh, where he had acted in a diplomatic capacity, he was placed at the head of the commercial agents at Venice. Here, as in every other place, they were constantly on the alert for the benefit of their master. Three of these agents were apprehended at Venice, while engaged in making a survey of the Po; and the account of their capture appeared in the *Moniteur* of 25th July, 1805, to which the following was subjoined:— "An Aulic counsellor of Austria has been arrested at Paris, by order of the minister of police, by way of retaliation for the arrest of our vice-commercial agent, and other French subjects on the Austrian territory. This will prove to the Austrian government, that it is not to violate the laws of nations with impunity." These agents were dispersed through the whole of Germany. The greater part of the postmasters and post-office clerks were in the pay of France; the latter received annually from 200 to 400 ducats. By these methods the French ministers at Vienna, Berlin, Frankfort, Munich, Dresden, Hamburgh, &c., had access to the letters and despatches of those offices, at all times, and even kept such as they supposed might be of advantage. Correspondence, thus iniquitously obtained, often appeared in the *Moniteur*. The despatch from Lord Harrowby to Earl Gower, appeared in that paper of the 20th March, 1804, taken from Mr. Wagstaff, a British messenger, in the vicinity of Berlin, not by common highwaymen, but by the agents of Bonaparte.

Note W, p. 82.

When Bonaparte returned from Germany, and determined on marching his army into Spain, he assembled the troops on the place Carousel near the Thuilleries, and having ordered them to be formed into close columns, and the officers being assembled, he told them, that after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, and passed through Germany by forced marches, he should, without allowing them a moment's rest, order them to march through France. He had occasion for their immediate service. The hideous presence of the leopard of England contaminated the peninsula of Spain and Portugal. It was incumbent on them to drive him with dismay and destruction from the Continent. The pillars of Hercules must witness their conquering and avenging prowess. From it would result a prosperous and durable peace, and the consequent prosperity of France. These were the objects the nearest his heart; the wish to obtain them alone induced him to call for their exertions. What they had already done placed them on a level with the Roman legions: what remained, which he had no doubt they would perform with as much cheerfulness, promptitude, and success, would, if possible, augment their glory, secure the happiness of their country, and imprint its remembrance deeply and permanently on his heart."

Note X, p. 86.

It was not quite unnatural for Bonaparte to calculate on the facility of the emperor; but that very facility had ope-

rated a change on the minds of the Russian nobility that was fatal to his hopes, but of which, with all his spies, he was unacquainted.

The following letter, written to the King of England, will shew how the Emperor Alexander had been acquiescent. Apparently deceived by Bonaparte he wrote a letter, in conjunction with the self elected Emperor of the French, from Erfurth, dated the 12th October, to his Britannic Majesty, on the subject of peace, of which the following is a copy:

"SIRE,

"The present circumstances of Europe have brought us together at Erfurth. Our first thought is to yield to the wish and the wants of every people, and to seek, in a speedy pacification with your majesty, the most efficacious remedy for the miseries which oppress all nations. We make known to your majesty our sincere desire in this respect by the present letter. The long and bloody war which has torn the Continent is at an end, without the possibility of being renewed. Many changes have taken place in Europe; many states have been overthrown. The cause is to be found in the state of agitation and misery in which the stagnation of maritime commerce has placed the greatest nations. Still greater changes may yet take place, and all of them contrary to the policy of the English nation. Peace, then, is at once the interest of the Continent, as it is the interest of the people of Great Britain. We unite in entreating your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, silencing that of the passions; to seek, with the intention of arriving at that object, to conciliate all interests, and by that means to preserve all the powers which exist, and so ensure the happiness of Europe

and of this generation, at the head of which Providence has placed us.

(Signed) "ALEXANDER.
"NAPOLEON."

Bonaparte's treatment of the royal family of Spain was previous to this; yet he persuaded the Emperor of Russia to sanction what he had done. The British king was made of sterner stuff, he could not be persuaded.

It may here be proper to observe, that the arrangements at Tilsit, in the secret articles between Bonaparte and Alexander, it was agreed that "The dynasty of the Bourbons in Spain, and of the Braganza family in Portugal, shall cease to exist. A prince of the blood of Bonaparte's family shall be invested with the crown of those kingdoms."

NOTE Y, p. 90.

THAT the tone and pretensions of Napoleon were not much altered is plain from the following address to his soldiers after the battle of Lutzen:

"SOLDIERS!

"I am satisfied with you. You have fulfilled my expectations; you have supplied every thing by your good will, and by your valour. On the memorable 2d of May you defeated and routed the Russian and Prussian army, commanded by the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia. You have added new lustre to the glory of my eagles; you have displayed all that the French blood is

capable of: the battle of Lutzen will be placed above those of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Moskwa. In a single battle you have counteracted all their plots. We will drive back these Tartars into their frightful regions, which they ought never to have left. There let them remain amidst their frozen deserts,—the abode of slavery, of barbarism, and of corruption, where man is debased to an equality with the brute! You have deserved well of civilized Europe.

"Soldiers! Italy, France, and Germany, return you thanks."

Note Z, p. 120.

The following mean and fulsome addresses, presented to Bonaparte and his Empress after their marriage, afford a fine specimen of the meanness of the addressers, and the want of modesty in Bonaparte.

The cardinal grand almoner of France had united Bonaparte and Maria Louisa of Austria in the bands of wedlock on the 11th of March, after which the president of the senate delivered the following addresses to their majesties:

To the Emperor.—Sire, it is with the most respectful and profound emotion that the senate this day present themselves before your majesty. Never have they more powerfully felt the force and dignity of those family ties, which unite the monarch to his faithful subjects. Your most tender affections, Sire, the most intimate desires of your heart, will henceforth be identified with the first interests of the monarchy, and the most ardent wish of your people—the duration of the most powerful dynasty which has ever been founded among men. How many hearts,

even beyond the frontiers of your empire, have bounded with joy with what is to constitute your felicity; and your great soul has not been insensible to their transports! Europe contemplates with rapture the august daughter of the sovereign of Austria on the glorious throne of Napoleon. Providence, Sire, in reserving for you this illustrious spouse, has been pleased to manifest more and more, that you have been born for the happiness of nations, and to secure the repose of the world."

To the Empress.—"Madam, the shouts of joy which have every where accompanied your majesty's steps, that concert of benedictions which still echo from Vienna to Paris, are the faithful expressions of the sentiments of the people. The senate comes to offer to your majesty testimonies of homage not less ardent, not less sincere. The imperial crown which sparkles on your brow, that other crown of graces and virtues which tempers and softens the lustre of the former, attracts towards you the hearts of 30,000,000 of Frenchmen, who make it their joy and pride to salute you by the name of their sovereign. Those Frenchmen whom you have adopted, and to whom, by the most sacred of promises, you have vowed the sentiments of a tender mother, you will find worthy of your kind regards. You will more and more cherish the good and tender-hearted people *, who always feel an anxious wish to love those who govern them, and to place affection and honour by the side of zeal and obedience. These sentiments, which we have the happiness to express to your majesties, are under the guarantee of heaven, like that sacred oath which has for ever united the great and splendid destinies of Napoleon and Maria-Louisa."

* The tender-hearted people who guillotined *her* aunt and *their* queen!

NOTE AA, p. 126.

WHEN Bonaparte became emperor, he began to coin money. Till then there was no French coin except what had been concealed during the circulation of assignats, and had re-appeared after that paper was no longer of any use. No accurate estimate of the amount of that coin has ever been made, but that was supposed to be about 15 millions sterling, or between 3 and 400 millions of francs. During his reign of ten years, Bonaparte coined above 73 millions sterling in gold and silver, as under

gold	670,000,000
5 francs silver	950,000,000
2 francs do.	25,000,000
1 franc do.	132,000,000
½ franc	14,000,000
¼ do. or 5 sols	296,000
Total	1,791,296,000

NOTE BB, p. 134.

THE impossibility of co-operation from want of confidence in each other, was always considered Bonaparte's surest protection. It protected him against every danger assassination excepted, and of consequence that was the only thing that he was afraid of. He took great care and was always protected by persons who were too much interested in his safety not to be extremely vigilant; but still he is said to have occasionally been under the influence of great terror and uneasiness, nor indeed is there any

wonder. As for regular plots, conspiracies, or insurrections, he does not appear to have been under any apprehension from them, neither indeed had he any occasion.

The estimate made in France of the lives lost by the Revolution and the wars it occasioned, amounts to 8,526,476, of which 5,500,000 after Bonaparte became first consul. It is impossible that these calculations can be accurate, but if nearly so, it is quite sufficient for every purpose of information.

The annual expenses of the imperial household amounted to 42,000,000 francs, or 1,750,000*l*. The rest of the imperial family cost 12,000,000 a-year, or half a million sterling.

Bonaparte in his imperial capacity sanctioned or issued 5060 decrees. In the midst of all these enormous expenses he had his clothes and even his boots mended nearly as a clerk or upper servant would in England, but so as no gentleman would. He looked into every thing, even the hiring the servants about the palace, and seeing that they had good characters. So much was he afraid of assassination.

Note CC, p. 138.

As an example of the strictly honourable conduct of generals Pichegru and Moreau, who both afterwards became enemies to the Revolution, the following may be taken:

"In 1794 the French armies overrun West Flanders, Pichegru was commander-in-chief, and Moreau commanded an army which marched *en avant*. Moreau, when he arrived at Antwerp, amongst other things seized the plate belonging to the churches, in order to send it to

Paris. The religious people in that old and once flourishing city offered to redeem the plate. Moreau accepted the offer, and the plate was redeemed for about 60,000 francs in hard money.

"Next day Moreau sent to inform the agents who had redeemed the plate, that Pichegru disapproved of the transaction—that they must send back the plate, and that he would return the money. The plate was accordingly brought to Moreau a second time, who paid them the value in assignats!! In less than a month a decree was issued in Paris, reducing all assignats circulating in Flanders or Brabant, to one-twentieth of their value; and, ultimately they became waste-paper. This scheme of Moreau was very cunning and dishonourable. The church plate they could seize there, as in other towns; but they could not get the hard money. By this trick the hard money was obtained as well as the plate.

Note DD, p. 144.

The instances of the violation of neutral territory and by so doing insulting other nations, and trampling on established laws and usages was equivalent to a declaration that all the world must submit to his insolence, or that he would quarrel with all those that did not. Such conduct as this naturally led to the general combination that took placeas soon as the oppressed and insulted people had an opportunity.

That the result was foreseen is clear, because it was foretold and that very distinctly, in the periodical work called *Anticipation*, published in 1808, of which the following are extracts:

"It is very natural that a strong power should conquer a weak one; and by proceeding with one power after another, and attacking them singly, aggrandizement and victory are not only natural, but they may be said to be necessary.

"That a great number of nations should be conquered by one is then very natural; but it is quite contrary to nature, that any one nation should, for a great length of time, continue to rule over a number of other nations. It, therefore, follows that the fall of a nation is probable, after it has obtained power over all the other nations that are within its reach.

"The French nation has now very nearly attained that point; and in a few years (the Revolution having been introduced into Spain, Germany, Italy, *&c. &c.*) the soldiers and inhabitants will rise to that natural equality with the French, that will enable them to assert their own liberty and independence, such as they in former times enjoyed.

"Want of moderation is the great error of Bonaparte; it is the rock on which he must split, if he lives long: therefore, the end he proposes to himself is not wise. He is proposing to establish an empire, that, from the nature of things, cannot be permanent."

The following is another extract from the same journal, in a letter from *Frederick the Great* in the shades to the present King of Prussia, in the sunshine in the beginning of the year 1808:

"One of the principal causes of the Revolution is, the opinion (that was very prevalent all over Europe) that the French would ultimately secure the liberties of mankind. Under this impression, the resistance made was as feeble as it was ineffectual; but now the case will be different. The effects of French fraternity have been now felt in a manner that will never be forgotten; and when another

opportunity comes, there will be energy on both sides, so that then the French will not, as hitherto, have uniformly the advantage.

"This opportunity will soon occur; the present state of things cannot last. But do not exhaust yourself by keeping up a large army badly paid,—but keep up a small army, well paid and well disciplined, and that will serve for a rallying point, when you find the time fit, and you are assured of the hearty co-operation of other nations."

N. B. This prediction has been literally fulfilled.

Note EE, p. 145.

When Bonaparte new modelled the national institute, he suppressed the class, of which political economy was the object. This was not done certainly because he thought the study useless, but that he thought it inconvenient. He was too well informed a man not to know the value and utility of that study. As the whole of his plan of government was unfriendly to industry and to commerce, the study must have tended to expose the erroneous and disadvantageous course he pursued. He flattered the people, and made them believe, or at least tried to make them believe, that he wished to make them rich and happy, but then he had a way of his own of doing that. The first step to the riches of France was the ruin of England, that favourite topic, and the next was to lay other nations under contribution. He said he wanted ships, colonies, and commerce, when he was invading Germany; but unfortunately, the very day he said that, lord Nelson fought the battle of Trafalgar, on which occasion some ships were taken, and others reported to be *missing*, which have never been found.

Note FF, p. 154.

These are only given as being well known examples, but by no means as exclusive. The great difference between real and pretended statesmen is, that the former lay durable plans, and the latter exert all their care and attention on objects that press upon their attention. Also that real statesmen are guided by the unalterable principle of seeking the welfare and prosperity of their country, and the pretended statesman aims at preserving appearances more than securing realities. Bonaparte, with all his magnificent plans, excelled most in temporary expedients.

Note GG, p. 164.

The affectation of Napoleon in what we suppose to be one of the attributes of angels or a superior race of beings, is a sort of imitation of Alexander the Great, who wished to pass for the son of Jupiter Ammon. In making this comparison, allowance is to be made for difference of circumstances, and chiefly for the different state of the world. The analogy only applies to the affected vanity of each of those great men, endeavouring to be considered as superior in their nature to the human race; when, in reality, they were only endowed with a much larger portion of rare and great qualities than most other men.

The pretending to command the destinies of men in a way as if it was by supernatural power, though not positively declared, was pretty plainly indicated by the emperor in many of his speeches. And his literary flatterers

were less punctilious, and plainly said, that what he decreed and willed was unalterable, like fate, and must be. M. Hauterive, a writer of considerable abilities, wrote a book, apparently for the purpose, and to demonstrate, that the British government was either mad, or superlatively ignorant, to think of opposing his irresistible will.

Since the abdication at Fontainebleau, this oracular writer has ceased his predictions, as the oracle of old did on the coming of the Messiah. Bonaparte was much pleased with Hauterive's adulation and flattery.

Note HH, p. 165.

The talents of Bonaparte have some appearance of being innate, or like those of persons (boys, for example,) who, without knowing how they do it, can solve intricate problems in arithmetic, with a rapidity and accuracy without the use of written figures, that exceeds any thing that the most able calculators can perform.

The admirable Crichton was a person who had a similar talent, but in a great variety of ways: not only did he surpass other men in such things as memory is the chief requisite, such as a knowledge of languages, but he excelled in argument and the sciences. His life was not long enough to have learned by the usual process of learning, even aided by the best memory and understanding, one tenth part of what he is said to have known.

Bonaparte was an able general at once—an able negotiator, and displayed a great knowledge of human nature, without having any experience.

In a lesser degree and in particular branches of know-

ledge, we are accustomed to such intuitive knowledge, known by the name of *natural genius*. A turn for *music, painting, arithmetic, geometry, mechanics, traffic, cunning*, &c., are often displayed by children at a very early age, before any reasoning or thinking process can have operated. This occasionally produces persons who at once attain nearly the full possession of some single art without study. Napoleon probably was the rare phenomenon of a man who, possessed instead of only one talent in this manner, a great many, accompanied with that sagacity and wisdom that taught him how to combine and connect the whole. One thing is certain, that he did not, like other men, require experience to become what he was, but that all at once he possessed that skill that others obtain by experience.

General Appendix Note.

As a great number of circumstances relative to Bonaparte that are of some importance, require a place in the Appendix, to prevent the trouble of looking for them in different notes, they are given all together.

Of the different crimes with which he has been charged, relative to poisoning the sick and wounded, ordering men to be interred before they were quite dead, not one has been authenticated; and they are probably not true, because it would be dangerous in an army to do any thing that would so alienate the affections of the soldiers from their general.

Besides, that the French soldiers, though capable of great excesses in their fury, have never been found wanting in humanity to the helpless, and those who were under misfortune.

On the other hand (religion out of the question), Frenchmen have often been heard not to deny, but to vindicate, the giving poison to men sick and wounded when beyond the hope of recovery, on the same principle that horses disabled by accident are put to death. This is a terrible doctrine, but where men have no religion, it is not easy to refute it; where they have, it is not necessary.

That Bonaparte had no religious principle is evident from his conduct in Egypt, which gives also one of the most complete pictures of an impostor and hypocrite that is to be found in history.

Though he had not forces sufficient to make any permanent conquest of Egypt, and by all that has since appeared, intended to sacrifice the army he had conducted there, he on his landing issued a proclamation, of which the following are extracts:—

"Soldiers! you are going to undertake a conquest, the effects of which, on the commerce and civilization of the world, are beyond the power of numbers to calculate.—You will give to England so sure and effectual a blow, that it may ere long be followed by the blow of death."

"We shall experience some fatiguing marches, and shall engage in several battles; we shall succeed in all our enterprises."

"The people here treat their women differently from us, but in every country he who violates the honour of a female is a monster."

"Pillage, which can enrich but a few, will dishonour us."

Thus in a style as if he held the destinies at his command, he told the soldiers they should succeed in every thing; and, as if he had forgot the pillage and violation of women he had permitted in Italy, he forbid both because the time was not yet come.

His treaty with the mufti and chiefs of Alexandria began just as if he had been the most religious Mussulman.

"Glory to God, to whom all glory is due, and the salutation of peace to the prophet Mahomet, his family, and the companions of his divine mission."

Then follow promises on the part of Bonaparte to respect the laws and institutions of the country, and to prevent his soldiers from disquieting the inhabitants.

This was certainly a sufficiently hypocritical commencement to one of the most cruel marauding expeditions that ever was undertaken.

When after fighting his way to Cairo, he arrived at Giza, he published a pacific address.

"Inhabitants of Cairo,—I am satisfied with your conduct. You have done well in not taking part against me. I am come to destroy the race of Mamelucs, to protect commerce, and the natives of the country: those who are afraid may be tranquil; those who have fled may return to their houses. Let prayer be continued as usual, and I wish it always to continue. Have no apprehensions for your families, your houses, your property, and above all, the religion of the prophet whom I honour and love."

All this was only to get a peaceable footing in a town of 300,000 inhabitants, where there was soon after a very cruel massacre of many of the inhabitants by this pacific friend and protector.

The visit to the pyramids is one of the highest specimens of hypocritical imposture that ever was witnessed.

When the army first encamped near those immense monuments of the former greatness of Egypt, he, in a theatrical style, apostrophized his soldiers—"From the height of these pyramids forty ages contemplate us."

Such theatrical and mystical farces had a great effect

on the French army, and shew that Bonaparte was a charlatan of the first order.

When he had entered the last vault in the pyramid, he seated himself on a large stone, desiring the muftis, imans, &c., to be seated also, when he began the following conversation:

BONAPARTE.—God is great, and his works are marvellous; but we have here a grand production of the hand of man. What was the object of him who caused this pyramid to be erected?"

SULEIMAN.—He was a powerful king of Egypt, who's name it is said was Cheops. He wished to prevent the sacrilegious from troubling the repose of his ashes.

BONAPARTE.—Cyrus the Great commanded that his body should be left in the open air, that it might return to the elements. Dost thou not think that better?

SULEIMAN.—(*inclining himself*)—Glory to God to whom all glory is due!

BONAPARTE.—Honour to Allah! Who was the calif that caused this pyramid to be opened, and thus troubled the ashes of the dead?

MUHAMED.—It is believed that it was Mahmoud the commander of the faithful, who reigned several centuries ago in Bagdat; but when the entrance was made into the chamber, they found written on the wall in letters of gold:

The impious shall commit iniquity without recompense, but not without remorse.

BONAPARTE.—The bread stolen by the wicked filleth his mouth with sand.

MUHAMED.—These are the words of wisdom—(*inclining himself.*)

BONAPARTE.—Glory to Allah! There is no other God but God: Mahomet is his prophet, and I am his friend.

After a long succession of farcical conversation of the same sort, Bonaparte left the pyramid to follow his marauding expedition.

Robbery and plunder were never accompanied before by such antic tricks, to impose upon mankind; and the greatest wonder is, that mankind did not long ago hold in abhorrence and contempt the man who could condescend to such meanness; for there is a mixture of unblushing impudence and meanness, of which any other man but Bonaparte would be unwilling to bear the shame, or would have condescended to be guilty: and nothing but a thorough contempt for the Frenchmen who accompanied him, could have permitted the scandalous exhibition.

That Bonaparte, who it is now well known never could remain at peace a month, might throw the blame of protracted hostility on England, and at the same time raise himself by treating as an equal the king of England, he was no sooner elevated to the consulship than he wrote the following letter:

"Bonaparte, first consul of the French Republic, to his majesty the king of Great Britain.

"Paris, 5 Nivose, 8th year of the Republic.

"Promoted by the desire of the French nation to the office of first magistrate of the Republic, I conceive it not improper to make this communication in a direct manner to your majesty.

"Must the war which, for four years past has ravaged every part of the world, be continued for ever? Are there no means to bring it to an issue?

"How is it possible for two of the most enlightened nations of Europe, whose powers and resources are greater than their safety and independence require, to sacrifice the benefits of commerce, interior prosperity, and individual

happiness, to ideas of vain greatness? can they not feel that peace is as glorious as it is necessary?

"These sentiments cannot be strange to your majesty's heart, reigning over a free people with no other view but to secure their happiness.

"Your majesty will be convinced that I am prompted to this overture by a sincere desire of contributing effectually to a general pacification, by some speedy remedy unembarrassed by forms which may be necessary to disguise the real situation of weak states, but which, between powerful nations, only prove their mutual intention to deceive.

"France and England unfortunately may still procrastinate for a long time the moment of absolute inability to proceed further; but I can venture to assert, that the fate of every civilized nation is dependant on the termination of a war which involves the whole world in its destructive vortex.

(Signed) "BONAPARTE."

Such was the catechizing style in which this great first consul wrote to our excellent king, whom he perhaps thought to deceive by his rough republican appearance of frankness. Unfortunately for his honour and good intentions, a letter from General Kleber in Egypt was intercepted by an English cruizer, and that despatch contained the instructions Bonaparte had left when he quitted Egypt, one part of which was desiring him to negotiate with the Turks and English *in order to gain time*. This was only useful as a positive evidence of the duplicity of Bonaparte, for neither the king nor his ministers would have been deceived by such a letter.

This conduct certainly requires no commentary: the only observation to be made is, that the style of the letter and the duplicity of the conduct are perfectly in character.

Some parts of Bonaparte's conduct to Spain that are as insidious, but not so well known or remembered, as his behaviour to the royal family of that kingdom, are worth recording here.

Previous to obtaining possession of the country, he got 16,000 of her best troops sent to fight for him in Germany. This method of weakening the regular forces was immediately followed by the entrance of French troops under pretence of marching through to attack Portugal: but they no sooner were in the country, than they seized on the fortresses, and declared all those should be treated as rebels who resisted. The manner in which the French obtained possession of Barcelona was peculiarly treacherous. On the 13th of February, about 10,000 French troops arrived in the neighbourhood of that city, which as their commander affirmed, were marching to Valencia, to which place he desired passports from the governor, requesting his troops might rest and refresh themselves a few days at Barcelona, should the governor grant permission. He agreed to his request; the gates of the city were thrown open to the French army; and the inhabitants received and treated them with the utmost kindness and hospitality. In three days the whole French army appeared on parade, prepared, and seemingly intending to march immediately. The inhabitants assembled to take leave of their friends, when to their astonishment the French army divided into two bodies, one of which marched to the citadel, of which they took immediate possession, and the other to Mountjoi, a fort on the top of the hill commanding the town. Here was a garrison of 6,000 Spaniards, whom the French ordered to surrender; to whom the commandant replied, that he must wait for the instructions of his government, but that the French troops in the mean time should be supplied with every accommodation. The French officer in-

sisted that his orders should be instantly executed, on which the Spaniards gave up the fort. Besides the army which got possession of Barcelona in this treacherous manner, the number of troops which entered Spain through Irun amounted to 71,789 infantry, and 10,104 cavalry.

It must really be admitted, that those who are admirers of the character of Bonaparte after such conduct, must be strangely blinded by his victories, or they must be very void of honourable principles. Here was a terrible concatenation of crime. He first obtains, as ally, the means of weakening the country—secondly, he introduces troops under a false pretence—thirdly, he seizes all the fortresses he is able without ceremony—and fourthly, Barcelona, too great and important not to be secured with every precaution, he got possession of by downright fraud and false promises. His criminality is even still greater than that shewn in regard to Venice and Sardinia, because Spain was an ally and a very obsequious one, and there was not even the shadow of a pretence for ill treating that nation or the royal family.

As some specimen of the real regard that Bonaparte had for men of letters, whom he flattered, and who pretended to idolize him, the change he operated on the formation of the National Institute may serve. This society originally consisted of three classes, each of which was again divided into sections; but he made the classes four in number, in which many of the former sections were united, a new class added, and two sections raised into classes. As nothing can be so hostile to the views of tyranny as those studies which lead to the investigation of the origin of power, the rights of man, the duties which the members of society owe to each other, and the means by which political knowledge may be both diffused and preserved; the section of political economy was banished along with those researches

which might prove inimical to the views of tyranny. Bonaparte always affected, at least, to be anxious for the improvement of the agriculture, commerce, and manufactures of France, so as to raise them above all other nations; and, therefore, political economy could only be proscribed by him for the same reason that all tyrants discourage that study.

It appeared by the letters intercepted in the course of the Egyption expedition, that Bonaparte had authorized General Kleber, in case any of the members of the commission of arts could be of use to him, *to put them in requisition without scruple*, instead of sending them back to France according to promise!

Judging from men in ordinary life, or such characters as have hitherto appeared, one would ask. Is this the order given by the lover of learning, and admirer of the fine arts, who, when at Milan, wrote the following letter to M. Oriani, who was invited to pay him a visit?

"The pursuits of knowledge, which do honour to the human understanding; the arts which adorn life, and hand down the memory of great exploits to posterity, must ever obtain respect in all free governments. All men of genius, all who hold a distinguished rank in the republic of letters, are Frenchmen, be they of what country they will. Men of learning in Milan have never obtained the regard they deserve; living retired in their studies and laboratories, they thought themselves fortunate if they were not persecuted by kings and priests; but this will be no more so; freedom of thought is naturalized in Italy, and it will allow no more inquisition, no more intolerance, no more despotism. I invite all men of letters to impart to me their ideas as to the method by which arts and knowledge may be revived. All learned men who choose to visit France, will be received by the government with the utmost regard. A great ma-

thematician, a celebrated painter, or a man of merit in any line, is a more valuable acquisition to France, than the richest conquest. I request that you will make these sentiments to be known in Milan, to all men of distinguished talents, or superior merit."

As a specimen of the style in which he treated kings, his address to his soldiers respecting the Neapolitan monarch, is a pretty fair one.

"Soldiers! for ten years I have done all I could to save the king of Naples; he has done every thing in his power to destroy himself. After the battles of Dego, Mondovi, and of Lodi, he could give me no effectual opposition. I placed confidence in the word of this prince, and I behaved with generosity towards him. When the second coalition was dissolved at Marengo, the king of Naples, who was the first to commence that unjust war, abandoned at Luneville by his allies, remained alone, and without protection. He solicited my pardon, and I forgave him a second time. A few weeks ago you were at the gates of Naples. I had sufficient reason to suspect the treachery which was intended, and to avenge the insults which I had received. Still I was generous. I acknowledged the neutrality of Naples—I ordered you to evacuate that kingdom, and for the third time the house of Naples was confirmed and saved.

"Shall we grant pardon for a fourth time, shall we for a fourth time place any confidence in a court without truth, honour, or common sense?—No! no! the Neapolitan dynasty has ceased to reign—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe, and the honour of our crown. Soldiers! march—drive into the sea, if they will wait your attack, these feeble battalions of the tyrants of the sea. Shew to the world the manner in which we punish the perjured. Lose no time in informing me, that the *whole* of Italy is subject

to my laws or those of my allies; that the finest country in the world is emancipated from the yoke of the most perfidious of men; that the sacredness of treaties is avenged; and that the *manes* of my brave soldiers, massacred in the ports of Sicily, on their return from Egypt, after having escaped from the dangers of the sea, the deserts, and a hundred battles are, at length, appeased. Soldiers! my brother will lead you on; he is the depository of my authority—he is in full possession of my confidence—let him have yours.

(Signed) "NAPOLEON."

The conduct to nations with which he had entered into solemn treaties, was not a degree better than to those where there was no sort of compact.

A single year had scarcely elapsed after the treaty of Luneville, till he found means to raise himself to the presidency of the Italian republic. A little after this, one of the Swiss cantons made part of the Republic of France. This paved the way for subduing the whole country by force of arms, and dictating that form of government which he thought proper, contrary to the express letter of the 11th article of the treaty of Luneville. In this the contracting parties had mutually guaranteed the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics, and the right of the inhabitants to establish that form of government which they respectively should think most suitable to their situation.—As a proof that he had already resolved on hostilities with Austria, whenever it might suit his purpose, when he reviewed his troops, he frequently put them in mind of Marengo and Hohenlinden, and told them that they must keep themselves in readiness for again covering themselves with glory. Accordingly he did not stop here. The president

of the Italian republic was soon proclaimed King of Italy; the republic of Genoa became a part of the French empire; and to shew how he was to maintain these strides of ambition, the *Moniteur* announced the formation of a camp at Marengo, and another at Castiglione. In the mean time, the only thing done by the emperor of Germany, to put himself on a footing with his opponent, was, to assume the title of *Hereditary* Emperor of Austria.

When the impetuosity and madness of Bonaparte, the fury of the French revolutionists, and the patience of oppressed nations, having made him tamely surrender at Fontainebleau, he still at the last made one of those theatrical exhibitions to which he had long been accustomed, and which he had so often practised.

When setting off he made the following address to the officers and soldiers of the old guard, probably having in view that fatal return to France that took place the following year.

"Brother soldiers! I bid you farewell. During the twenty years that we have acted together, I have been satisfied with you. I have always found you in the path of glory. All the powers of Europe have armed against me; a part of my generals have betrayed their duty; France herself has betrayed it. With your assistance, and that of the brave men who remained faithful to me, I have for three years preserved France from civil war. Be faithful to the new king whom France has chosen; be obedient to your commanders, and do not abandon your dear country. Pity not my fate; I shall be happy when I know you are so likewise. I might have died; nothing would have been more easy for me; but I still wish to pursue the path of glory. What we have done, I will write. I cannot embrace you all; but I will embrace your general.—Come, general. Let the eagle be brought

to me, that I may also embrace it. Ah, dear eagle, may the kisses which I bestow on you resound to posterity! Adieu, my children, Adieu, my brave companions! Once more encompass me." Then the staff formed a circle around him. Bonaparte now got into his carriage, at which moment he appeared confused, while the tears trickled down his cheeks.

In collecting these well-authenticated proofs of the want of honour, of true dignity, and the feelings which belong to a gentleman, (without which, no man, however exalted his rank, can be respectable), it must be admitted that the meanness with which princes, kings, emperors, and the pope himself, degraded their dignity, by stooping to flatter his vanity, and comply with his will are some excuse.

The Papal allocution delivered by his holiness in the secret consistory at Rome, after his return from crowning Bonaparte, was published at Paris, and is a fine specimen of degradation.

In the allocution the Pope explains to the cardinals his motives for his journey to Paris to be for the purpose of *decorating his dear son in Christ Napoleon, and his dear daughter in Christ Josephine, with the ensigns of imperial dignity!!*

The Pope tells how he was delighted at his first interview with the emperor at Fontainebleau. That emperor, whose fame extended to the extremities of the world, whom God had chosen to restore his true religion in France to its ancient splendour. That he had moreover enjoyed the pleasure of baptizing the prince Napoleon, the nephew of Bonaparte, who was presented by the emperor himself and his august mother at the holy font.

If ever degradation went further than this, history has been ashamed to record the disgraceful occurrence.

Bonaparte seems to have been perfectly sensible of the degradation of the man, and to have considered himself as being under no obligation on that account, for he soon after pulled the Pope from his high papal chair, and placed him in a French prison; there to ruminate at leisure on the gratitude of his BELOVED SON IN CHRIST, THE BOLD AND BRAVE NAPOLEON.

Twenty volumes might be filled with examples of the haughty pride and audacity displayed by Bonaparte and the crouching servility of those whom he insulted and oppressed, but the result could not lead to any more decided opinion than those that have been already given.

It is a comfort and a satisfaction to think, that this great hero who astonished the world, always was foiled in his attempts when he was opposed by British subjects, or by the British nation; and, it is a lesson that may be learned with advantage, that while that proud man trampled on those who bent before him, he, in the hour of peril and distress, threw himself on this country for protection.

THE END.

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